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This Article contrasts two theoretically distinct approaches to pursuing related
objectives of environmental protection: the public trust doctrine and the rights of
nature movement. It reviews the development of public trust and rights of nature
principles in both domestic and international legal contexts, and explores points of
theoretical commonality and contrast between the two, giving special attention to
the opposing systems of environmental ethics from which the anthropocentric public
trust and ecocentric rights of nature principles arise. The marked jurisdictional
variation associated with both approaches suggests their evolving and inchoate
nature as a guarantor of environmental rights. Moreover, both are especially
oriented toward the protection of waterways, suggesting the limitations of
conventional environmental law to provide adequate protection, and the resulting
resort to alternative means.
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After reviewing the historical origins of the public trust doctrine in Roman and
English common law, the article recounts its reception and development in U.S. law,
leading to extraordinary jurisdictional diversity along the axes of the resources to
which the trust applies, what values the trust protects, what mechanisms of law
vindicate trust principles, and diverging legal theories in different states about the
nature of the doctrine itself. It offers a snapshot of the diversity of the doctrine in
sample states of California, Idaho, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Colorado, Hawaii, and
Florida, and then reviews the state of public trust principles in nations beyond the
United States.
It then provides an overview of the rights of nature movement, both
internationally and domestically. It provides the first scholarly survey of major
rights of nature laws enacted throughout the world, and then reviews a series of local
rights of nature bills introduced and enacted in American municipalities and Native
American tribes, as well as judicial and legislative efforts to block them. It especially
focuses on unfolding disputes in Florida, where multiple local governments are
experimenting with rights of nature ordinances, and Orange County voters adopted
a Bill of Rights charter amendment to protect the local river system from extraction
in the same year that the state legislature statutorily preempted local rights of nature
ordinances from effect.
Finally, it compares and contrasts the two approaches, considering how these
diverging anthropocentric and biocentric frames of reference provide different
answers to basic questions of environmental management. It asks whether the
doctrines can provide mutual support or are destined to undermine one another. It
also considers the ways each model is used as a tool of political advocacy in
legislative and administrative contexts beyond litigation. Both partner failures in
litigation with more promising impacts in the political arena, where the motivating
ideas can become a galvanizing force for policy change. Indeed, the enormous
jurisdictional variation among both approaches—each a mosaic, rather than a
monolith—signals the extent to which they are still evolving, and may long remain
inchoate vessels of advocacy into which the champions of vulnerable environmental
values pour both their frustrations and their hopes.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article compares two theoretically distinct approaches to
pursuing related objectives of environmental protection: the public
trust doctrine and the rights of nature movement. Both legal strategies
are deployed to accomplish similar ends, especially regarding
waterways, but they are grounded in very different frameworks of
environmental ethics. The anthropocentric public trust doctrine, which
privileges human interests in pursuing environmental protection,
contrasts sharply against the ecocentric rights of nature movement,
which locates environmental rights directly in nature itself. It would
therefore seem that these approaches would operate very differently
(and perhaps one day they will), but the similarities in their present
stages of development are striking. The rights of nature is a much newer
legal strategy than the public trust, and the trust has a much broader
portfolio than simply its role in environmental protection—but as both
approaches develop and differentiate across jurisdictions, they are
evolving along a related set of legal axes, from the targets of their
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protection to the mechanisms of their implementation. This project
explores these important points of contrast and commonality as these
two approaches continue to evolve, both in the United States and
around the world. It provides a comprehensive review of the
development of public trust principles along distinct legal axes, and the
first major scholarly survey of rights of nature initiatives globally and
domestically.
Among the oldest doctrines of the common law, the public trust
doctrine creates a set of public rights and responsibilities with regard to
certain natural resources, especially waterways.1 The American
approach assigns states responsibility to manage natural resources for
the benefit of the public, but the doctrine has evolved along multiple
dimensions among the different U.S. states.2 Some extend doctrinal
protection from waterways to other resources, some extend doctrinal
protection from a limited set of navigation-related values to more
fulsome environmental values, and some locate public trust principles
in different areas of state law, including common law, statutory law, and
constitutional law.3 Different versions of public trust principles have
also appeared in legal systems throughout the world, including India,
South Africa, Pakistan, Kenya, Brazil, and the Philippines.4 The public
trust doctrine did not originate as a doctrine of environmental law, and
it protects many values of natural resource commons beyond
environmental values, but it has become an increasingly important
complement to conventional environmental regulation of natural
resource commons.5 Even so, similar environmental advocacy is
coalescing around an entirely different idea.
Just as the public trust has been increasingly deployed toward
environmentalism, the rights of nature movement has emerged as a
biocentric or ecocentric alternative. While the public trust doctrine
locates rights to environmental protection in the people who would
benefit, the rights of nature movement assigns rights directly to the
1 See generally Erin Ryan, A Short History of the Public Trust Doctrine and Its Intersection
with Private Water Law, 38 VA. ENV’T L.J. 135 (2020) [hereinafter Ryan, A Short History]; Erin
Ryan, From Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust: Navigating the Public and Private Interests in
Public Trust Resource Commons, 10 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENV’T L. 39 (2019); Erin Ryan, The
Public Trust Doctrine, Private Water Allocation, and Mono Lake: The Historic Saga of National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 45 ENV’T L. 561 (2015) [hereinafter Ryan, The Historic Saga].
See also ERIN RYAN, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, PRIVATE RIGHTS IN WATER, AND THE MONO
LAKE STORY (forthcoming 2022).
2 See infra Section I.B.
3 See id.
4 See infra Section I.D.
5 See infra Section I.C–I.D.
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natural systems designated for protection. For example, New Zealand
law implements an indigenous Māori principle that confers rights to
protection for parks, rivers, and mountains in and of themselves,6 and
Ecuador has instantiated rights of nature principles directly into its
constitution.7 Bolivia continues to campaign for universal recognition
of the rights of nature by the United Nations.8 Even in the United States,
local rights of nature ordinances have been enacted coast to coast, from
California to Florida, and many places in between, including
midwestern efforts to protect the Great Lakes and nationwide tribal
initiatives.9 Following competing acts of state and local lawmaking in
2020, Floridians are battling over conflicts between multiple rights of
nature initiatives to protect river resources and state legislative efforts
to preempt them.10
This Article explores these two approaches to environmental
protection, contrasting their shared goals with the fundamentally
different frames of reference from which they begin. Drawing from an
array of public trust and rights of nature examples operating both
domestically and internationally, we consider the distinct legal axes on
which both approaches are separately differentiating as they evolve
across jurisdictional lines. We then consider the opposing systems of
underlying environmental ethics from which they begin—the inherent
anthropocentrism that underlies the public trust doctrine, and the
unapologetic biocentrism or ecocentrism that underlies the rights of
nature approach.11 We conclude with consideration of the relative
advantages and challenges of each approach, including the vulnerability
of anthropocentric ethics to short-sighted human capriciousness and
the uncertainty of who speaks for nature when determining what
honoring the rights of nature requires.
Indeed, environmental advocates will struggle to determine which
approach is better in their own legal contexts, as both approaches are
problematic in different ways. The public trust doctrine constrains
short-term exploitation of natural resources to protect the public—but
people can be notoriously fickle. As Professor Richard Lazarus warned
after its modern ascent during the 1980s, the public trust doctrine is a
dangerous foundation for environmental protection because it locates
See infra Section II.C.2.a.
See infra Section II.C.1.a.
8 See infra Section II.C.1.b.
9 See infra Section II.D.
10 See infra Section II.D.4.
11 See infra Section III.A.2 (discussing the difference between biocentric and ecocentric
ethics).
6
7

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3841825

7_RYAN.CURRY.RULE.42.6.7.DONE.docx (Do Not Delete)

2454

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

10/9/21 12:22 AM

[Vol. 42:6

its moral authority in the public interest, and people can always
reprioritize their needs, especially under conditions of economic
stress.12 Sometimes, people will sacrifice economic development to
protect nature, and other times they will “pave[] paradise, put up a
parking lot.”13
The biocentric rights of nature approach seemingly resolves that
issue squarely on the side of environmental protection, without
privileging human interests over other components of the protected
ecosystem.14 It prioritizes environmental protection regardless of
whether the general public has shifted its attention. Nevertheless, there
remains the unsettled question of who speaks for nature in biocentric
decision-making, when that which is targeted for protection cannot
speak for itself.15 It can be especially hard to know who best represents
the interests of nature when different human advocates make
competing claims—for example, in favor of solar farms or desert
habitat.16
In the end, which is better probably depends on the specific ends
to which each is deployed. It may be that the question is simply a matter
of path dependency on prior legal concepts; the similarity between each
model and the legal culture in which it is deployed may be the most
determinative reason that advocates would follow one approach or the
other, as well as the best predictor of its success.17 But it is also important
to recognize the ways in which both models are used as tools of political
advocacy in coordination with litigation. Both approaches partner
notable failures in litigation with more promising impacts in the
political arena, where the underlying ideals become a galvanizing force
12 Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 715–16 (1986). Instead of
trusting the public trust doctrine as a source of environmental protection, Lazarus advocated for
a stewardship approach to public commons protection modeled after the federal environmental
statutes of the 1970s, such as the Clean Air and Water Acts and the Endangered Species Act. Id.
at 675–77.
13 JONI MITCHELL, Big Yellow Taxi, on LADIES OF THE CANYON (Reprise Recs. 1970).
14 See infra Section III.A.2.
15 See infra Section III.C.4. This problem has been recognized in the United States at least
since its original presentation to the United States Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972), where the Supreme Court confined legal standing to raise legal claims only to
persons, and not to natural systems. See infra Section II.A.2.
16 Sammy Roth, Study: California Solar Farms Threaten Desert Species, DESERT SUN (Oct. 20,
2015, 11:55 AM), https://www.desertsun.com/story/tech/science/energy/2015/10/19/studycalifornia-solar-farms-threaten-desert-species/74233862
[https://perma.cc/H9PK-27AJ]
(“Large-scale solar development threatens natural ecosystems across California’s deserts,
according to a new study.”).
17 See infra Section III.C.4.
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for policy change.18 Both approaches speak especially powerfully to
waterways—likely indicating the extent to which water resources are
under-protected by conventional environmental law—but they ask for
materially different forms of relief, with different legal implications for
the future.19 Even so, the enormous jurisdictional variation associated
with each approach signals the extent to which both are still evolving,
and may long remain inchoate vessels of advocacy into which the
champions of vulnerable environmental values pour their unique hopes
and frustrations.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides an overview of the
public trust doctrine and its basic legal tenets. After reviewing its
historical origins in Roman and English common law, Part I recounts
its acceptance and development in U.S. law, leading to extraordinary
jurisdictional diversity along the axes of the resources to which the trust
applies, what values the trust protects, what mechanisms of law
vindicate trust principles, and different legal theories in different states
about the nature of the doctrine itself. Part I offers a snapshot of the
diversity of the doctrine in such sample states as California, Idaho,
Pennsylvania, Michigan, Colorado, Hawaii, and Florida, and then
reviews the state of public trust principles in nations beyond the United
States.
Part II provides an overview of the rights of nature movement,
both internationally and domestically. It provides the first scholarly
survey of major rights of nature laws enacted throughout the world, and
then reviews a series of local rights of nature bills introduced and
enacted in American municipalities and Native American tribes, as well
as judicial and legislative efforts to block them. Part II gives special
attention to the unfolding dispute in the State of Florida, where multiple
local governments are experimenting with rights of nature ordinances.
In early 2021, Orange County passed a Bill of Rights ordinance
protecting a local river system from extraction just as the Florida State
Legislature statutorily preempted any rights of nature ordinances from
taking effect.
Part III compares and contrasts the two approaches, focusing on
the different environmental ethical frameworks from which each
begins. It reviews the anthropocentrism behind the public trust doctrine
and explores its prevalence in U.S. law, and then contrasts it with the
biocentrism that underlies the rights of nature movement and its
comparative paucity in U.S. law. It considers how these different ethical

18
19

See infra Section III.C.4.
See infra Section III.A.
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frames of reference provide different answers to basic questions of
environmental management, using the example of the unfolding
Florida rights of nature debate for context. Noting the focus on both
doctrines on protecting waterways, it considers whether the two could
provide mutual support, or whether they are destined to undermine one
another. Finally, it considers which approach is most likely to bear fruit,
and the significant role that each approach plays in the political contexts
that include but exceed the litigation in which they are invoked. It
suggests that path dependence in the overall legal context may be the
most determinative indicator of success, but also considers whether
there is value to be had in regulatory redundancy between the two—
perhaps even a paradoxical system of environmental checks and
balances.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

By the law of nature these things are common to mankind—the
air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the
sea.20

Among the oldest doctrines of the common law tradition, the
public trust doctrine and associated legal principles provide that the
state holds certain natural resource commons in trust for the public
benefit, especially waterways.21 Every American state and many other
nations have adopted some version of the doctrine,22 which has evolved
considerably across these different jurisdictions to showcase notable
geographical variation today. The development of the public trust has
received both support23 and critique24 by legal scholars observing its

20 THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 2.1.1 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., Longmans, Green, &
Co. 4th ed. 1869).
21 See generally Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1.
22 See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines:
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PA. ST. ENV’T L. REV. 1 (2007)
[hereinafter Craig, Eastern Public Trust Doctrines] (comparing eastern states’ public trust
doctrines); Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust
Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37
ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010) [hereinafter Craig, Western Public Trust Doctrines] (comparing western
states’ public trust doctrines); Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the
Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling the
Saxion Vision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 741, 760 (2012) (reviewing the adoption of public trust
principles internationally).
23 See Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 141 n.19.
24 Id. at 141 n.20.
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gradual transformation from an anti-monopoly doctrine of sovereign
authority to one of sovereign responsibility to also protect
environmental values.25 Some have lauded the evolution of the doctrine
from merely guaranteeing continued public access to also protecting
trust resources from degradation by overuse.26 Others suggest that it
unduly limits private property rights, compromises the separation of
powers, or displaces more effective means of protecting environmental
values.27 Summarizing previously published work on its historical
development,28 this Part offers a brief account of the doctrine’s
historical roots in early Roman and English law before reviewing its
historical development in the United States and abroad. It considers the
surprisingly diverse array of axes along which the modern public trust
doctrine has developed in different states, applying to different
resources, protecting different values, and operating through different
legal mechanisms. It then reviews three modern examples in which the
doctrine was framed explicitly to protect environmental rights and
concludes with a sampling of the public trust principles currently in
operation internationally.
A.

The Public Trust Doctrine from Early Roman and English Law to
the United States

Most accounts of the public trust doctrine trace its roots back to
ancient Rome.29 In the sixth century, Byzantine Emperor Justinian I
recorded public trust principles in his codification of imperial Roman
common law in the Institutes of Justinian,30 famously defining the jus
publicum principle of common ownership of natural resources: “By the
law of nature these things are common to mankind—the air, running

Id. at 141 n.19 (see especially work by Michael Blumm and Mary Christina Wood).
Id. at 141 n.20 (see especially work by Barton Thompson (critiquing the doctrine’s impact
on property rights), James Huffman (arguing that the doctrine encourages judicial encroachment
on the legislature), and Richard Lazarus (providing an environmental critique of the doctrine)).
27 See id.; see also Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 1, at 617–22.
28 See generally Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1.
29 See id. at 140–43. While the conventional account has been repeatedly stated by the U.S.
Supreme Court and the majority of relevant scholarship, a handful of scholars have questioned
it. See id. at 146–49 (discussing work by James Huffman, J.B. Ruhl and Tom McGinn, and Bruce
Frier).
30 H.F. JOLOWICZ & BARRY NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
ROMAN LAW 492–93 (3d ed. 1972).
25
26
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water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea.”31 These
principles were received from Roman common law into early English
law, appearing as early as the 1215 Magna Carta,32 the progenitor of
western democracy and constitutional law,33 and its 1217 addendum,
the Charter of the Forest.34 The original Magna Carta protected public
rights to fishing and navigation on major navigable waters “throughout
the whole of England,”35 and the Forest Charter guaranteed public
access to certain undeveloped sovereign lands for grazing, forage,
agriculture, and lumber.36 The doctrine also appeared in early English
common law, which affirmed sovereign ownership of submerged
tidelands for public use and enjoyment.37
The public trust doctrine was first recognized in the United States
during the early 1800s, making its first appearances in state courts. In
an 1821 dispute about the ownership of submerged oyster beds, Arnold
v. Mundy, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed that the land beneath
navigable waterways is common property, and that landward
proprietors have no more power than the English crown to convert
them into private property:
31 THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 2.1.1 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., Longmans, Green, &
Co. 4th ed. 1869).
32 THE MAGNA CARTA OF 1215, ch. 33, https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/magna-carta1215?shelfitemviewer=1 [https://perma.cc/S24G-JAUG]; see also Ryan, A Short History, supra
note 1, at 143–45 (discussing the appearance of public trust principles in the Magna Carta and
Forest Charter).
33 See
Doris
Mary
Stenton, Magna
Carta,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Magna-Carta (last updated Feb. 11, 2021) [https://perma.cc/
4QU4-ZK5B].
34 THE MAGNA CARTA OF 1217, ch. 12; see also Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 143–
45.
35 THE MAGNA CARTA OF 1215, ch. 33, https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/magna-carta1215?shelfitemviewer=1 [https://perma.cc/S24G-JAUG]; see also Michael C. Blumm & Courtney
Engel, Proprietary and Sovereign Public Trust Obligations: From Justinian and Hale to Lamprey
and Oswego Lake, 43 VT. L. REV. 1, 7 (2018).
36 THE MAGNA CARTA OF 1217, ch. 12; John Langton & Graham Jones, The Charter of the
Forest of King Henry III, FORESTS & CHASES OF ENG. & WALES C. 1000 TO C. 1850,
http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/forests/Carta.htm [https://perma.cc/S76D-7WER] (discussing public
rights of access to public commons protected under the Forest Charter); see also Sarah Nield, The
New Forest: Ancient Forest and Modern Playground, in 2 MODERN STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW
287, 294 (Elizabeth Cooke ed. 2003); Anne Bottomley, Beneath the City: The Forest! Civic
Commons as Practice and Critique, 5 BIRKBECK L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2018); Nicholas A. Robinson, The
Public Trust Doctrine in the 21st Century, 10 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENV’T L. 83, 84–87 (2020).
37 The Case of the Royal Fishery of Banne (1610) 80 Eng. Rep. 540, 543 (KB); MATTHEW
HALE, A TREATISE DE JURE MARIS ET BRACHIORUM EJUSDEM, reprinted in STUART A. MOORE, A
HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO 370, 371–72 (3d ed. 1888)
(describing public rights in different kinds of submerged lands); see also Ryan, A Short History,
supra note 1, at 145.
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The sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot, consistently with
the principles of the law of nature and the constitution of a well
ordered society, make a direct and absolute grant of the waters
of the state, divesting all the citizens of their common right. It
would be a grievance which never could be long borne by a free
people.38

In 1842, the U.S. Supreme Court provided a similar account of the
public trust doctrine in Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, affirming the
sovereign ownership of navigable waters and their submerged resources
and the presence of the doctrine in English law as far back as the Magna
Carta.39 Some fifty years later, in 1894, the Supreme Court formally
ratified the public trust doctrine in Shively v. Bowlby, holding that all
submerged lands below the mean high-water mark in all U.S. lands are
held in trust by the state for the benefit of the public.40
Around the same time, in the canonical case of Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. Illinois, the U.S. Supreme Court demonstrated the force
of the doctrine in constraining state authority to manage trust resources
for the public benefit and in providing citizens with a judicial remedy
for violations of the trust.41 In affirming that the state legislature could
not transfer ownership of the bed of Chicago Harbor to a private
railroad company, the Court emphasized that the government holds
trust resources in trust for the public:
[T]he State holds the title to the lands under the navigable
waters. . . . in trust for the people of the State that they may
enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over

38 Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 71–72, 78 (N.J. 1821) (referencing Justinian’s characterization
of “the air, the running water, the sea, the fish, and the wild beasts” as common property and
holding that title to these remained in the sovereign, to “be held, protected, and regulated for the
common use and benefit”); see also Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 150–51.
39 Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 416–18 (1842); see also Ryan, A Short
History, supra note 1, at 152–53.
40 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 53–54 (1894). The dispute revolved around the submerged
lands below a state-sanctioned wharf of the Columbia River in Oregon, and the defendant
claimed that he owned the submerged lands because the U.S. Congress had granted title to the
original claimant before Oregon became a state. Id. at 8–9. The Court found the original grant
did not include the submerged lands under the principles of English and American common law,
in which the English King had held lands for the benefit of the public, that after the American
Revolution those same rights went to the thirteen colonies, and that all American submerged
land acquired by whatever means after the Revolution would be subject to the same public trust
limitations. Id. at 14–15, 48–49, 57–58; see also Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 155–60.
41 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
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them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the
obstruction or interference of private parties.42

Analogizing to the responsibility of the trustee in a conventional
property law trust, the case demonstrated that the government does not
own public trust resources in the same proprietary way that it owns
other public property.43 With very circumscribed exceptions,44 the state
may not alienate or destroy trust resources.45 The doctrine, therefore,
creates a judicial remedy—one of the earliest examples of a citizen-suit
cause of action—by which ordinary people may hold the state
accountable for failure to maintain trust resources.46 In this way, the
Illinois Central case marks an important moment in the public trust
doctrine’s gradual transition from a doctrine conferring sovereign
authority over trust resources to one that also imposes sovereign
responsibilities over trust resources, rendering the doctrine both a grant
and a limit of sovereign authority on the same resources.47
Illinois Central has become a lodestar development of the common
law public trust,48 and today, the common law in nearly every U.S. state
offers meaningful protection of navigable waterways as public
commons and for public access.49 Some states expand trust protections
Id.
See, e.g., Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past & Charting
Its Future, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 667 (2012) (“Simply stated, however, the doctrine provides
that certain natural resources are held by the government in a special status—in ‘trust’—for
current and future generations.”).
44 See, e.g., Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453 (approving limited dispositions of trust resources to
private parties to improve navigation or when discrete parcels can be disposed of without
impairing the public interest in the remaining trust resource); see also Michael C. Blumm, The
Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property: The Accommodation Principle, 27 PACE ENV’T L. REV.
649, 660–62 (2010) (discussing the Illinois Central exception, “authoriz[ing] privatization of trust
resources when 1) the conveyance furthered public purposes, and 2) there was no substantial
effect on remaining trust resources”).
45 Frank, supra note 43, at 667 (“Government officials may neither alienate those resources
into private ownership nor permit their injury or destruction.”).
46 See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 473 (1970) (describing how citizens have brought lawsuits to
enforce the trust obligations of the state).
47 See Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 138, 160, 176–80, 205.
48 See, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust
Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 802–03 (2004)
(outlining the history of the case in light of its importance in modern public trust theory); see
also Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 160–66.
49 See generally Craig, Eastern Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 22 (comparing eastern
states’ public trust doctrines); Craig, Western Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 22 (comparing
western states’ public trust doctrines); ALEXANDRA B. KLASS & LING-YEE HUANG, CTR. FOR
42
43
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from waterways to other resources, such as the New Jersey doctrine
protecting not only access to navigable waters but public rights of
passage over dry sand beaches as needed to reasonably access coastal
waters.50 Even today, the doctrine continues to develop independently
among the different states, as reviewed in the Section that follows.
B.

The Evolution of the American Public Trust Across Multiple Axes

In the century and a third since Illinois Central was decided, the
American public trust doctrine has become notably differentiated
among the states, with different versions protecting different resources
and values to different degrees and even through different legal
mechanisms.51 Some states apply the doctrine to only waterways, while
others expand the resources protected by the trust to include wildlife,
beach access, other natural and cultural resources, and perhaps even
atmospheric resources. Different trust values are protected in different
states, some of which protect only the traditional fishing, swimming,
and navigational values, while others add environmental, recreational,
and cultural values. In some states, the doctrine primarily operates
through common law, while others have incorporated public trust
principles into state statutory, regulatory, and constitutional law.
Given so much variety, the public trust doctrine can be considered
something of a genus from which countless differentiated species have
evolved, all with a common ancestor. It would not be accurate today to
say that every state’s public trust doctrine serves as a guarantor of
environmental rights. However, there are increasing examples in which
the doctrine has been reframed as such. The question is how far that
legal evolution of the doctrine will go. This Section reviews the different
axes along which the trust has developed in different states, and, in so
PROGRESSIVE REFORM, RESTORING THE TRUST: WATER RESOURCES AND THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE, A MANUAL FOR ADVOCATES 21–24 (2009) (comparing the sources of various states’
Public Trust doctrines); THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN 45 STATES (Michael C. Blumm ed.
2014) [hereinafter 45 STATES] (analyzing the public trust doctrines of 45 states); CTR. FOR
PROGRESSIVE REFORM, RESTORING THE TRUST: AN INDEX OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND CASES ON WATER RESOURCES AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
(2009) [hereinafter RESTORING THE TRUST: AN INDEX].
50 See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 363 (N.J. 1984) (“In
order to exercise these rights guaranteed by the public trust doctrine, the public must have access
to municipally-owned dry sand areas as well as the foreshore. The extension of the public trust
doctrine to include municipally-owned dry sand areas was necessitated by our conclusion that
enjoyment of rights in the foreshore is inseparable from use of dry sand beaches.”).
51 See, e.g., KLASS & HUANG, supra note 49, at 21–24 (describing the differentiation of the
public trust doctrine along constitutional and statutory lines).
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doing, provides a snapshot of very different versions of modern
doctrine in five different regions of the United States: Hawaii, Colorado,
California, Florida, and Idaho.
1.

Vindicating Public Trust Principles Through Different Forms of
Law

The public trust doctrine operates through a variety of different
legal mechanisms among the several states. The common law doctrine
is the undeniable progenitor of public trust principles in the United
States, as recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in cases like Pollard v.
Hagan, Illinois Central, and Shively v. Bowlby.52 Since then, however,
public trust principles have been adopted in various state statutes and
even ratified in state constitutions, sometimes working with the
common law doctrines and sometimes displacing them.53 Perhaps for
this reason more than any other, there is no single public trust doctrine
in the United States. Many are developing along entirely different lines
of legal evolution, in these different mechanisms of law.
Today, very few states operate from a purely common law version
of the public trust doctrine, unaccompanied by additional statutory,
regulatory, or constitutional directives or counterparts, but in some, the
common law plays a relatively more important role than others.
Massachusetts, for example, maintains a fairly traditional common law
doctrine, protecting traditional values of navigation, fishing, and
swimming, mostly through judicial enforcement and elaboration.54
Massachusetts courts have steadfastly enforced historic jus publicum
encumbrances for public navigation and fishing.55 The political
branches are statutorily authorized to enforce public access to trust
resources, but their performance remains subject to public oversight

52 See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 53–54 (1894); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387
(1892); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
53 See Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 167–70; Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust
Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 714
(2006).
54 Butler v. Att’y Gen., 80 N.E. 688, 689 (Mass. 1907) (“In the seashore the entire property,
under the colonial ordinance, is in the individual, subject to the public rights. . . . of navigation,
with such incidental rights as pertain thereto. We think that there is a right to swim or float in or
upon public waters as well as to sail upon them.”); Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.)
53, 91–93 (Mass. 1851).
55 Arno v. Commonwealth, 931 N.E.2d 1, 16–18 (Mass. 2010) (holding registration of
certificate of title proceedings could not divest the public of its rights in tidelands).
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through the judicial system.56 The state’s highest court has held that the
legislature must act as a “fiduciary for the public”57 to ensure that public
trust encumbrances on submerged lands remain acknowledged and
open for use for designated trust purposes.58 The legislature has
statutorily delegated much of its public trust authority to state
administrative agencies, but these decisions remain subject to judicial
review.59 Even legislative determinations regarding public trust grants,
uses, and purposes are reviewable by the Massachusetts courts.60
In a few states, the public trust doctrine has been formally
constitutionalized, shifting vindication of public trust principles from
the common law to the constitution and the statutes it authorizes. For
example, in Pennsylvania, the Environmental Rights Amendment to the
Constitution has become the central locus for public trust protection of
environmental values, promising:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the
environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the
common property of all the people, including generations yet to
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.61

Alger, 61 Mass. at 91–93.
Arno, 931 N.E.2d at 14 (holding registration of certificate of title proceedings could not
divest the public of its rights in tidelands).
58 Bos. Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 358–59, 367 (Mass. 1979)
(“We therefore hold that the [Boston Waterfront Development Corporation] has title to its
property in fee simple, but subject to the condition subsequent that it be used for the public
purpose for which it was granted.” This was a rejection of the longstanding precedent that the
legislature possessed the power to convent submerged land free from the public trust because the
jus publicum, the jus privatum, and all of Parliament’s rights of regulation had devolved upon the
state at the time of the Revolution.); accord United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120,
124–25 (D. Mass. 1981) (holding that the United States could take property below low-water
mark in “full fee simple,” however, the federal government was restricted in its ability to abdicate
to private individuals its sovereign public trust in land). But see Op. of the Justs. to the Senate,
424 N.E.2d 1092, 1100, 1107 (Mass. 1981) (upheld, as a general proposition, the legislature’s
power to free land from the public trust and stated the two-thirds voting requirement applies to
the disposition of all lands and easements taken or acquired for the stated purposes, regardless
of when they were taken or acquired).
59 Op. of the Justs. to the Senate, 424 N.E.2d at 1105.
60 Id. at 1101 (“The question whether a particular legislative act, or an administrative decision
pursuant to statutory authorization, serves a public purpose is for the Legislature to determine,
and, although that legislative determination is entitled to great deference, it is not wholly beyond
judicial scrutiny.”); Brian Sheets, The Public Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts, in 45 STATES, supra
note 49, at 364.
61 PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; see also Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 167–68; infra notes
158–59.
56
57
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In other states, the common law trust has been flanked by related
principles in constitutional and statutory law, but all remain robust
sources of public trust protection. For example, the public trust plays
an important role in the common law, constitution, and statutory laws
of Hawaii. The Hawaiian Constitution guarantees that “[a]ll public
natural resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the
people.”62
Similarly, California has adopted public trust principles in its
constitution, statutes, and regulatory law, in addition to its robust
common law trust. Article Ten of the California Constitution codifies
the doctrine in relation to water resources, including the sovereign
ownership doctrine as it applies to tidelands63 and rights of public access
to all navigable waters.64 The doctrine also appears in several sections of
the California Water Code.65 Section 102 states that “[a]ll water within
the State is the property of the people of the State,”66 Section 104 deems
the state responsible for determining how the state’s water will be
used,67 and Section 1201 affirms that all unappropriated water is to be
“public water of the State.”68 The California State Water Resources
Control Board (SWRCB) has also cited the public trust doctrine in its

HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
CAL. CONST. art. X, § 3 (noting that “[a]ll tidelands within two miles of any incorporated
city, city and county, or town in this State, and fronting on the water of any harbor, estuary, bay,
or inlet used for the purposes of navigation, shall be withheld from grant or sale to private
persons, partnerships, or corporations” with legislatively constrained exceptions as needed to
protect the public interest).
64 Id. § 4 (“No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or possessing the frontage or
tidal lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or other navigable water in this State, shall be permitted
to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is required for any public purpose, nor to
destroy or obstruct the free navigation of such water; and the Legislature shall enact such laws as
will give the most liberal construction to this provision, so that access to the navigable waters of
this State shall be always attainable for the people thereof.”).
65 RESTORING THE TRUST: AN INDEX, supra note 49, at 6; CAL. WATER CODE §§ 102, 104,
1201 (West 1943).
66 CAL. WATER CODE § 102.
67 Id. § 104.
68 Id. § 1201.
62
63
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decisions,69 albeit sometimes cursorily70 and not always to prioritize
environmental values.71 Nevertheless, the most important California
public trust developments have taken place judicially, by courts
interpreting the common law doctrine, in such cases as the National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court “Mono Lake” case,72 discussed below
in Section I.C.1.
In Florida, the doctrine developed under the common law until it
was codified in Article 10, Section 11 of the Florida Constitution, which
states that “[t]he title to lands under navigable waters . . . is held by the
state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for all the people.”73 Early in
Florida’s history, the Florida Supreme Court had observed that the
public trust doctrine protected the “use and enjoyment” of Florida’s
trust resources for “navigation and fishing and other implied
purposes.”74 Over time, those uses were expanded through conventional
common law processes to include navigation, commerce, fishing,
swimming, and sunbathing.75 More recently, the doctrine has been
invoked as a defense to takings claims.76 Since constitutional
69 For a few examples of regulatory rulings, see CAL. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, STATE WATER
RES. CONTROL BD., ORD. WR 2009-0015 (Mar. 17, 2009), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/
waterrights/board_decisions/adopted_orders/orders/2009/wro2009_0015.pdf [https://perma.cc/
45DE-H8EB] (requiring bypass flows “[f]or the protection of fish, wildlife, and public trust
resources”); CAL. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., Div. Decision 20100001, at 7–11 (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/
programs/applications/division_decisions/2010/dd2010_0001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2L53CPJT] (citing the doctrine while rejecting a revised water rights permit and while inciting the
early stages of a dam removal); CAL. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD.,
ORD. WR 2007-0032-DWR, at 3–5 (Oct. 9, 2007), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/
board_decisions/adopted_orders/orders/2007/wro2007_0032_dwr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
7MMY-N663] (citing the doctrine as a reason for denying a temporary urgency change permit);
CAL. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., ORD. WR 2004-0040-DWR, at 5–
6 (Sept. 17, 2004), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/board_decisions/adopted_orders/
orders/2004/wro2004_0040.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QFB-FNA7] (citing an impact on public trust
resources as a reason for denial).
70 Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Administrative State,
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099, 1130 n.186, 1132 n.192 (2012) (noting that the SWRCB occasionally
makes what appear to be “boilerplate” references to public trust principles).
71 Id. at 1133–34.
72 See generally Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
73 FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11.
74 State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 13 So. 640, 648 (Fla. 1893).
75 White v. Hughes, 190 So. 446, 448–51 (Fla. 1939); Adams v. Elliot, 174 So. 731, 734 (Fla.
1937).
76 For example, in Krieter v. Chiles a riparian property owner brought a takings claim after
being denied a permit to build a dock on sovereign submerged lands. Krieter v. Chiles, 595 So.
2d 111, 112 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). The court held that the riparian owner’s rights were subject to
the public’s interests and could not constitute a taking. Id. at 113.
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codification, however, the development of the doctrine seems to have
slowed. Statutorily, public-trust-like principles are also included in the
state’s “public interest” criterion for approving uses of water
resources.77
In other states, the common law trust principles have been codified
without explicit language in the constitution. Public trust principles
have been codified into Minnesota statutes, and, as these statutes have
become the more important avenue for the protection of public trust
values, the development of the common law trust has become less
salient.78 There is a lack of case law in Minnesota protecting natural
resources;79 in its place, the state enacted the Minnesota Environmental
Rights Act (MERA) in 1971, which gives “any private party, state, or
local government the right to sue for declaratory or injunctive relief to
protect air, water, land, or other natural resources from pollution,
impairment, or destruction.”80 Minnesota’s doctrine relies largely on
statutory and constitutional bases. Idaho’s public trust doctrine exists
in common law and statutory law, without a clear presence in the
constitution.81 The Nevada public trust doctrine appears in both
common law and state statute but does not explicitly appear in the state
constitution.82 However, even though the public trust doctrine does not
appear directly in the Nevada Constitution, the Supreme Court of
Nevada has interpreted the common law doctrine as an implied
constitutional limit on sovereign authority, blurring the boundary
between common law and constitutional law.83

FLA. STAT. § 373.223 (2016).
Alexandra B. Klass, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Shadow of State Environmental Rights
Laws: A Case Study, 45 ENV’T L. 431, 431 (2015) (noting that Minnesota environmental statutes
have channeled litigation into statutory claims instead of common law public trust doctrine
claims).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 433–34.
81 See infra notes 137–44; see also Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 197–99.
82 Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 612–14 (Nev. 2011) (citing State v. Bunkowski, 503
P.2d 1231, 1234 (Nev. 1972)); NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025 (1913) (“The water of all sources of
water supply within the boundaries of the State whether above or beneath the surface of the
ground, belongs to the public.”).
83 See Mineral Cnty. v. Lyon Cnty., 473 P.3d 418, 423–26 (Nev. 2020); see also Ryan, A Short
History, supra note 1, at 199–204 (discussing recent developments in Nevada); Lawrence, 254
P.3d at 612 (interpreting the gift clause of the state constitution to constrain legislative alienation
of trust lands).
77
78
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Different Resources Protected by the Doctrine

Different states’ public trust doctrines protect different resources,
although the common core of all of them remains navigable waterways.
For example, South Carolina statutorily defines navigable waters and
the physical extent of the public rights in general waters and tidal
waters.84 In Louisiana, “running waters, the waters and bottoms of
natural navigable water bodies, the territorial sea, and the seashore” are
deemed “public things,”85 and the state has also been deemed to own
the “bayous, rivers, streams, lagoons, lakes and bays, and the beds
thereof, not under the direct ownership of any person on August 12,
1910.”86 New Jersey strongly applies the public trust doctrine to its
waterways and, notably, erases the navigability requirement, applying
the trust to all water resources in the state, including surface, ground,
and drinking water.87 Of note, New Jersey also extends the public access
rights implied by the public trust from submerged lands, as in most
states, even to privately held dry sand beaches as needed to afford the
public reasonable access to submerged public trust lands.88
In Massachusetts, the doctrine has also been extended beyond
traditional coastal assets to also protect acquired public lands89 and even
federal lands.90 That said, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
has passed on the opportunity to link the public trust to rights to
recreational activities in navigable waters,91 or to protect public access
to beaches,92 departing from the trajectory taken by other states with

84 S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-1-10 (1976). It is significant that case law protects access to navigable
water whether or not there is a clearly defined public interest because of the amount of
marshlands, intercoastal waterways, and shore that are protected under the specialized version
of the trust. South Carolina ex rel. Medlock v. S.C. Coastal Council, 346 S.E.2d 716, 719 (S.C.
1986); Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 22, at 751–52.
85 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 450 (1978).
86 LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:1101 (1954).
87 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:11A-3(g) (West 1977); Mayor of Clifton v. Passaic Valley Water
Comm’n, 557 A.2d 299 (N.J. 1989); see also RESTORING THE TRUST: AN INDEX, supra note 49, at
15 nn.149–53 (discussing the New Jersey doctrine).
88 Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 51 (N.J. 1972).
89 See Gould v. Greylock Rsrv. Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 124–25 (Mass. 1966).
90 See United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124–25 (D. Mass. 1981).
91 See Fafard v. Conservation Comm’n of Barnstable, 733 N.E.2d 66, 76 (Mass. 2000) (passing
on recreational values).
92 Op. of the Justs. to the House of Representatives, 313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 1974) (rejecting
beach access).
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strong public trust protections like New Jersey and California.93 Indeed,
the court has used its interpretive discretion to limit the further
development of trust values by both judicial and legislative actors,
holding that the Massachusetts Constitution requires a two-thirds vote
to approve a public trust purpose beyond those previously identified,
and with explicit acknowledgment of the change and new interest
applied to the land.94
However, other states have expanded the trust to other resources
beyond waterways, especially states that include trust principles in
statutory or constitutional law. Hawaii arguably boasts the most
expansive public trust doctrine in the United States, applying not only
to all surface and ground water resources, but to all public natural
resources in the state. As noted, the Hawaii Constitution
straightforwardly declares that not just navigable waterways, but “[a]ll
public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit of
the people.”95 Elsewhere, the constitution charges the state with the
explicit duty to protect water resources for the benefit of the public.96
The doctrine has been further developed in Hawaii statutes requiring
the state to protect “traditional and customary Hawaiian rights” in the
“procreation of fish and wildlife, the maintenance of proper ecological
balance and scenic beauty, and the preservation and enhancement of
waters of the State for municipal uses, public recreation, public water
supply, agriculture, and navigation.”97 The expansive doctrine has also
been interpreted judicially, such as the Supreme Court of Hawaii’s
decision in Robinson v. Ariyoshi, which affirmed the state’s “duty to
maintain the purity and flow of our waters for future generations.”98
Protected at these three different levels of state law, the Hawaii doctrine
imposes a duty on the state to protect an exhaustive array of resources
and associated values, including cultural, ecological, recreational,
scenic, and economic values for present and future generations.
Similarly, Pennsylvania’s constitutionalized public trust also
protects all natural resources in the state, including parklands, forests,
93 See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, BETHANY R. BERGER, NESTOR M. DAVIDSON & EDUARDO
MOISÉS PEÑALVER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 75 (6th ed. 2014)
(contrasting Massachusetts and New Jersey public trust law on beach access).
94 Op. of the Justs. to the Senate, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1100, 1107–08 (Mass. 1981) (upholding,
as a general proposition, the legislature’s power to free land from the public trust and stating the
two-thirds voting requirement applies to the disposition of all lands and easements taken or
acquired for the stated purposes, regardless of when they were taken or acquired).
95 HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 11.
96 Id.
97 HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-2(c) (1999).
98 Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 310 (Haw. 1982).
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and the oil and mineral resources within them.99 California’s public
trust doctrine applies mostly to waterways, but in at least one case, was
held to also apply to wildlife. In Center for Biological Diversity v. FPL
Group, the California Court of Appeal held that public agencies must
consider wildlife preservation under public trust principles when
making decisions,100 although it is the only California case allowing
citizens to enforce public trust principles for wildlife protection.101 In a
1970s codification of public trust principles, since repealed, Michigan
law held the trust to apply to atmospheric resources.102
By contrast, many states of the interior West, such as Colorado and
Idaho, have developed a much narrower doctrine, limiting its
protections only to conventionally navigable waterways, and even then,
sometimes begrudgingly.103 Indeed, of all the United States, Colorado
has taken the most restrictive view of the public trust doctrine,
weakening it to the point of near impotence. Like all states, Colorado
gained title to all submerged lands at statehood,104 presumably
impressed with the same public trust doctrine that the Supreme Court
recognized in Illinois Central.105 However, it has since interpreted the
doctrine to have little impact in its constitution, statutes, or common
law,106 most notoriously by declaring that there are no navigable
99

PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 916 (Pa.

2017).
Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
See id.
102 Environmental Protection Act of 1970, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1202(1) (1970)
(extending the public trust to authorize legal actions “for the protection of the air” in addition to
water and other natural resources), repealed by Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
Act, 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts 451.
103 IDAHO CODE § 58-1203 (1996); In re German Ditch & Reservoir Co., 139 P. 2, 9 (Colo.
1914) (asserting that all Colorado streams are nonnavigable); Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220, 222
(Colo. 1912) (same), overruled in part by United States v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 1
(Colo. 1982) (disputing its treatment of non-navigable waters on federal lands); Craig, Western
Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 22, at 71.
104 See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845) (holding the shores of navigable waters,
and the soils under them, were reserved to the states, and the new states have the same
sovereignty and jurisdiction over these lands as the original thirteen states).
105 See supra notes 41–47.
106 People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027–29 (Colo. 1979) (limiting public recreational use
of state waterways); Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n v. Martinez, 433 P.3d 22 (Colo. 2019)
(upholding the state’s decision not to engage in proposed rulemaking to limit oil and gas drilling
that could harm public trust resources). Martinez is part of the youth’s climate change litigation.
Id. at 24. Although much of the climate change litigation has failed, Martinez is illustrative of
Colorado’s expressed rejection of the public trust doctrine in two important ways. First, the
Commissioner responded by stating that Colorado expressly rejects the public trust doctrine.
100
101
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waterways in the state.107 In later litigation, it further clarified that to the
extent there is a public trust doctrine in Colorado, it does not protect
recreational values associated with waterways.108 Interestingly, having
disempowered the public trust doctrine as a formal matter, Colorado
has nevertheless instituted several other programs to protect some
environmental values protected by the public trust doctrine in other
states, such as dedicating natural streams not previously appropriated
for the use of citizens109 and creating a trust fund to preserve state
wildlife, parks, rivers, and open space.110
3.

Different Values Protected by the Doctrine

As different states protect different resources, they also protect
different trust-associated values. For example, California’s Constitution
contains public trust principles, preserving water for the public welfare
and in the public interest,111 and statutorily declares that “[a]ll water
within the State is the property of the people of the State”;112 that the
state is responsible for determining water use;113 and that all

Second, the holding is contrary to a plain reading of the text. The Colorado Supreme Court
reasoned that it must give deference to the agency. Id. at 25–26. The court affirmed the
interpretation that the commission is not required to ensure public health, safety, and welfare,
including protection of environment and wildlife resources. Id. at 32. Instead, the law merely
requires balancing these interests against oil and gas development. Id.
107 In re German Ditch, 139 P. at 9 (“The natural streams of the state are nonnavigable within
its limits . . . .”); Stockman, 129 P. at 222. But see Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 321
(1973) (implying that the Colorado River is a navigable river); Richard Gast, People v. Emmert:
A Step Backward for Recreational Water Use in Colorado, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 247, 267 (1981)
(discussing the assertions in Stockman and In re German Ditch that Colorado waterways are
nonnavigable, but suggesting they are merely dicta).
108 See, e.g., Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1027 (declaring private landowner’s ownership of the
streambed of a non-navigable stream, and thereby upholding a charge of criminal trespass against
a recreationist who had floated down a non-navigable stream, occasionally touching the
streambed).
109 COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5–7 (declaring natural streams not already appropriated as
property of the public).
110 Id. art. XXVII, §§ 1–3 (creating the Great Outdoors Colorado Program to preserve,
protect, and manage wildlife, park, river, trail, and open space heritage funded by statesupervised lottery games). The state also imposes duties on its land management agency to
manage school trust lands. Id. art. IX, § 10 (placing duties on the state board of land
commissioners for the prudent management in protecting beauty, wildlife habitat, open space,
and natural values of school lands that are held in public trust to benefit public schools).
111 CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
112 CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1943).
113 Id. § 104.
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unappropriated water is public water.114 However, California case law
expands the doctrine to protect values beyond the conventional rights
of fishing, swimming, and navigation. First in Marks v. Whitney, and,
most notably, affirmed in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court
(the Mono Lake case), the California Supreme Court held that the
public trust protects ecological, scenic, and recreational uses associated
with trust resources, and that the state must “protect public trust uses
whenever feasible.”115 As noted, Center for Biological Diversity held that
public agencies must also consider wildlife preservation when making
decisions.116
Hawaii protects similar trust values, including recreational,
ecological, and scenic values.117 Nevada has also expanded on
traditionally protected values to include recreational and ecological
protections.118 Other states’ doctrines offer expanded protection for
recreational values, but fewer explicit protections for environmental
values. Montana’s doctrine focuses on the traditional rights of
navigation and fishing but includes some protection for recreational
uses.119 Oregon expressly protects public rights for recreation on all
navigable-in-fact waters120 and also specifies rights for commercial
use.121 New Jersey protects recreational values extensively, including
beach access.122 Florida expressly protects fishing, navigation, and
commercial and recreational uses, such as swimming and sunbathing.123
Id. § 1201.
Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 719–28 (Cal. 1983); KLASS & HUANG,
supra note 49, at 4.
116 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
117 See supra notes 95–98.
118 Mineral Cnty. v. Dep’t of Conservation & Nat. Res., 20 P.3d 800 (Nev. 2001) (reviewing
petitions to prevent the state from granting more rights to withdraw water from the Walker River
system and a writ of mandamus challenging the state’s public trust obligations in managing the
flows into Walker Lake). Justice Rose, in his concurrence, stated, “Although the original
objectives of the public trust were to protect the public’s rights in navigation, commerce, and
fishing, the trust has evolved to encompass additional public values—including recreational and
ecological uses.” Id. at 807 (Rose, J., concurring).
119 Erika A. Doot, The Public Trust Doctrine in Montana, in 45 STATES, supra note 49, at 467.
120 Or. Dep’t of Just., Off. of the Att’y Gen., Op. No. 8281 (Apr. 21, 2005).
121 Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 175 P. 437, 441–42 (Or. 1918) (considering whether Beaver
Creek was navigable, the court was not convinced that the test for navigability should only
include transportation of goods and that commerce could be construed to include the use of boats
for pleasure).
122 See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972).
See generally supra Section I.B.2.
123 White v. Hughes, 190 So. 446, 448–51 (Fla. 1939) (detailing that “[t]here is probably no
custom more universal, more natural or more ancient on the sea-coasts” than that of bathing in
the ocean and enjoying the related recreation); Adams v. Elliott, 171 So. 731, 734 (Fla. 1937).
114
115
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South Carolina’s doctrine has been expanded past fishing rights to
include “valuable floatage,” defined broadly to include “all ‘legitimate
and beneficial public use,’ including recreation.”124
Other states have expressly limited the doctrine’s development of
protected values. As noted above, in addition to minimizing the reach
of the doctrine by eliminating recognition of its waterways as navigable,
Colorado has disclaimed any protection by the doctrine for recreational
values and limits consideration under the doctrine of environmental
values.125 Idaho’s common law and statutory law point in different
directions, with judicial common law expanding trust resources beyond
navigable waters and, seemingly, toward environmental values, but as
discussed below, the legislature has responded by statutorily limiting
the trust to protect only the most traditional trust values.126
4.

Different Legal Theories About the Nature of the Doctrine

Finally, different states have developed different ideas about the
nature of the doctrine itself at the level of legal theory.127 Some states
treat the doctrine as an ordinary feature of judicial common law, an
extension of the police power to protect public health and safety that
can be displaced or overridden by the legislature through enactment of
contrary statutory law.128 Others see the doctrine as a quasiconstitutional, “constitutive” doctrine that cannot be revoked through
typical legislative or judicial means because it is an irrevocable limit on

124 Hughes v. Nelson, 399 S.E.2d 24, 25 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990); Casey Hill, The Public Trust
Doctrine in South Carolina, in 45 STATES, supra note 49, at 760.
125 See, e.g., People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027–29 (Colo. 1979) (defendants had no right
under the Constitution of Colorado to float and fish on a non-navigable natural stream, stating,
“Without permission, the public cannot use such waters for recreation.”); Colo. Oil & Gas
Conservation Comm’n v. Martinez, 433 P.3d 22 (Colo. 2019).
126 See, e.g., Walbridge v. Robinson, 125 P. 812, 814 (Idaho 1912) (indicating that the state
may hold in its sovereign capacity all resources not suited to private appropriation, including
light and air); Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass’n v. State ex rel. Andrus, 899 P.2d 949, 952–56 (Idaho
1995) (recognizing that, even if not public trust lands themselves, if the alienation of state land
could adversely affect trust resources, private citizens have standing to challenge the sale under
the public trust doctrine); see IDAHO CODE §§ 58-1201–1203 (1996) (“The public trust doctrine
as it is applied in the state of Idaho is solely a limitation on the power of the state to alienate or
encumber the title to the beds of navigable waters as defined in this chapter. . . . The public trust
doctrine shall not be applied to any purpose other than as provided in this chapter.”).
127 See Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 176–81, 192–204 (discussing the constitutive
question).
128 See, e.g., id. at 197–99; IDAHO CODE §§ 58-1201–1203 (quoted supra note 126).
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the authority with which the sovereign may govern.129 This was an
essential element of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the Illinois
Central case, discussed in Section I.A, explaining why state legislation
purporting to alienate the bed of Chicago Harbor was held to be ultra
vires and thus void of legal effect.130
Support for the constitutive interpretation as a guarantor of
environmental rights appears most famously in the California Supreme
Court’s decision in the Mono Lake case, protecting environmental
values at Mono Lake from water withdrawals authorized under water
allocation statutes.131 Los Angeles had secured state permits to export
the water decades earlier under statutory water allocation laws, and it
had argued that the California legislature had abrogated the public trust
doctrine when it enacted these water law statutes.132 However, the

129 Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 176–81, 192–204; see, e.g., Jan S. Stevens, The Public
Trust and In-Stream Uses, 19 ENV’T L. 605, 609 (1989) (arguing that the public trust is an
inalienable attribute of state sovereignty); Joseph Regalia, A New Water Law Vista: Rooting the
Public Trust Doctrine in the Courts, 108 KY. L.J. 1, 6 (2020) (“Not only should litigants be able to
argue for an expansion of trust duties in state courts under state constitutions, they should also
be able to argue for this expansion in federal courts under the U.S. Constitution.”); Michael C.
Blumm & Mary Christina Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit”: Climate Change, Due Process, and the
Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 43–44 (2017) (arguing that the public trust doctrine
is “an inherent constitutional limit on sovereignty”); Michael C. Blumm & Lynn S. Schaffer, The
Federal Public Trust Doctrine: Misinterpreting Justice Kennedy and Illinois Central Railroad, 45
ENV’T L. 399 (2015) (arguing that the public trust doctrine is an inherent limit on both state and
federal sovereign authority, and that Illinois Central represents an application of the Tenth
Amendment’s reserved powers doctrine); Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust:
The Law’s DNA, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 281, 288 (2014) (arguing that the public trust
doctrine is an implied limit on federal authority because it “is the chalkboard on which the
Constitution is written”); Crystal S. Chase, The Illinois Central Public Trust Doctrine and Federal
Common Law: An Unconventional View, 16 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 113, 133,
137–42 (2010) (arguing that the Illinois Central public trust doctrine is grounded in federal
common law, and that the federal common law reading confers continuing legitimacy on the
decision, even after the 1938 Erie Railroad decision limited the reach of federal common law);
Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and
Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENV’T L. 425, 453, 458, 461–62 (1989) (arguing that the
Supreme Court’s Illinois Central decision was “premised on federal law” and that the public trust
doctrine is therefore a feature of both federal and state law because states manage trust lands
within a federally imposed limit that prevents them from abdicating their responsibility as
trustees). But see Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 269, 273–74, 278 (1980) (arguing for a public trust responsibility in the federal
administration of federal public lands, but that this trust responsibility arises from a different
source than the state-constraining public trust in submerged lands).
130 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); see supra notes 41–47 and accompanying
text (discussing Illinois Central); see also Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 160–66
(interpreting Illinois Central).
131 See generally Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
132 Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3841825

7_RYAN.CURRY.RULE.42.6.7.DONE.docx (Do Not Delete)

2474

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

10/9/21 12:22 AM

[Vol. 42:6

California Supreme Court held that the statutory prior appropriations
doctrine did not displace the public trust doctrine, and that the state
had erred in granting these permits decades earlier because it lacked the
authority to do so without considering its public trust obligations
first.133
Many states have followed California’s model,134 considering the
public trust as a quasi-constitutional constraint on sovereign authority.
Nevertheless, other states are less committed to the idea. Colorado law
minimizes the role of the public trust in general,135 and Idaho most
famously rejected the California approach in protecting environmental
values compromised by water rights granted under state allocation
statutes.136 Idaho case law had initially invited a broader interpretation
of the public trust doctrine, considering application to light, air, public
lands, and other natural resources,137 but responsive legislative moves
imposed a more traditional version of the doctrine, rejecting
application to environmental values.138 After the Idaho Supreme Court

133 Id. at 728; see also Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 192–97 (discussing the
significance of the case for the constitutive legal theory question).
134 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 613 (Nev. 2011) (“The final underpinning
of our formal adoption of the public trust doctrine arises from the inherent limitations on the
state’s sovereign power . . . .”); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 443 (Haw. 2000)
(“[H]istory and precedent have established the public trust as an inherent attribute of sovereign
authority . . . .”); E. Cape May Assocs. v. State Dept. of Env’t Prot., 777 A.2d 1015, 1034 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (“[T]idally-flowed land has always been subject to the public trust
doctrine. . . . [which] provides that the sovereign never waives its right to regulate the use of
public trust property . . . .”); Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (Wash. 1987) (“The state can
no more convey or give away this jus publicum interest than it can ‘abdicate its police powers in
the administration of government and the preservation of the peace.’”).
135 See supra note 107.
136 See IDAHO CODE §§ 58-1201-1203 (1996) (Chapter 12: Public Trust Doctrine); see also
Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 197–99 (discussing the significance of the case for the
constitutive legal theory question).
137 See, e.g., Walbridge v. Robinson, 125 P. 812, 814 (Idaho 1912) (indicating that the state
may hold in its sovereign capacity all resources not suited to private appropriation, including
light and air); Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass’n v. State ex rel. Andrus, 899 P.2d 949, 952–56 (Idaho
1995) (recognizing that, even if not public trust lands themselves, if the alienation of state land
could adversely affect trust resources, private citizens have standing to challenge the sale under
the public trust doctrine).
138 See IDAHO CODE §§ 58-1201–1203 (“The public trust doctrine as it is applied in the state
of Idaho is solely a limitation on the power of the state to alienate or encumber the title to the
beds of navigable waters as defined in this chapter. . . . The public trust doctrine shall not be
applied to any purpose other than as provided in this chapter.”); see also Craig, Western Public
Trust Doctrines, supra note 22, at 77 (“Idaho courts until 1996 were following the western
‘modern trend,’ indicated that water and ‘proprietary rights to use water . . . are held subject the
public trust.’ In 1996, however, Idaho’s legislature invalidated this line of cases, instead defining
(and confining) that state’s public trust doctrine by statute.”) (footnote omitted).
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issued a series of public trust decisions converging on California’s
approach, the legislature expressly foreclosed the constitutive
interpretation of the public trust doctrine by statute.139 Idaho Code Title
58, Chapter 12 explicitly recognizes that the doctrine does limit the
state’s ability to alienate the title to the beds of navigable waterways,140
but it expressly states that the trust will not impact the allocation of
prior appropriative water rights or affect state decisions regarding the
use of public trust waterways.141 In so doing, Idaho also rejected
California’s interpretation in the Mono Lake case, finding itself that the
prior appropriation doctrine does in fact trump the public trust
doctrine.142 As now codified in statute, the Idaho doctrine applies only
to navigable waters and not to any other trust lands or water rights.143
In an attempt, perhaps, to split the difference on the constitutive
question, the Nevada Supreme Court recently affirmed its
understanding of the doctrine as a constitutive limit on sovereign
authority regarding all waterways in the state—but also held that there
can be no conflict between the state’s obligations under the public trust
doctrine and settled water allocation permits because state water law
has always required that water permits only be granted when doing so
serves the public interest.144 In so doing, Nevada affirmed the doctrine’s
sovereign ownership constraint as a quasi-constitutional limit on state
sovereign authority, but foreclosed the constitutive interpretation of the
doctrine as a guarantor of environmental rights.145

IDAHO CODE §§ 58-1201-1203.
Id. § 58-1201(4), (6) (defining the public trust doctrine as guiding alienation of the title of
the beds of navigable waters and clarifying that the purpose of the act is to define limits on the
public trust doctrine); id. § 58-1203(1) (limiting the public trust doctrine to “solely a limitation
on the power of the state to alienate or encumber the title to the beds of navigable waters”).
141 Id. § 58-1203(3) (stating that the trust does not limit the state to authorize public and
private use or alienation of title to the beds of navigable waters if the state board of land
commissioners determines that it is in accordance with Idaho statutes and constitution and for
the purposes of navigation, commerce, recreation, agriculture, mining, forestry, or other uses).
142 See Ryan, Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 56–57. The move prompted
considerable scholarly controversy on this issue. See James M. Kearney, Recent Statute Closing
the Floodgates? Idaho’s Statutory Limitation on the Public Trust Doctrine, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 91,
94 (1997); Michael C. Blumm, Harrison C. Dunning & Scott W. Reed, Renouncing the Public
Trust Doctrine: An Assessment of the Validity of Idaho House Bill 794, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 461, 472
(1997) (noting that the new statute “was the legislature’s response to judicial public trust
declarations” in a series of Idaho Supreme Court cases).
143 IDAHO CODE § 58-1203.
144 Mineral Cnty. v. Lyon Cnty., 473 P.3d 418, 425–27 (Nev. 2020); see also Ryan, A Short
History, supra note 1, at 199–204 (discussing the significance of the case for the constitutive legal
theory question).
145 See Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 201–04 (critiquing this aspect of the decision).
139
140
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The Modern U.S. Public Trust Doctrine as a Protector of
Environmental Rights

Considering the array of covered resources, protected values, and
operating mechanisms that attend the public trust doctrine in different
states, it is clear that there is no one way to understand the modern
American doctrine. However, this Section introduces a handful of
examples in which the modern public trust doctrine has been framed as
a protector of environmental rights. These examples—the California
doctrine’s protection of environmental values at Mono Lake, the
Pennsylvania doctrine’s protection of environmental values against
fracking, and the Michigan doctrine’s protection of the Great Lakes
from damage by oil spills—help showcase the gradual shift in focus of
the doctrine from a grant of sovereign authority to guarantee public
access to trust resources toward an assignment of sovereign
responsibility to also protect trust resources from environmental
degradation, even by public overuse. In addition, the doctrine has been
increasingly deployed as a defense against regulatory takings claims
challenging environmental regulations, though not with universal
success.
1.

The California Public Trust and Water Rights at Mono Lake

The first is the seminal public trust case recognizing that the
doctrine protects environmental values: the California Supreme Court’s
1983 decision protecting Mono Lake.146 This hallmark case of the
modern public trust era featured a battle among competing public uses
of Mono Lake, a vast desert lake draining the eastern watershed of
Yosemite National Park, due east of San Francisco and four hundred
miles north of Los Angeles.147 To secure drinking water resources for its
citizens, Los Angeles had constructed an aquifer diverting southward
fresh water from nearly all of the mountain creeks that sustained Mono
Lake.148 By the early 1980s, after forty years of water withdrawals, the
lake’s level had dropped forty-five vertical feet, the ecosystem was on
the verge of collapse, and toxic dust storms from the exposed lakebed
threatened public health as the region came into violation of particulate
Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
See generally Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 1.
148 See id. at 591–603; see also JOHN HART, STORM OVER MONO: THE MONO LAKE BATTLE AND
THE CALIFORNIA WATER FUTURE 56–57 (1996); Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Working Out an
Environmental Ethic: Anniversary Lessons from Mono Lake, 4 WYO. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2004).
146
147
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matter pollution thresholds under the Clean Air Act.149 Attempting a
novel use of the public trust doctrine, the plaintiffs argued that the state
had failed its obligations to protect Mono Lake, a navigable water body
indisputably protected by the public trust doctrine, when it authorized
Los Angeles to begin diverting water decades earlier on grounds that
the SWRCB had failed to consider the foreseeable harms this would
cause to the public trust values at Mono Lake, including ecologic, scenic,
and recreational values.150 Among other defenses,151 Los Angeles
countered that the public trust doctrine had been subsumed by the
statutory prior appropriations doctrine of water allocation, and that
their use of Mono Basin water for conventional municipal use was
protected by California law.152
The California Supreme Court held that state obligations under the
common law public trust doctrine had not been abrogated by statutory
water law, and that the state had indeed violated its public trust
obligations to consider the environmental consequences of water
withdrawals from the Mono Basin.153 It invalidated Los Angeles’
diversion permits and required the SWRCB to start over, this time
weighing the legitimate needs for water in Southern California against
the environmental harms at Mono Lake and encouraging the protection
of Mono Lake’s public trust values, including environmental values, as
much as possible.154 The Mono Lake case is notable for protecting
environmental values of a trust resource, applying the doctrine to the
non-navigable tributaries of a protected waterway,155 recognizing the

149 See Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 1, at 599–601; see also HART, supra note 148, at
52–54; Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western
Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701, 704–05 (1995) (describing Mono Lake’s unique level of salinity).
150 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 728–29 (noting that the rights had been acquired “in 1940
from a water board which believed it lacked both the power and the duty to protect the Mono
Lake environment,” and that DWP “continues to exercise those rights in apparent disregard for
the resulting damage to . . . Mono Lake”).
151 Id. at 716, 727 (rejecting Los Angeles’ defense that the public trust doctrine applied only to
navigable waterways, and not the diverted non-navigable creeks, and holding instead that it
protects the non-navigable tributaries that sustain a protected navigable waterway).
152 Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 1, at 604–07.
153 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 728–29.
154 Id. at 712, 727 (“Approval of such diversion without considering public trust
values . . . may result in needless destruction of those values. . . . [B]efore state courts and
agencies approve water diversions they should consider the effect of such diversions upon
interests protected by the public trust, and attempt, so far as feasible, to avoid or minimize any
harm to those interests.”).
155 Id. at 720–21; see also Env’t L. Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d
393, 399–403 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (concluding that the public trust doctrine protected
groundwater tributaries of navigable waters), cert. denied, 2018 Cal. LEXIS 9313 (Cal. 2018).
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state’s ongoing duty to supervise the protection of trust resources,156
and perhaps most importantly, for suggesting that the California public
trust is a quasi-constitutional doctrine because, unlike ordinary
common law doctrines, it was not abrogated by conflicting state
statutes.157
2.

The Pennsylvania Constitution’s Environmental Rights
Amendment

In other states, as discussed in Section I.B.1, public trust principles
have developed through means other than the common law, including
constitutional or statutory doctrines. As noted, Pennsylvania’s
Environmental Rights Amendment constitutionally expands the public
ownership premise of the Justinian jus publicum to other natural
resources and explicitly protects environmental values, including “clean
air, pure water, and . . . the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic
and esthetic values of the environment.”158 The provision goes on to
affirm protection for future generations, implying the importance of
protecting the long-term environmental values over short-term
economic interests of present generations: “Pennsylvania’s public
natural resources are the common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the
Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all
the people.”159
Demonstrating the power of these principles in Pennsylvania, in
the 2014 case of Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court invoked these principles sua sponte to
invalidate a statute preempting local regulation of fracking operations
through zoning ordinances.160 The court observed that the
Environmental Rights Amendment required the protection of present
and future generations’ interests in the state’s public natural
resources.161 The Robinson Township decision was affirmed a few years
Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 727.
See Ryan, Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 56–60; Ryan, The Historic
Saga, supra note 1, at 609–13; Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 192–97.
158 PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
159 Id.
160 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 919–20 (Pa. 2013).
161 Id. (noting that “a political subdivision has a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in
protecting the environment and the quality of life within its borders” and that “[t]he protection
of environmental and esthetic interests is an essential aspect of Pennsylvanians’ quality of life and
a key part of local government’s role”).
156
157
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later when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the state was
obliged to manage the resources in state parks and forests (including oil
and other minerals) as trustee for the public according to standard
public trust principles.162
3.

Michigan’s Public Trust and the Great Lakes

Finally, the public trust doctrine is not always invoked by citizens
against the government, but, occasionally, by the government in defense
of public resources, even when it puts the state in conflict with citizens
whose access is curtailed or denied. For example, as discussed further
in Part III, the governor of Michigan recently relied on the public trust
doctrine in revoking a nearly-seventy-year-old easement permitting
submerged oil pipelines to run between Lake Huron and Lake Michigan
to prevent a potentially catastrophic oil spill from frequent anchor
strikes by passing commercial shipping traffic.163 The Office of the
Governor announced that “[t]he state is revoking the 1953 easement for
violation of the public trust doctrine. This body of law recognizes the
State of Michigan as the ‘trustee’ of the public’s rights in the Great Lakes
and lays upon the state legal obligations to protect those rights from any
impairment.”164 In a statement, the governor explained that “the
continued use of the dual pipelines cannot be reconciled with the
public’s rights in the Great Lakes and the State’s duty to protect them,”
and that the pipeline operators had imposed “on the people of Michigan
an unacceptable risk of a catastrophic oil spill in the Great Lakes that
could devastate our economy and way of life.”165 The Michigan example
Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017).
John Flesher, Michigan Governor Seeks to Revoke Enbridge Easement, STAR TRIB. (Nov. 13,
2020, 7:51 PM), https://www.startribune.com/michigan-governor-seeks-to-revoke-enbridgeeasement/573072012 [https://perma.cc/T64V-QP38].
164 Press Release, State of Mich. Off. of the Governor, Governor Whitmer Takes Action to
Shut Down the Line 5 Dual Pipelines Through the Straits of Mackinac After a Reasonable
Transition Period to Protect the State’s Energy Needs (Nov. 13, 2020),
https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90640-545110—,00.html
[https://perma.cc/V95P-VPRZ].
165 Id. (“The state found that the 1953 easement violated the public trust doctrine from its
inception because the easement does not make the necessary public trust findings. Moreover, the
state also found that the continued use of the dual pipelines cannot be reconciled with the public’s
rights in the Great Lakes and the State’s duty to protect them. Transporting millions of gallons
of petroleum products each day through two 67-year old [sic] pipelines that lie exposed along the
entire span of a busy shipping channel presents an extraordinary and unacceptable risk. The dual
pipelines are vulnerable to anchor strikes, similar dangerous impacts, and the inherent risks of
162
163
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shows how the public trust doctrine has shifted from serving solely as a
mandate for public access to a background principle of state law,
obligating the state to protect public access and environmental values
of trust resources, with an increasing thumb on the scale toward
protecting environmental values because of the state’s obligation to
preserve them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.
4.

The Public Trust as a Defense of Environmental Regulation
Against Takings Claims

From an environmental rights perspective, an important doctrinal
development that cuts across jurisdictions is the increasing reliance by
governments on the public trust doctrine as a defense against takings
challenges to environmental regulations.166 In a number of high-profile
cases, the doctrine has been invoked in litigation brought under the U.S.
Constitution’s Takings Clause,167 where governments defending
environmental regulations argue that the trust sets forth environmental
rights in the public that limit plaintiffs’ reasonable expectations with
regard to the use of trust resources. Not every court has allowed it, but
state and municipal governments are increasingly shielding themselves
against regulatory takings claims on the grounds that the public trust
doctrine obligates them to protect the environmental values of trust
resources, especially wetland and coastal areas, as well as public access
to those resources.168
In its 1992 decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the
Supreme Court clarified that takings liability applies whenever state
regulation obstructs all economically viable use of private property,169
sidestepping the usual regulatory takings balancing test that also
requires consideration of the public interest in the regulatory
prevention of harm,170 and making it easier for owners to challenge
environmental regulations limiting the development of fragile coastal
pipeline operations.”). The statement goes on to list examples in which the pipelines were
accidentally struck by commercial vessel anchors and repeated efforts by the state to win
cooperation by the pipeline operators in meeting its obligations under the easement to avoid
potential harm. Id.
166 See Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 170–73.
167 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
168 See Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 172–73.
169 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–30 (1992); see also Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626–30 (2001).
170 Compare Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, with Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978) (describing the three factor regulatory takings balancing test).
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or wetland property.171 However, the Court also clarified that the Lucas
rule does not apply if the regulation is a “background principle[]” of
state property law—such as nuisance law—that already limits the
owner’s reasonable expectations about the permissible uses of
property.172 The Supreme Court’s nineteenth century recognition in
decisions like Illinois Central and others173 that the public trust doctrine
is a foundational element of American law “thus took on new
importance as its twentieth century takings jurisprudence expanded
liability for environmental regulations that interfere with economic
use,”174 confirming the doctrine as a “background principle[]” of state
common law.175 As one author has previously observed:
Today, the doctrine is increasingly invoked by state and municipal
parties defending takings claims against regulations involving
construction on tidelands and wetlands, public access to waterways,
and interference with water rights. For example, the Hawaii Supreme
Court rejected a takings challenge against the state’s denial of water
use permits because “the original limitation of the public trust”
extinguished any claim the plaintiffs could make to an absolute right
to water for purposes other than those protected by the trust.
Quoting Professor Joseph Sax, one of the original scholarly
proponents of the modern public trust doctrine, the court explained
that “[t]he state is not ‘taking’ something belonging to an owner, but
is asserting a right it always held as a servitude burdening owners of
water rights.” . . . Given the extensive history reported in this article
and recited in these decisions, it seems difficult to argue that the
public trust doctrine is not a background principle of state law that
should impact reasonable expectations, even if it remains possible to
argue over how, exactly, it should impact them.176

See Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 170–73.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–30; see also Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626–30.
173 See Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 152–55 (discussing Martin v. Wadell, 41 U.S.
367 (1842), Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845), and Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894)).
174 Id. at 172; see also John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Principles
Defense in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931, 931–34 (2012); Frank, supra note 43, at
682–84.
175 Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 171 (defining “background principles” as “those
built-in legal norms that constrain owners’ legitimate expectations about the suitable uses of
different kinds of property”).
176 Id. at 172–73 (footnotes omitted).
171
172
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At present, courts in New Jersey,177 Hawaii,178 Wisconsin,179 South
Carolina,180 Louisiana,181 Rhode Island,182 and the Ninth Circuit183 have
all accepted the public trust doctrine as a legitimate “background
principles” defense to takings claims against environmental regulations,
all implicitly recognizing an underlying right of the public in preventing
environmental harm, even when it causes private economic harm.
Nevertheless, the Federal Court of Claims has cast doubt on the
background principles defense,184 and the Texas Supreme Court also
177 Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 64 F. Supp. 2d 354 (D.N.J. 1999)
(rejecting a takings challenge to a state agency rule requiring developers of waterfront property
to provide walkways along the water because the public trust doctrine prevents owners from
claiming any entitlement to exclude).
178 In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000).
179 See R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 628 N.W.2d 781 (Wis. 2001) (rejecting a takings challenge
to the state’s denial of a marina’s dredging permit because the developer lacked reasonable
investment-backed expectations to fill wetlands and because riparian rights are inferior to the
public trust doctrine). The Wisconsin Supreme Court emphasized that “[t]he public trust
doctrine as an encumbrance on riparian rights is established ‘by judicial authority so long
acquiesced in as to become a rule of property.’ It is part of the organic law of the state, and is to
be broadly and beneficially construed.” Id. at 788 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Franzini
v. Layland, 97 N.W. 499, 502 (Wis. 1903)).
180 McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 2003) (holding that the public trust
doctrine properly blocked tidelands development without compensation, even when the lands at
issue became submerged after the owner took title).
181 See Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085, 1088, 1102 (La. 2004) (rejecting a takings challenge
against erosion-controlling freshwater diversion programs and holding that “the redistribution
of existing productive oyster beds to other areas must be tolerated under the public trust
doctrine”).
182 See Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *1 n.2, *7, *15 (R.I. Super.
Ct. July 5, 2005) (an unpublished decision on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court rejecting a
takings challenge against the denial of permit to develop in coastal wetlands because, inter alia,
the public trust doctrine prevented the formation of reasonable investment-backed expectations
to “fill or develop that portion of the site which is below mean high water”).
183 Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming the city’s
refusal to allow construction of residences on an elevated platform above tidelands because the
public trust doctrine vitiated any entitlement by the owner to build there).
184 Compare Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1293–96 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (Judge Moore, reversing dismissal of a takings claim by a California irrigator required to
create fish passage lanes to satisfy the Endangered Species Act, and rejecting, in dicta, all
counterarguments that would have barred the claim), with id. at 1297 (Mayer, J., dissenting)
(Judge Mayer, writing in dissent: “Casitas does not own the water in question because all water
sources within California belong to the public. Cal. Wat. Code §§ 102, 1001. Whether Casitas
even has a vested property interest in the use of the water is a threshold issue to be determined
under California law. California subjects appropriative water rights licenses to the public trust
and reasonable use doctrines, so Casitas likely has no property interest in the water, and therefore
no takings claim.”). Although the Court allowed the Casitas Water District to litigate its takings
claim in the 2008 decision, a different panel on the same court ultimately dismissed the claim
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appears skeptical,185 showing that for the time being, this use of the
doctrine remains jurisdictionally unsettled.
D.

Public Trust Principles Around the World

Even though the roots of the public trust doctrine extend back to
early Roman and English common law,186 the doctrine is most closely
associated with the United States, where constitutional constraints on
sovereign authority have long been a distinguishing feature of
American law.187 Nevertheless, public trust principles continue to
appear and evolve in other legal jurisdictions throughout the world.
Indeed, variations on the idea that people hold common rights in
natural resources have developed in various ancient legal systems
simultaneously and independently, for example, in ancient Ottoman
law—which extends common rights not only to water and air
commons, but to trees, grass, and even mushrooms.188 Civil law nations
(without prejudice) when litigation concluded in 2013, though without addressing the public
trust background principle issue. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2013); see also Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313
(2001) (in an opinion by the same judge who authored the 2008 Casitas decision, rejecting the
state’s public trust “background principles” defense against a takings claim by California
irrigators after water delivery under a state contract was temporarily suspended while the state
complied with restrictions under the Endangered Species Act).
185 See Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 723 (Tex. 2012) (“[W]hile losing property to
the public trust as it becomes part of the wet beach or submerged under the ocean is an ordinary
hazard of ownership for coastal property owners, it is far less reasonable, and unsupported by
ancient common law precepts, to hold that a public easement can suddenly encumber an entirely
new portion of a landowner’s property or a different landowner’s property that was not
previously subject to that right of use.”).
186 See supra Section I.A.
187 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 12–13 (2002)
(discussing the uniquely American tradition of subjecting sovereign activity to constitutional
review by the judiciary).
188 See Al-Majalla Al Ahkam Al Adaliyyah [The Ottoman Courts Manual (Hanafi)], bk. X, ch.
IV, § 1, arts. 1234–47, https://www.iium.edu.my/deed/lawbase/al_majalle/al_majalleb10.html
[https://perma.cc/7U4B-8G8A]. In 1962, an Israeli court drew on the Mejelle to apply public
trust-like principles in a case affirming public rights to access beaches, overturning the conviction
of Moshe Puterman for trespassing on a public beach. CrimA (TA) 851/60 Puterman v. AG, PM
30, 7 (1962) (Isr.). For discussion of the case and the role of Ottoman law in the court’s decision,
see David Schorr, The Israeli (and Ottoman and Islamic) Public Trust Doctrine, ENV’T, L., & HIST.
(July 13, 2016, 11:46 AM), https://environmentlawhistory.blogspot.com/2016/07/the-israeliand-ottoman-and-islamic.html [https://perma.cc/Z5KT-AND8] (discussing the case and the role
of Article 1234, et seq., of the Ottoman civil code); Zafrir Rinat, Thanks to This Man, You Don’t
Have to Pay to Go to the Beach in Israel, HAARETZ (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.haaretz.com/
israel-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-this-man-is-the-reason-why-israeli-beach-entry-is-free-
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often enforce a public-trust like doctrine of the sovereign ownership of
water resources,189 presumably with shared roots in the Justinian jus
publicum, as Roman common law is also the progenitor of much of the
civil codes of the European continent.190 Among nations that recognize
environmentally protective public trust principles, some base their legal
doctrines on versions of the trust found commonly in the United States,
while others have developed versions of the public trust doctrine wholly
their own. This Section reviews the reach of public trust principles
across the globe, with representative examples from all inhabited
continents, working roughly west from the International Date Line.
1.

Oceania

a. New Zealand and Australia
The two largest nations in Oceania, Australia and New Zealand,
are both British commonwealth nations that root their formal legal
systems in the same English common law as the United States. Unlike
the wayward American colony, however, neither Australia nor New
Zealand has extended the public trust doctrine beyond its early English
origins toward environmental protection. Instead, both nations have
addressed related concerns through the development of rights of nature

1.5387797 [https://perma.cc/ANH3-APTD] (describing the case and the Mejelle doctrine it
applied). See also Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 205 (briefly discussing the public trust
principles in the Mejelle).
189 Las Siete Partidas, P. III, tit. 28, laws III, IV, VI; see also C.C. Art. 407 (Spain) (declaring
that rivers and their natural courses, springs, streams, and riverbeds are in the public domain);
C.C. Art. 339 (Spain) (declaring that rivers, riverbanks, shores, and bays are in the public
domain); see also MERITXELL COSTEJÀ, NURIA FONT, ANNA RIGOL, & JOAN SUBIRATS, THE
EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL WATER REGIME IN SPAIN (2002), https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/
viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.472.7319&rep=rep1&type=pdf
[https://perma.cc/858Y-6V49]
(detailing the aspects of water that remain in the public domain after Spain’s Civil Code was
amended with multiple comprehensive pieces of water law legislation); Ker & Co. v. Couden, 223
U.S. 268 (1912) (in interpreting a case about ownership of submerged lands, noting that under
Spanish civil law, the seashore flowed by the tides was public property, belonging, in Spain, to
the sovereign). Several Florida cases also discuss the Spanish roots of the Florida sovereign
ownership aspect of the public trust doctrine. Apalachicola Land & Dev. Co. v. McRae, 98 So.
505, 517–18 (Fla. 1923); Geiger v. Filor, 8 Fla. 325, 336–37 (1859); Bd. of Trs. v. Webb, 618 So.
2d 1381, 1382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). Other Florida cases also cite to the English common law
roots of the Florida public trust doctrine. Broward v. Mabry, 50 So. 826, 829 (Fla. 1909).
190 Hessel E. Yntema, Roman Law and Its Influence on Western Civilization, 35 CORNELL L.Q.
77, 88 (1949) (describing Roman common law as the “fundamental body of legal doctrine” which
is the “common element in the individual legal systems of much of Continental Europe, and its
colonies”).
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principles, derived from the legal culture of their indigenous
populations, that are the subject of Part II.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that some Oceanian scholars have
advocated for the expansion of the doctrine beyond its English origins
to encompass vulnerable environmental values in their countries.191 It
has also been argued that environmentally protective elements of the
doctrine are already in force in Oceania, even if they have not yet been
formally recognized.192 The Maori People of New Zealand, among the
original progenitors of the modern rights of nature movement, have
also attempted to utilize the public trust doctrine in their ongoing
litigation against anthropogenic contributions to climate change.193 The
willingness of advocates to embrace both public trust and rights of
nature principles in support of environmental goals is a notable
phenomenon discussed further in Section III.B.
2.

Asia

a. The Philippines
The Philippines boasts one of the most comprehensive public trust
doctrines in the world. The public trust has played an important role in
the common law, statutory law, and constitution of the Philippines
since the 1970s. The Water Code of 1976 declared that all waters belong
to the State,194 that the public held an easement along the banks of all
rivers and streams for access, and that the public also held an easement
for “recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage” on the shores

191 Nicola Hulley, The Public Trust Doctrine in New Zealand, AUG. 2015 RMJ 31, 31; N.J.
Hulley, New Zealand’s Public Trust Doctrine (2018) (LLM Paper, University of Wellington)
https://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10063/8072/thesis_access.pdf?
sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/9TZC-JDCG]; Tim Bonyhady, An Australian Public Trust, in
ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY AND POLICY: STILL SETTLING AUSTRALIA 258–72 (Stephen Dovers
ed., 2000); Bruce Thom, Climate Change, Coastal Hazards, and the Public Trust Doctrine,
MQJICEL (2012) Vol 8(2).
192 Id.
193 Patricia Quijano Vallejos & Lisa Anne Hamilton, Maori Communities Bring Climate
Claims Against New Zealand Under the Public Trust Doctrine, CTR. FOR INT’L ENV’T L. (Nov. 1,
2017),
https://www.ciel.org/maori-communities-bring-climate-claims-new-zealand-publictrust-doctrine [https://perma.cc/N6LF-428V].
194 A Decree Instituting a Water Code, Thereby Revising and Consolidating the Laws
Governing the Ownership, Appropriation, Utilization, Exploitation, Development, Conservation
and Protection of Water Resources, Pres. Dec. No. 1067, art. 3 (Dec. 31, 1976) (Phil.),
https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1976/12/31/presidential-decree-no-1067-s-1976
[https://perma.cc/A4BR-FMK8]. The code defines waters broadly to include surface water,
groundwater, atmospheric water, and sea water. Id. art. 4.
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of all seas and lakes.195 One year later, the Philippines passed the 1977
Environmental Policy, which declared that the nation would
“recognize, discharge and fulfill the responsibilities of each generation
as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations . . . .”196 Ten years later, the Filipino Constitution of 1987
constitutionalized these environmental rights, announcing that “[t]he
State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.”197
The doctrine has also been developed judicially. In 1987, the
Supreme Court ruled in Oposa v. Factoran that the new constitutional
language did, in fact, codify public trust principles and was selfexecuting.198 The Court held that a class of students challenging the
state’s grant of a timber license could sue the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources for violating its public trust
obligations under the Constitution.199 In the end, the case had little
effect on timber harvesting in the Philippines because the students
failed to pursue the case.200 However, in revisiting the issue fifteen years
later, the Supreme Court clarified that the government did hold trust
obligations under the Constitution.201 Since then, the doctrine has been
interpreted to include the conservation and management of natural
resources to ensure their equitable distribution across present and
future generations.202

Id. art. 51.
Philippine Environmental Policy, Pres. Dec. No. 1151, § 2 (June 6, 1977) (Phil.),
https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1977/06/06/presidential-decree-no-1151-s-1977
[https://perma.cc/JF6Z-8D8S]. One pair of scholars have observed that the policy is reminiscent
of language in the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act. Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 22, at
770 n.154 (quoting this policy, which also includes U.S. NEPA-like language, 42 U.S.C. § 4331,
at Pres. Dec. No. 1151, § 1: “It is hereby declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create,
develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive
and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements
of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainments of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being.”).
197 CONST. (1987), art. II, § 16 (Phil.).
198 Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083 (July 30, 1993) (Phil.), reprinted in 1 U.N. ENV’T
PROGRAMME ET AL., COMPENDIUM OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN MATTERS RELATED TO
ENVIRONMENT: NATIONAL DECISIONS 22, 30–31 (1998) [hereinafter UN COMPENDIUM]; see also
id. at 36 (Feliciano, J., concurring).
199 See Dante B. Gatmaytan, The Illusion of Intergenerational Equity: Oposa v. Factoran as a
Pyrrhic Victory, 15 GEO. INT’L ENV’T L. REV. 457, 467–68 (2003).
200 Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 22, at 772; see also Gatmaytan, supra note 199, at 467–68.
201 Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 22, at 772 (citing Metro. Manila Dev. Auth. v. Concerned
Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. No. 171947-48, 574 S.C.R.A. 661 (Dec. 18, 2008) (Phil.)).
202 Id. at 775.
195
196
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The expansive Filipino public trust doctrine has been described as
“encompassing terrestrial, aquatic, and marine resources, and
providing public access for recreational and ecological purposes, as well
as traditional public trust purposes.”203 While some public trust scholars
point to the Filipino doctrine as an international model,204 others have
raised questions about the force of the aspirational doctrine in reality.205
b. India
India, which inherited its jurisprudence from English common
law, recognizes the public trust even more broadly than the United
States,206 guaranteeing the protection of public environmental rights in
all natural resources nationwide. In India, the right to a healthy
environment has been framed as a component of the constitutionally
protected right to life,207 as first recognized in the Dehradun Quarrying
case.208 After Dehradun Quarrying, the Supreme Court of India first
articulated the Indian public trust doctrine in the 1997 decision in M.C.
Mehta v. Kamal Nath, in which it cited the California Supreme Court’s
reasoning in the Mono Lake case to set forth an even more powerful
version of the doctrine.209 After a developer sought to blast, dredge,
reconstruct, and redirect the flow of a river threatening its resort,210 the
plaintiffs sued to prevent it, arguing that the proposed action would
encroach on a protected forest, cause harm to public lands, and threaten
the community with landslides and flooding.211 Affirming the public
trust as “the law of the land” and that the public was the beneficiary of
the “sea-shore, running waters, airs, forests and ecologically fragile
lands,” the court sided with the plaintiffs.212 Referring to the English

Id. at 774.
Id.
205 David L. Callies & Katie L. Smith, The Public Trust Doctrine: A United States and
Comparative Analysis, 7 J. INT’L & COMP. L. 41 (2020) (while acknowledging that public trust
principles are evident throughout Filipino history, arguing that “the doctrine has never been
unequivocally adopted,” and that the words “public trust doctrine” are “not found anywhere in
the common law, statutes or Constitution of the Philippines”).
206 Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 22, at 760.
207 INDIAN CONST., art. 21.
208 Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra, Dehradun v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1988
SC 2187 (India).
209 M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 SCC 388 (India), reprinted in UN COMPENDIUM,
supra note 198, at 259.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 266–69.
212 Id. at 269–70, 272.
203
204

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3841825

7_RYAN.CURRY.RULE.42.6.7.DONE.docx (Do Not Delete)

2488

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

10/9/21 12:22 AM

[Vol. 42:6

common law roots of the public trust, the court held that the doctrine
protected:
The aesthetic use and the pristine glory of the natural resources, the
environment and the ecosystems of our country . . . [from being]
eroded for private, commercial or any other use unless the courts
find it necessary, in good faith, for the public good and in the public
interest to encroach upon the said resources.213

Three years after M.C. Mehta, the Indian Supreme Court held that the
doctrine was part of the Indian Constitution214 and further extended its
reach over all natural resources in the nation to include parklands.215
Indian case law also gives citizens a right to enforce the doctrine,
regardless of personal injury.216 At least one scholar credits judicial use
of the doctrine in the 1980s and 1990s with significant environmental
justice gains in India, but suggests that reinforcement by formal
environmental laws and regulations will be required to sustain them.217
3.

The Greater Middle East

a. Pakistan
There is no direct mention of the public trust doctrine in the
constitution or statutes of Pakistan,218 but the Supreme Court has
concluded that public rights to environmental health are implied by the
language of the constitution in article nine: “No person shall be
deprived of life or liberty save in accordance with law.”219 Article nine
appears to contain public trust-like principles that protect public rights

Id. at 273.
Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 22, at 762 (quoting M.I. Builders Priv. Ltd. v. Radhey
Shayam Sahu, (1999) 6 SCC 464, 518 (India)) (“The court agreed with a state high court that the
public trust doctrine protected the park because of its ‘historical importance and environmental
necessity’ and was entrenched in Article 21 of the Constitution, which declares that ‘[n]o person
shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by
law.’”).
215 Id. at 763.
216 Id. at 765 (citing Interview by Rachel Guthrie with Sairam Bhat, Professor, Nat’l L. Sch. of
India at Bangalore, in Portland, Or. (Oct. 21, 2010)).
217 Naazima Kamardeen, The Honeymoon Is Over: an Assessment of Judicial Activism in
Environmental Cases in Sri Lanka, 6 JINDAL GLOB. L. REV. 73 (2015).
218 Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 22, at 766.
219 PAKISTAN CONST. art. 9; Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 22, at 766–68; see In re Hum. Rts.
Case, (1994) 46 PLD (SC) 102 (1992) (Pak.), reprinted in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 198, at
280; Zia v. WAPDA, (1994) 46 PLD (SC) 693 (Pak.), reprinted in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note
198, at 323.
213
214
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in the “clean atmosphere and unpolluted environment” against actions
that would harm them.220 The doctrine has been definitively used to
protect water resources from pollution, especially drinking water, but
West Pakistan Salt Miners Union v. Director of Industries & Mineral
Development suggested that it would apply as needed to protect “any
environmental resources protected by the constitutional right to life.”221
In one case, In re Human Rights Case (Environmental Pollution in
Balochistan), the Supreme Court held that industrial and nuclear waste
dumping on coastal land violated article nine by creating
“environmental hazard and pollution.”222 In Shehla Zia v. WAPDA, the
Supreme Court further emphasized that the right to life included the
right to environmental health, applying the doctrine to electromagnetic
energy and requiring that any future siting of electicity facilities be
preceded by public notice and comment.223
b. Israel
Through a combination of different sources of law, Israeli law
features public trust language seeking to protect environmental rights
for present and future generations.224 The Protection of Coastal and
Environmental Law was enacted in 2004 to restore and preserve the
coastal environment for the benefit and enjoyment of the public and
future generations.225 The law considers the sea and shore as integral
pieces that extend three hundred meters inland from the country’s
territorial waters, essentially deeming the whole area a public resource
to be protected from damage.226 The Mejelle, referenced by Israeli case
law, also states that “[w]ater, air, and light are free to all, and all people
are joint owners in these three things.”227 The country has most
Zia, 46 PLD (SC) 693, reprinted in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 198, at 333–34.
Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 22, at 769 nn.145–46 (citing Salt Miners Union v. Dir. of
Indus. & Mineral Dev., (1994) SCMR (SC) 2061 (Pak.), reprinted in UN COMPENDIUM, supra
note 198, at 286 and PAKISTAN CONST. art. 9 (describing the constitutional right to life)).
222 In re Hum. Rts. Case, 46 PLD (SC) 102, reprinted in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 198, at
280.
223 Zia, 46 PLD (SC) 693, reprinted in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 198, at 323; see Blumm
& Guthrie, supra note 22, at 767–68 (citing the description of the word “life” in the decision of
Zia).
224 Introduction to Israel’s Legal System, LIBR. CONG. (June 6, 2015), https://www.loc.gov/law/
help/legal-research-guide/israel.php [https://perma.cc/67EZ-5VCH].
225 Protecting Israel’s Coast, MINISTRY ENV’T PROT. (Aug. 17, 2020), https://www.gov.il/en/
departments/guides/coastal_environment_preservation [https://perma.cc/UST6-H7YE]; Tzvi
Levinson, Julia Lietzmann & Gil Dror, Protection of the Coastal Environment—A Step Towards
Sustainability, 36 ENV’T POL’Y & L. 94 (2006).
226 MINISTRY ENV’T PROT., supra note 225.
227 Schorr, supra note 188.
220
221
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famously applied the rule to guarantee public rights of access to beach
and coastal areas in Puterman v. AG.228
4.

Africa

a. Uganda
Uganda’s extensive public trust doctrine parallels the
comprehensiveness of the doctrines found in the Philippines and India,
extending far upland from navigable waters.229 The Supreme Court of
Uganda first articulated the doctrine in its 2004 decision in Advocates
Coalition for Development and Environment v. Attorney General,230
where the plaintiff challenged on public trust grounds the government’s
approval of a fifty-year plantation permit for a forest reserve.231 The
court ruled that the government had breached its public trust
obligations by failing to perform an environmental impact assessment
and had failed its duty to obtain consent from the local community.232
Since then, Ugandan constitutional and statutory laws233 have
elaborated the Ugandan public trust doctrine to protect all surface water
resources, wetlands, groundwater, public lands (including national
parks, forests, and game reserves), wildlife, plant life, mineral resources,
and “any land to be reserved for ecological and touristic purposes for

228 In 1962, an Israeli court drew on the Mejelle to apply public trust-like principles in a case
affirming public rights to access beaches, overturning the conviction of Moshe Puterman for
trespassing on a public beach. CrimA (TA) 851/60 Puterman v. AG, PM 30, 7 (1962) (Isr.). For a
discussion of the case and the role of Ottoman law in the court’s decision, see Schorr, supra note
188; Rinat, supra note 188 (describing the case and the Mejelle doctrine it applied); Ryan, A Short
History, supra note 1, at 205.
229 Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 22, at 779 n.199 (comparing Ugandan law to parallel Indian
and Philippine case law).
230 Advocs. Coal. for Dev. & Env’t v. Att’y Gen., Misc. Cause No. 0100 of 2004 (July 11, 2005)
(Uganda),
https://elaw.org/system/files/attachments/publicresource/ug.Acode_.v.
AttorneyGeneral_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/RDV5-TTK6].
231 Id. at *4–5.
232 Id. at *23.
233 UGANDA CONST. objective XIII; id. art. 39; id. art. 237(2)(b); id. objective XXVII (directing
the state to “promote sustainable development and public awareness of the need to manage land,
air, water resources in a balanced and sustainable manner for the present and future generations,”
and that “the natural resources of Uganda shall be managed in such a way as to meet the
development and environmental needs of present and future generations of Ugandans;
and . . . take all possible measures to prevent or minimise damage and destruction to land, air
and water resources resulting from pollution or other causes”); The Land Act, ch. 227, § 44 (2010)
(Uganda); Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 22, at 777–78.
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the common good . . . .”234 As this piece goes to press, Ugandan
plaintiffs are currently attempting to expand public trust protections to
include atmospheric resources.235
b. Kenya
Kenya has interpreted the public trust doctrine as a legal means for
vindicating the right to life that is expressly protected in the Kenyan
Constitution.236 In Waweru v. Republic, the High Court of Kenya
allowed plaintiffs to rely on the doctrine in challenging the discharge of
raw sewage into the Kiserian River, holding that the Kenyan
Constitution entitles every citizen to the right to life and that the
Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act grants citizens a
right to a clean and healthy environment.237 After Waweru, Kenya
adopted a new constitution in 2010, which further expanded
environmental protections in guaranteeing the right “to have the
environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations
through legislative and other measures.”238
c. Nigeria
The public trust doctrine makes a brief but potentially significant
appearance in Nigeria’s Constitution of 1999, which declares that “[t]he
State shall protect and improve the environment and safeguard the
water, air and land, forest and wildlife of Nigeria.”239 However, to our

234 UGANDA CONST. art. 237(2)(b); The Land Act, ch. 227, § 44 (2010) (Uganda); Blumm &
Guthrie, supra note 22, at 779 (citing UGANDA CONST. objective XIII).
235 Mbabzi v Att’y Gen., Civil Suit No. 283 of 2012 (Uganda 2012) (sending the case to
mediation); see also Callies & Smith, supra note 205, at 61 (discussing the case). As this piece goes
to press, the plaintiffs are awaiting a scheduled hearing after failing to resolve the case in
mediation
and
amending
their
complaint.
‘Uganda,
OUR
CHILD.’S
TR.,
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/uganda [https://perma.cc/QL5P-LL2F].
236 Waweru v. Republic, (2006) 1 K.L.R. 677, 688 (H.C.K.) (Kenya), http://www.kenyalaw.org/
caselaw/cases/view/14988 [https://perma.cc/TL3Q-Q6RB]; see also Blumm & Guthrie, supra note
22, at 781–82 (discussing the case and its significance).
237 Waweru, 1 K.L.R. at 687 (citing CONST. OF KENYA art. 26 (2010) (Kenya) and
Environmental Management and Coordination Act (1999), Cap. 8 § 3, 108).
238 CONST. OF KENYA (2010), art. 42 (2010) (Kenya), https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/
constitution-of-kenya/112-chapter-four-the-bill-of-rights/part-2-rights-and-fundamentalfreedoms/208-42-environment [https://perma.cc/WRQ5-ET6Y] (“Every person has the right to
a clean and healthy environment, which includes the right—(a) to have the environment
protected for the benefit of present and future generations through legislative and other
measures, particularly those contemplated in Article 69; and (b) to have obligations relating to
the environment fulfilled under Article 70.”); see also Callies & Smith, supra note 205, at 62–63
(discussing the new provisions).
239 CONST. OF NIGERIA (1999), § 20.
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knowledge at the time this piece goes to press, this provision has yet to
be the subject of any case law enforcing or interpreting it.
d. South Africa
As in Kenya, India, Pakistan, and Nigeria, the South African
Constitution protects the right to life.240 South Africa goes further,
however, in codifying public trust principles directly into its
constitutional text, protecting the environment for the benefit of
present and future generations in Sections 11,241 24,242 and 27243. In
addition, the legislature codified public trust principles through the
National Water Act of 1998, which states that water is a natural resource
belonging to all people.244 One scholar reports that the judiciary is also
confirming the force of the doctrine in litigation.245 However, another
South African researcher observes that while the nation’s public trust
was designed to free scarce water resources from the constraints of both
private ownership and environmental regulation to meet basic human
needs, it has yet to be “operationalized” with meaningful guidance for
administrative decision-making.246
S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 11.
Id.
242 Id. § 24 (“Everyone has the right—a. to an environment that is not harmful to their health
or well-being; and b. to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future
generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that—i. prevent pollution and
ecological degradation; ii. promote conservation; and iii. secure ecologically sustainable
development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social
development.”).
243 Id. § 27 (“Everyone has the right to have access to . . . sufficient food and water . . . . The
state must take reasonable legislative and other measures . . . to achieve the progressive
realisation of . . . these rights.”).
244 National Water Act 36 of 1998 (S. Afr.).
245 Andrew Blackmore, Note, The Application of and the Prospects for the Public Trust
Doctrine in South Africa: A Brief Overview, 135 S. AFR. L.J. 631 (2018); see, e.g., Minister of Water
& Env’t Affs. v. Really Useful Invs., 2017 (1) SA 505 (SCA) (S. Afr.); Clairison’’s CC v. MEC for
Loc. Gov’t Env’t Affs. & Dev. Plan. & Bitou Mun., 2012 (3) SA 128 (CC) (S. Afr.); HTF Devs. v.
Minister of Env’t Affs. and Tourism, 2006 (5) SA 512 (T) (S. Afr.); Thomas v. Gouveia, 2008 (1)
SA 392 (T) (S. Afr.).
246 See Dr. Bill Harding, email communication of August 17, 2021 (on file with author)
(“While our version of the trust has clear US ‘roots’, it is quite a different beast and was deployed
as a transformative and democratising instrument which, without challenge, dispensed with
riparian rights to water and reallocated the whole of the resource in favour of meeting basic
human needs and reallocating water to the most appropriate uses. The parallel intention was to
remove obstacles to environmental protection, particularly with respect to water resource
protection according to an ecosystem directed basis. . . . What our environmental body of law
lacks is that the trust principles have yet to be built out to further their understanding, especially
in guidance for administrative decision making.”); see also Bill Harding, Hydroecological
240
241
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Europe

Conspicuously missing from the parade of nations developing
public trust principles for environmental protection are many of the
countries in Europe. As discussed further below, the British maintain
the doctrine of sovereign ownership of submerged lands but have not
developed the doctrine much beyond the common law principles
reviewed in Section I.A. Meanwhile, as noted above, European civil law
nations, such as Spain, have adopted a related principle of sovereign
ownership with shared roots in the Justinian jus publicum,247 given that
Roman common law is also the progenitor of much of the continental
European civil codes.248 It may be that Europeans have felt less need to
develop environmental rights under public trust principles because
their legal systems, at least by comparision with many others across the
globe, have protected environmental values more effectively by
conventional statutory and regulatory means. This Section briefly
reviews related developments in Great Britain, given its special status as
midwife to the American public trust.
a. England
While the principle of sovereign ownership of submerged
tidelands continues to apply, public trust principles never developed in
England the way they did in the United States.249 The term “public trust
doctrine” will not be recognized by the average English law scholar
unless they have studied its development in the United States or
corresponding principles of fiduciary obligations to public commons
that bind the crown in Canada.250 Even resource commons protected
connectivity as a normative framework for aquatic ecosystem regulation: Lessons from the USA
(thesis in preparation for the degree PhD in Public Law (Environmental Law), University of Cape
Town, South Africa).
247 Las Siete Partidas, P. III, tit. 28, laws III, IV, VI; Ker & Co. v. Couden, 223 U.S. 268 (1912)
(in interpreting a case about ownership of submerged lands, noting that under Spanish civil law,
the seashore flowed by the tides was public property, belonging, in Spain, to the sovereign).
Several Florida cases also discuss the Spanish roots of the Florida sovereign ownership aspect of
the public trust doctrine. Apalachicola Land & Dev. Co. v. McRae, 98 So. 505, 517–18 (Fla. 1923);
Geiger v. Filor, 8 Fla. 325, 336–37 (1859); Bd. of Trs. v. Webb, 618 So. 2d 1381, 1382 (Fla. 3d DCA
1993). Other Florida cases also cite to the English common law roots of the Florida public trust
doctrine. Broward v. Mabry, 50 So. 826, 829 (Fla. 1909); Geiger, 8 Fla. at 336–37.
248 See Yntema, supra note 190 (describing Roman common law as the “fundamental body of
legal doctrine” which is the “common element in the individual legal systems of much of
Continental Europe, and its colonies”).
249 See Bottomley, supra note 36, at 18–19 (distinguishing the American and English
approaches to common property).
250 See id.
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under the Magna Carta’s ancient Charter of the Forests have dwindled
in importance.251 Traditional forms of common property, such as
common pasture lands for grazing, became less important as the British
economy shifted from its feudal origins toward more entrenched and
widespread privatization.252 In assessing the devolution of English
commons to private property, Professor Anne Bottomley has observed
that “patterns of enclosure and privatisation” were substantially altering
the landscape by the seventeenth century and had overwhelmingly
changed it by the late eighteenth century.253
b. Scotland and Wales
However, the historic trend toward privatization of natural
resource commons is increasingly meeting with reversals in Great
Britain, especially in Scotland and Wales. In both Wales and England,
recent statutory law enables both public authorities and private
individuals to proactively designate land they already own as a
“registered commons” to purposefully preserve common rights of
access overlying more conventional forms of ownership.254 This
approach enables the creation of broader forms of public commons
than are currently recognized under most applications of the American
public trust doctrine, but these statutory commons do not hold the
foundational, quasi-constitutional character of the pre-statutory public
trust doctrine as a constraint on sovereign authority.255 Meanwhile,
Scotland has embarked on an even more ambitious program of
reasserting public natural resource commons in its adoption of the 2003
Land Reform Act, which establishes access rights over much of the

251 See Nield, supra note 36, at 5–8, 13 (discussing the waning lands and resources protected
under English Forest Law from the Middle Ages to the New Forest Act of 1964).
252 See id. at 12–23 (discussing the gradual privatization of the sovereign forest commons);
Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic Property Cases
About the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 807–09 (1979) (discussing the development of
the “enclosure movement” and the historical trend away from public commons and toward
exclusivity in the use and ownership of natural resources).
253 See Bottomley, supra note 36, at 5; see also id. at 16 (“It is no surprise that commons, as the
state of nature, was understood in so much European political philosophy as simply being in a
state-of-waiting to be made into, reduced into, property by the inventive intrusion of the
human.”).
254 Id. at 19–20.
255 Id. at 18–19 (differentiating between the English and Welsh approaches to public
commons and the public trust approach taken in the United States).
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country’s open land and inland water resources, even those privately
owned.256
c. A Future British Trust?
Notably, some predict that environmental law in Great Britain will
likely get weaker after Brexit, the British exit from the European Union,
because environmental harm will no longer be the subject of stricter
E.U. laws overseen by the Court of the European Union.257 If
environmental protection becomes weakened in this way, it could
present an opportunity to for the British to readdress the role of the
public trust doctrine as a common law constraint with implications for
environmental protection.258 Some scholars suggest that English courts
adopt the American version of the doctrine that has developed since its
departure from English origins, referencing American public trust cases
where analogous claims have arisen in the U.K.259 In this way, public
trust principles emphasizing environmental values may yet cross the
pond in the opposite direction, bringing the development of the
common law doctrine full circle.
6.

Latin America

a. Brazil
Public trust principles are both an explicit and implicit feature of
Brazil’s 1993 constitution, which affirms the sovereign ownership of
submerged lands and tidelands, mineral resources, archaeological sites,
256 Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, (ASP 2) pt. 1; see also John A. Lovett, Progressive
Property in Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, 89 NEB. L. REV. 739, 741 (2011) (“In
Part I of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 (the LRSA), just the latest in a series of sweeping
property law reform initiatives in Scotland, the Scots have created a new kind of property interest
and a detailed property regime to contextualize this interest. At the heart of this regime is the
right of responsible access. It is a right to go almost anywhere in Scotland, on most land and
inland water, whether privately owned or public, without a motorized vehicle, for purposes of
recreation, education, and passage, as long as one acts responsibly.”).
257 Marc Willers & Emily Shirley, The Public Trust Doctrine’s Role in Post-Brexit Britain,
GARDEN CT. CHAMBER (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.gardencourtchambers.co.uk/the-publictrust-doctrines-role-in-post-brexit-britain [https://perma.cc/7885-UJW4].
258 Id.
259 See, e.g., Bottomley, supra note 36, at 17–19. Nevertheless, other scholars considering the
matter have noted that English statutory law may already obviate some of the more ambitious
environmental applications of the trust, such as the atmospheric trust project, which some may
argue has been preempted by the Climate Change Act of 2008 that sets legally binding carbon
reduction targets for the country. Bradley Freeman & Emily Shirley, England and the Public Trust
Doctrine, J. PLAN. & ENV’T L. 839, 845 (2014).
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caves, and energy sites,260 but also adopts the core environmental rights
of ecological protection, intergenerational equity, public environmental
rights, and the sovereign responsibility of the government as trustee of
these rights and resources.261 Brazil’s Constitution also protects
ecological processes, genetic wealth, fauna, and flora—recognizing the
“national wealth” and key resources of the Amazon Forest, Atlantic
Woodlands, and the coastline.262 However, the public trust doctrine has
not thus far been the subject of litigation in Brazilian courts.263
b. Ecuador
In 2008, Ecuador arguably ratified the most ambitious set of
constitutional protections for environmental rights in the world.264 The
2008 Ecuadorian Constitution incorporated public trust principles
extending well beyond waterways to include nearly all natural
resources.265 However, as discussed in Part II, Ecuador went further
than protecting the public trust doctrine, becoming the first nation to
explicitly recognize the legal rights of nature. In addition to assigning
sovereign responsibility for protecting conventional public trust
principles, the constitution declares the fundamental rights inherent in
nature, including rights to exist, persist, and flourish, and grants all
persons the right to “call upon public authorities to enforce the rights
of nature.”266

CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 20 (Braz.).
Id. art. 5; id. art. 225 (“All have the right to an ecologically balanced environment, which
is an asset of common use and essential to a healthy quality of life, and both the Government and
the community shall have the duty to defend and preserve it for present and future generations.”).
262 Id. art. 20; id. art. 225 (also listing the Serra do Mar and the Pantanal Mato-Grossense, and
prohibiting the alienation of “unoccupied” lands if “necessary to protect the natural
ecosystems”).
263 Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 22, at 794.
264 CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR 2008 [C.P.] [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 20,
2008, art. 71 (Ecuador).
265 Id. art. 12; id. art. 375, cl. 8. The constitution refers to “[t]he unique and priceless natural
assets of Ecuador includ[ing], among others, the physical, biological and geological formations
whose value from the environmental, scientific, cultural, or landscape standpoint requires
protection, conservation, recovery and promotion.” Id. art. 404.
266 Id. art. 71.
260
261
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North America

a. Canada
Canada has endorsed public trust principles without formally
affixing them into law. Reflecting the common roots of American and
Canadian law in the public trust principles of the Roman jus publicum
and English Magna Carta, Canadian courts have allowed suit against
the government for failure to maintain common rights to fish in
Atlantic waters.267 Beyond that, Canadian law has not more formally
developed the public trust in the ways that American states have.
Nevertheless, references to public trust principles have surfaced in
disputes over public access and private obstructions to navigable
waterways and other environmental values. For example, in considering
whether a mining project was exempt from environmental assessment
requirements, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal held for the
environmental plaintiffs on grounds that public trust principles
protecting future generations were an important element of the
governing environmental legislation.268 Similarly, in addressing a forest
fire public nuisance claim in British Columbia v. Canadian Forest
Products, the court discussed the evolution of the American public trust
doctrine and opined that the public trust principles at stake in this case
granted the federal government damages for the forest fire, which was
caused by a Crown licensee’s negligence.269
b. United States
Finally, we return full circle to the United States. Although Section
I.B extensively reviewed the development of the doctrine across
individual states, it is also worth noting the potential for future public
267 Prince Edward Island v. Canada (2005), 256 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 343 ¶¶ 6, 37 (Can. P.E.I. Sup.
Ct.) (relying in part on British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Prods. Ltd., [2004] 2 S.C.R. 74 (Can.),
the court explained that if a government can sue “as guardian of the public interest, to claim
against a party causing damage to that public interest, then it would seem that in another case, a
beneficiary of the public interest ought to be able to claim against the government for a failure to
properly protect the public interest,” as “[a] right gives rise to a corresponding duty”).
268 Labrador Inuit Ass’n v. Newfoundland (1997), 155 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 93 ¶¶ 11, 80 (Can. Nfld.
C.A.) (“If the rights of future generations to the protection of the present integrity of the natural
world are to be taken seriously, and not to be regarded as mere empty rhetoric, care must be
taken in the interpretation and application of the legislation. Environmental laws must be
construed against their commitment to future generations and against a recognition that, in
addressing environmental issues, we often have imperfect knowledge as to the potential impact
of activities on the environment.”).
269 Canadian Forest Prods. Ltd., 2 S.C.R. ¶¶ 1, 46, 78–80 (the Crown sued for damages both in
its capacity as landowner and as representative of the public interest).
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trust developments at the national level. Although the U.S. Supreme
Court has not considered the issue directly, it has indicated in dicta that
the doctrine operates only as a matter of state law, and not federal law.270
Nevertheless, both environmental and scholarly advocates have long
argued that there is no reason to distinguish between the implications
of the doctrine for state and federal authority. That is to say, if the
doctrine limits sovereign authority to alienate or compromise essential
public commons, it should not matter at what level that authority is
operating, and federal sovereign authority should also be subject to the
responsibilities imposed by the doctrine.271 The argument rests on the
idea that the doctrine is an implied feature of federal constitutional
law,272 both because there is no reason to differentiate between state and

270 PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012); see also Ryan, A Short History, supra
note 1, at 170, 176–81 (discussing arguments that the public trust is also a constraint on federal
authority).
271 See, e.g., MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW
ECOLOGICAL AGE 133–36 (2014)]; Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of
Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological
Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENV’T L. 43, 74 (2009); Mary Christina Wood,
Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and
Future Generations (Part II): Instilling a Fiduciary Obligation in Governance, 39 ENV’T L. 91, 135–
36 (2009) (suggesting avenues for Congress to meet its public trust responsibilities); Blumm &
Schaffer, supra note 129, at 401 (arguing that “there is considerable precedent applying the public
trust doctrine to the federal government”); Blumm, Dunning & Reed, supra note 142, at 494
(“[T]he public trust is grounded in the federal constitutional equal footing doctrine . . . .”);
Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 426 (1987) (asserting that the
constitutional nature of the trust limits sovereign authority over public property in the same way
the Takings Clause limits sovereign authority over private property). As Gerald Torres and
Nathan Bellinger have written:
While some rights are created by government, others—often the most important preexisting rights—are inherent to humankind and merely secured by government. The
public trust doctrine is one of these inherent rights that pre-dates the United States
Constitution. As such, we suggest that the public trust doctrine is the chalkboard on
which the Constitution is written. When one writes something on a chalkboard, we
see the meaning of the writing, but we commonly forget that there is still a
chalkboard that created the space for the writing. We recognize that meaning comes
from what is actually written, but there could be no such conveyance of meaning
without the chalkboard as a foundation. After all, the Constitution was not written
on a blank slate but was written with certain principles and rights in mind. As the
chalkboard on which the Constitution was written, the public trust doctrine provides
the background and context for the Constitution.
Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law’s DNA, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. &
POL’Y 281, 288 (2014).
272 See, e.g., Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 129, at 403–07; see also Mono Lake to the
Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 60–64 (discussing the argument as raised in atmospheric trust
litigation, including Juliana v. United States); Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D.
Or. 2016), rev’d, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
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federal actors in this area, and because all post-thirteen-colony states
inherited their trust obligations through federal sovereignty.273 The
effort to expand recognition of the public trust constraint on federal
sovereign authority was a foundation of the atmospheric trust project,
a coordinated effort to sue state and federal actors for violating the
public trust doctrine obligations on the government to protect the
atmosphere, referencing the original Justinian reference to protected
trust resources in not only the sea and the shores of the sea, but also the
air.274 The most famous of these efforts included Juliana v. United
States, the “Kid’s Climate Case,” where youth plaintiffs sought
injunctive relief under the doctrine to protect the atmosphere from
greenhouse gas pollution and vindicate their fundamental right to
climate stability.275 After an exceedingly complex procedural history,276
the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case, but at the time of this writing, the
plaintiffs are considering further appeals.277
But as avenues are foreclosed to protect critical environmental
values and ecosystems under the public trust doctrine, environmental
advocates are increasingly turning to a new argument: the obligation to
protect the rights of nature themselves.

273 One way of viewing this is that in the equal footing conveyances, the federal government
itself imposed the trust on the states. See Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 129, at 403–07 (discussing
Justice Kennedy’s reference to the equal footing doctrine in Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521
U.S. 261 (1997) and what it means for the public trust doctrine’s origins).
274 THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 2.1.1 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., Longmans, Green &
Co. 4th ed. 1869).
275 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224; see also Symposium, Juliana v. United States: Debating the
Fundamentals of the Fundamental Right to a Sustainable Climate, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. ONLINE
1 (2018) (analyzing both the atmospheric trust claim and the accompanying fundamental rights
claim for climate stability); Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 60–64
(discussing the atmospheric trust litigation and analyzing the substantive and procedural history
of Juliana v. United States).
276 After a dramatic series of interlocutory appeals, writs of mandamus, and other attempts to
end the case before trial that extended over a period of nearly four years, the district court judge
heeded the U.S. Supreme Court’s hint to reverse herself on allowing the case to move forward,
making way for the Ninth Circuit to finally dismiss the case. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224
(rejecting the initial motion to dismiss); Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1164–66 (9th
Cir. 2020) (upholding the case amid two Trump Administration writs of mandamus); In re
United States, 139 S. Ct. 452 (2018) (U.S. Supreme Court dismissing the Administration’s writ,
but suggesting it be considered on interlocutory appeal); Juliana v. United States, No. 15-cv01517, 2018 WL 6303774, at *3 (D. Or. Nov. 21, 2018) (district court reversing itself and allowing
the interlocutory appeal); Juliana, 947 F.3d 1159 (reversing the district court and dismissing the
case); see also Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 60–64 (analyzing the complex
procedural history of Juliana v. United States).
277 Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1175.
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OVERVIEW OF THE RIGHTS OF NATURE

We’ve divided the diversity of life on Earth into two
categories—people and things. . . . To say we share this planet
with millions of other species is ecologically incontrovertible,
but legally incorrect. If we are the only species with rights, we
are the only species that really matters.278

Environmental law has long focused on protecting nature as a
resource for human enjoyment. By conventional accounts, we protect
water so people can drink or swim in it, air so people can breathe it,
natural areas for beauty and recreation, and ecosystem services to
provide irreplaceable benefits, such as flood control and agriculture.
However, this account has left other environmental advocates
unsatisfied. In Environmental Personhood, Professor Gwendolyn
Gordon observes that the “homocentric view” of environmental law has
“tended to jam environmental protection arguments into particular
shapes,” justifying environmental measures solely for the benefits they
can provide human beings, such as “allowing more people to experience
wilderness, or protecting the food chain for human consumption.”279
Even the public trust doctrine, celebrated by advocates as it is
increasingly deployed toward environmental protection, has been
criticized for overreliance on property right principles centered around
changing human needs.280 Tethering environmental protection to
ownership raises troubling questions about the viability of long-term
environmental protection in the face of mercurial public priorities.281
Reflecting these concerns, the rights of nature movement rejects this
paradigm and asserts that nature and natural features have inherent
value independent of human needs, and should accordingly be entitled
to their own legal rights.
The rights of nature movement springs from two wells, one
philosophical and the other pragmatic. For philosophical adherents, the
movement offers a critical reframing of environmental rights and
values, from an anthropocentric worldview arranged around
278 DAVID R. BOYD, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE: A LEGAL REVOLUTION THAT COULD SAVE THE
WORLD 8 (2017).
279 Gwendolyn J. Gordon, Environmental Personhood, 43 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 49, 72 (2018).
280 See Ryan, Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 60; see also Matthews v.
Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984) (“[W]e perceive the public trust
doctrine not to be ‘fixed or static,’ but one to ‘be molded and extended to meet changing
conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit.’” (quoting Borough of Neptune City
v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972)).
281 See Ryan, Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 60.
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conventional property and tort legal constructs to a biocentric system
that vindicates legal rights in ecosystems and other natural features
unrecognized at common law.282 For pragmatists, the movement
provides an alternative mechanism for environmental protection to
replace or complement conventional regulatory schemes that have
proved inadequate to the task.283 These advocates point to mounting
environmental degradation around the world as irrefutable evidence
that the anthropocentric system is fundamentally flawed.284
Conventional environmental legislation like the Clean Water Act, they
argue, only legalizes pollution, rather than preventing it.285 Many
communities frustrated by the perceived shortfalls of existing
environmental laws are pragmatically turning to the rights of nature as
a new way to protect the natural systems they hold dear.
This Part provides a brief overview of the rights of nature
movement, beginning with its historical origins in Indigenous culture
and early U.S. law, including its famous rejection by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Sierra Club v. Morton.286 It considers three different axes along
which different movements have developed, including what in nature is
protected, who speaks for rights-holders that cannot speak for
themselves, and by what mechanism of governance legal protections are
provided. It then reviews the explosion of rights of nature legal
movements in countries throughout the world, including generalized
constitutional recognition in Ecuador and legal personhood granted to
specific resources, often rivers, in countries like India, New Zealand,

282 For example, the Earth Law Center advocates for “a new generation of law that recognizes
the interconnectedness between humans and Nature and our responsibility to protect and defend
Nature.” What is Earth Law?, EARTH L. CTR., https://www.earthlawcenter.org/what-is-earth-law
[https://perma.cc/4ZJU-YZX7]. Similarly, The Global Alliance for Rights of Nature seeks to
“create a system of jurisprudence that sees and treats nature as a fundamental, rights bearing
entity and not as mere property to be exploited at will.” Our Mission, GLOB. ALL. FOR RTS.
NATURE, https://www.therightsofnature.org/fundamental-principles [https://perma.cc/34AFTB9U].
283 Katharine Bleau, Ecological Law: A New Era for the Environment, AM. BAR. ASS’N (Apr. 28,
2021),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources/publications/
natural_resources_environment/2020-21/spring/ecological-law-new-era-the-environment
[https://perma.cc/JP9W-2P7B] (noting the inadequacies of environmental legal regimes and the
growing “ecological law” movement).
284 Id.
285 The Clean Water Act, for example, prohibits the discharge of pollutants from a point
source into navigable waters without first obtaining a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit. The NPDES permit, in turn, allows the discharge of a specified level of
pollutant into a waterway. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
286 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972).
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and Colombia.287 Finally, it returns to the United States to review the
series of local rights of nature efforts that have recently emerged in
different states and among different North American tribal nations,
including a closer look at the ongoing controversy over rights of nature
ordinances in Florida.
A.

Historical Origins of Rights of Nature Principles
1.

Historical Origins: Indigenous Cultures

The basic principles advocated by the rights of nature movement—
that nature and its constituent components have intrinsic value that
deserve protection independently from human needs—appeared early
in human history and remain vital in many Indigenous cultures that
honor and protect the rights of nature as a cultural matter.288 For many
such communities, both domestic and abroad, rights of nature
principles are an ancient and deeply ingrained concept.289 Reflecting on
the growing rights of nature movement among Indigenous
communities today, Geneva E.B. Thompson, Associate General
Counsel for the Yurok Tribe of California, has observed:
For many indigenous nations, the advocacy for a healthy
environment is deeply intertwined with the protection of traditional,
historical, and cultural lifeways and practices. . . . [a connection that]
has been in place since time immemorial and will continue to be an
important and sacred connection well into the future.290

In these systems of governance, nature is not subordinate to
people; nature and humans are inextricably knit together. The 2010
Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth, drafted in Bolivia
by the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights
287 For additional discussion of the theoretical origins of the rights of nature movement and
its early milestones in New Zealand and elsewhere, see David Takacs, We Are the River, 2021 U.
ILL. L. REV. 545 (2021), published just as this article goes to press.
288 See Joseph Kowalski, Environmentalism Isn’t New: Lessons from Indigenous Law, 26
BUFFALO ENV’T L.J. 15, 29 (2019) (“In short, much of Indigenous jurisprudence was tied to
ancient spiritual beliefs regarding the earth as a sacred, living being. Their land carried lessons
for them on how to live, and a duty to care for the land. . . . The land was the source of all life,
and, therefore, the rules of how to live in that environment.”).
289 See BOYD, supra note 278, at 9 (“A key element of the legal systems of many Indigenous
cultures is a set of reciprocal rights and responsibilities between humans and other species, as
well as between humans and non-living elements of the environment.”).
290 Geneva E. B. Thompson, Codifying the Rights of Nature: The Growing Indigenous
Movement, 59 JUDGES’ J. 12, 12 (2020).
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of Mother Earth, draws on these ideals in its declaration that “we are all
part of Mother Earth, an indivisible, living community of interrelated
and interdependent beings with a common destiny.”291 For many of the
communities that contributed to this statement, the rights of nature
movement simply represents a return to their traditions and values.292
As Jon Greendeer, executive director of Heritage Preservation with the
Ho-Chunk Nation, remarked, “[t]his concept was always
there . . . . What the rights of nature does is translate our beliefs from an
indigenous perspective into modern legislation.”293
Beyond Indigenous cultures like these, however, the idea has long
run counter to most legal norms in most modern political contexts.
Indeed, the idea first appeared in the U.S. legal context in a famous
example of environmental litigation, Sierra Club v. Morton, where it was
formally rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court.
2.

Historical Origins: Should Trees Have Standing? and Sierra Club
v. Morton

In the United States, the origin of the rights of nature movement is
generally attributed to Christopher Stone’s article, Should Trees Have
Standing?,294 which played an important role in Justice Douglas’s
consideration of Sierra Club v. Morton.295 In that 1972 case, the Sierra
Club had sued Disney to halt construction of a proposed ski resort
within the Mineral King Valley in the Sequoia National Forest.296 The
Disney proposal included a sprawling eighty-acre complex of motels,
restaurants, ski facilities, parking lots, power lines, and a new twenty-

291 WORLD PEOPLE’S CONF. ON CLIMATE CHANGE & THE RTS. OF MOTHER EARTH, UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION
OF
RIGHTS
OF
MOTHER
EARTH
(2010),
https://www.therightsofnature.org/universal-declaration [https://perma.cc/X5TZ-V4ND].
292 See Lidia Cano Pecharroman, Rights of Nature: Rivers That Can Stand in Court, 7 RES. 1,
6 (2018) (“The paradigm that embraces and understands nature as a being with rights has been
part of many indigenous populations’ worldviews for hundreds of years. Their interdependent
relationship with nature has resulted in non-anthropocentric social systems in which human’s
harmonious relation with nature has been always the desirable outcome.”).
293 Justin Nobel, How a Small Town Is Standing Up to Fracking, ROLLING STONE (May 22,
2017, 3:35 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/how-a-small-town-isstanding-up-to-fracking-117307 [https://perma.cc/MF87-4VBZ].
294 Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 453 (1972).
295 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741–42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
296 Id. at 728–30 (majority opinion).
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mile highway through the forest, and the Sierra Club argued that it
would cause serious environmental damage.297
Notably, Sierra Club did not argue that their members were
directly impacted by the proposal, but rather that the project would
change the area’s “aesthetics and ecology” and “destroy or otherwise
adversely affect the scenery, natural and historic objects and wildlife of
the park and would impair the enjoyment of the park for future
generations.”298 To seek redress for these harms in court, however, a
plaintiff must show that it has standing to bring the suit, generally
satisfied when the plaintiff can show that the allegedly wrongful
conduct creates a specific and imminent injury that the court can
redress.299 The Sierra Club claimed that its “longstanding concern with
and expertise in such matters were sufficient to give it standing as a
‘representative of the public.’”300 The Supreme Court rejected this
argument, holding instead that the Sierra Club could not show standing
without demonstrating that its members would directly suffer adverse
impacts.301 In other words, imminent harm to the natural resources
themselves was not cognizable by the Court unless that harm produced
secondary impacts to a specific person bringing the lawsuit.
Sierra Club v. Morton is most relevant today not because of the
majority’s holding, but because of the passionate dissent that Justice
Douglas contributed to the decision. As David Boyd relates the story,
while Justice Douglas was considering Sierra Club v. Morton, he was
serving as a guest editor for a special edition of the Southern California
Law Review.302 Knowing this, contributing author Christopher Stone,
an environmental law professor at the University of Southern
California, “worked feverishly” to finish an article advocating for the
formal recognition of legal rights in nature so that he could include it
among the edition’s articles for Justice Douglas’s review.303 In his
resulting article, Should Trees Have Standing?, Professor Stone argued
that legal rights should be conferred on forests, oceans, rivers, and the
“natural environment as a whole.”304 Stone argued that natural objects
should have legal guardians and that environmental groups like the
Sierra Club were well poised to serve in that role. After all, he urged that
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304

Id. at 729–34.
Id. at 727, 734.
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 736.
Id. at 739–41.
BOYD, supra note 278, at 107.
Id.
Stone, supra note 294, at 456.
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“[c]orporations cannot speak either; nor can states, estates, infants,
incompetents, municipalities or universities. Lawyers speak for them,
as they customarily do for the ordinary citizen with legal problems.”305
By all accounts, Stone’s article appears to have had a strong
influence on Justice Douglas’s decision in the case. Reflecting many of
Stone’s arguments in his dissent, Justice Douglas advocated that legal
standing should be conferred on “environmental objects to sue for their
own preservation,” and that the case “would therefore be more properly
labeled as Mineral King v. Morton.”306 He recounted the routine and
widely accepted legal fictions of personhood conferred on ships and
corporations and asserted the same should apply to the natural world.307
So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes,
estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even
air . . . . The river, for example, is the living symbol of all the life it
sustains or nourishes—fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter,
fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all other animals, including man, who are
dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life. The
river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of
it.308

Although Justice Douglas failed to persuade a majority of his peers
on the Supreme Court, his dissent became the subject of an ongoing
legal conversation that would eventually help seed the modern rights of
nature movement.309
Following Sierra Club v. Morton, the rights of nature movement
lay dormant in the United States for nearly four decades. However,
while the movement languished domestically, it reemerged in the early
2000s internationally, driven in many instances by the Indigenous
communities discussed above, for whom these principles have long
been culturally central.310 Today, both the legacies of these traditional
Indigenous belief systems and the legal arguments of Justice Douglas’s
dissent are visible, in varying degrees, in many legal statements of the
rights of nature. Indeed, the different historical and philosophical

Id. at 464.
Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 742 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
307 Id. at 742–43.
308 Id. at 743.
309 David R. Boyd, Recognizing the Rights of Nature: Lofty Rhetoric or Legal Revolution?, 32
NAT. RES. & ENV’T 13, 13 (2018) (“Almost 50 years later, the seed of an idea planted by Professor
Stone and endorsed by Justice Douglas is blossoming all over the world. Acknowledging that
natural entities—trees, rivers and ecosystems—have legal rights has evolved from an academic
concept into black letter law.”).
310 See infra Section III.D.5.
305
306
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underpinnings of distinct rights of nature movements add diversity and
nuance to these different legal movements, which display as much or
more jurisdictional variety as the public trust doctrine. As explored
further in Part III, rich differences in the underlying legal cultures and
jurisdictional contexts may help explain the relative ease or difficulty by
which rights of nature movements take hold and succeed at their tasks.
B.

The Evolution of Rights of Nature Principles Across Different Axes

Just as the public trust doctrine has developed along different axes
in different jurisdictions, so has the rights of nature movement. Like the
public trust doctrine, rights of nature initiatives vary in what they
protect and the legal mechanisms by which protections are conferred,
adding further variation on the issue of who is empowered to vindicate
those rights.
This Section reviews four different axes along which different
rights of nature movements have developed, including what in nature
receives protection, who speaks for rights-holders that cannot speak for
themselves, by what mechanism of governance legal protections are
provided, and the nature of the rights that are actually granted. The
categories reviewed here do not exhaustively catalog all rights of nature
initiatives or the different features among them; instead, they showcase
the broad diversity of efforts—some more successful than others—
emerging both domestically and abroad. Indeed, aside from the core
principle that environmental rights should inhere in nonhuman beings,
the most striking feature of the rights of nature movement is the deep
diversity among individual efforts. Most accurately stated, there is no
one rights of nature movement; instead, there are many, each one
unfolding uniquely from others. The resulting laws differ dramatically
in design and application.311
1.

What is Protected Under the Rights of Nature Doctrine?

The first important axis on which rights of nature initiatives divide
is the question of what, exactly, it is in nature that receives legal

311 The academic discourse on understanding the nascent rights of nature movement is just
emerging, analyzing efficacy and norm construction. Craig M. Kauffman & Pamela L. Martin,
Constructing Rights of Nature Norms in the US, Ecuador, and New Zealand, 18 GLOBAL ENVT’L.
POL. 43 (2018) (describing the rights of nature movement in three nations along axes of scope
and strength).
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protection. In general, rights of nature laws fall into three distinct
categories: those that protect all of nature, those that protect specific
natural features or ecosystems, and those that protect individual plant
or animal species.
The first and most sweeping category protects nature in its
entirety, or as a very broad concept. For example, the Ecuadorian
Constitution, discussed further below, sets forth broad protections for
nature in its Constitution, explicitly protecting nature’s right to
“integral respect for its existence and for the maintenance and
regeneration of its life cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary
processes.”312 Similarly, the Bolivian Law of the Rights of Mother Earth
grants “Mother Earth” the right to life, biodiversity, water, clean air,
balance, restoration, and to be free from pollution.313 The Mexican state
of Colima adopted an ambitious rights of nature constitutional
amendment recognizing that nature, including all its ecosystems and
species, is entitled to rights, including restoration, regeneration of
natural cycles, and the conservation of its structure and ecological
functions.314
In the second category, representing the most commonly deployed
structure of the three, the rights of nature initiative protects a specific
natural feature, and often the ecosystems they sustain. For example,
rights of nature laws in New Zealand have protected the Whanganui
River315 and Mount Taranaki316 ecosystems by name, including
protections for the constituent components of these natural systems,
including water flows, wildlife, soils, and geologic features.317 India has
protected the Ganges River318 and two glacier-river systems, the

312 CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR 2008 [C.P.] [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 20,
2008, art. 71 (Ecuador).
313 Ley de Derechos de la Madre Tierra [Law of the Rights of Mother Earth], 2010 (Law No.
71) ch. III, art. 7 (Bol.).
314 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO LIBRE Y SOBERANO DE COLIMA [CONSTITUTION] art.
2 cl. IX (Mex.).
315 Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act of 2017, subpt. 12 (N.Z.).
316 Record of Understanding for Mount Taranaki, Pouākai and the Kaitake Ranges (Dec. 20,
2017) (N.Z.) [hereinafter Record of Understanding], https://www.govt.nz/assets/Documents/
OTS/Taranaki-Maunga/Taranaki-Maunga-Te-Anga-Putakerongo-Record-of-Understanding20-December-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2F9-4L57].
317 Te Urewera Act 2014, subpt. 5 (N.Z.) (“the value of Te Urewera for soil, water, and forest
conservation is maintained”); Id. at subpt. 46 (nothing that the management plan for Te Urewera
must include “scenic, geological, soil, and landform features”).
318 Mohd. Salim v. State of Uttarakhand, (2017) Writ Petition (PIL) No. 126 of 2014 (UTT
H.C.)
(India),
https://www.nonhumanrights.org/content/uploads/WPPIL-126-14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EA23-EMBS].
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Gangotri and Yamunotri glaciers.319 Colombia protects the Atrato
River320 and the Columbian Amazon321, among others. Australia
protects the Yarra River322 and has fielded calls for rights of nature
protections for the Great Barrier Reef and Artesian Basin.323 The city of
Toledo, Ohio, attempted to enact rights of nature protections for Lake
Erie, although the ordinance was later invalidated.324 Occupying
something of a middle-ground between this category and the first
protecting nature more broadly, Bangladesh has granted legal
personhood to all river systems within the nation.325
The final category along this axis more narrowly protects
individual species within a wider unprotected ecosystem, such as the
protection of a keystone species of wild rice by the White Earth Band of
Ojibwe, part of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe.326 Several state courts
in India, including the High Court of Uttarakhand327 and the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana, have protected animals as legal
319 Lalit Miglani v. State of Uttarakhand, (2017) Writ Petition (PIL) No. 140 of 2015 (UTT
H.C.) (India), http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/living%20entity%20Gangotri%
20Himalaya%20Uttarakhand%20High%20Court%20Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJ5M-BQ39].
320 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], noviembre 10, 2016, Sentencia T622/16 (Colom.) (Dignity Rts. Project trans., 2019), https://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/
resources/riveratratodecisionenglishdrpdellaw.pdf [https://perma.cc/JYE9-6D8M].
321 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Civ. abril 5, 2018, M.P. Luis
Armando Tolosa Villabona, STC4360-2018, Radicación n. 11001-22-03-000-2018-00319-01
(Colom.),
https://www.dejusticia.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Fallo-Corte-Suprema-deJusticia-Litigio-Cambio-Clim%C3%A1tico.pdf [https://perma.cc/EB3T-9TD5]; Colombian
Supreme Court Rules to Protect Future Generations and Amazon Rainforest in Climate Change
Case, ESCR-NET, https://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/2019/stc-4360-2018 [https://perma.cc/
7E8T-H9DJ].
322 Yarra River Protection Act 2017 (Vict.) subpt. 5(b) (Austl.).
323 U.N. Secretary-General, Harmony with Nature, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. A/74/236 (July 26, 2019)
(noting that in 2018, one Australian Senator “called for the adoption of rights of Nature laws, in
particular for iconic ecosystems such as the Great Barrier Reef, the Murray-Darling Basin and
the Great Artesian Basin”).
324 Drewes Farms P’ship v. City of Toledo, 441 F. Supp. 3d 551, 554, 558 (N.D. Ohio 2020).
325 Mari Margil, Bangladesh Supreme Court Upholds Rights of Rivers, MEDIUM (Aug. 24, 2020),
https://medium.com/@mari_margil/bangladesh-supreme-court-upholds-rights-of-riversede78568d8aa [https://perma.cc/ZX94-EB5A]; Rina Chandran, Fears of Evictions as Bangladesh
Gives Rivers Legal Rights, THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. NEWS (July 4, 2019, 11:58 AM),
https://news.trust.org/item/20190704113918-rzada [https://perma.cc/GZD4-U9AF]. For further
discussion, see infra Section II.C.3.b.
326 1855 Treaty Auth., Resolution Establishing Rights of Manoomin, Res. 2018-05 (Dec. 5,
2018), https://whiteearth.com/assets/files/public_documents/Letter%20to%20Tim%20Walz%
20re%20Rights%20of%20Manoomin.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Q26-UFBV].
327 Vineet Upadhyay, Animals Have Equal Rights as Humans, Says Uttarakhand High Court,
TIMES INDIA (July 5, 2018, 1:19 PM), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/dehradun/
members-of-animal-kingdom-to-be-treated-as-legal-entities-ukhand-hc/articleshow/
64860996.cms [https://perma.cc/N5B9-ANPP].
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persons.328 Similar efforts to recognize the rights of animals in captivity
through habeas corpus petitions have resulted in several instances of
animals being recognized as non-human persons.329
2.

Who Speaks for Rights-Holders?

The second axis on which different rights of nature initiatives
divide centers on the question of who advocates for nature, or who
speaks for rights-holders in the legal system that protects them, when
they cannot speak directly for themselves. Again, most rights of nature
laws fall into three categories: those in which anyone can speak for
nature, as a citizen-attorney general; those empowering anyone in the
local community with a special relationship to the protected aspect of
nature; and those that designate a specific legal guardian for the rightsholder.
In the first variety, anyone can represent nature and vindicate its
rights, empowering individuals, communities, and government entities.
In Ecuador, for example, “[a]ll persons, communities, peoples and
nations can call upon public authorities to enforce the rights of
nature.”330 This approach is often associated with rights of nature
approaches that protect nature in its broadest sense, rather than those
that target more specific features within nature.
The second and more common category is more restrictive,
limiting representation to a local community with a recognized
relationship to the protected aspect of nature. This approach is taken
with many rights of nature ordinances and charter amendments in the
328 Sanket Khandelwal, Environmental Personhood: Recent Developments and the Road Ahead,
JURIST (Apr. 24, 2020, 2:58 AM), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2020/04/sanketkhandelwal-environment-person [https://perma.cc/AX6G-FUZ7].
329 In 2014, Argentine animal rights activists successfully filed a habeas petition for Sandra, a
twenty-nine-year-old orangutan housed in a Buenos Aires zoo. The court ruled that Sandra was
a non-human person and recognized an orangutan as a subject of rights. Cámara Nacional de
Apelaciones en lo Criminal y Correccional [CNCrim. y Corr.] [National Court of Criminal and
Correctional Appeals], 14/11/2014, “Orangutana, Sandra / Habeas Corpus,” CCC
68831/2014/CA1 (Arg.), https://www.animallaw.info/sites/default/files/Orangutana%2C%
20Sandra%20s%3A%20Habeas%20Corpus.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JU7G-SSDA];
Emiliano
Giménez, Argentine Orangutan Granted Unprecedented Legal Rights, CNN (Jan. 4, 2015),
https://www.cnn.com/2014/12/23/world/americas/feat-orangutan-rights-ruling/index.html
[https://perma.cc/8RD9-TR6Y]; see also Islamabad Wildlife Mgmt. Bd. v. Metro. Corp.
Islamabad, (2020) C.M. No. 1630 of 2020 (Islamabad High Court) (Pak.),
https://www.nonhumanrights.org/content/uploads/KAAVAN-Supp.Order-7.18.20.pdf..pdf
[https://perma.cc/TRX5-ZEMT] (recognizing the rights of non-human animals and ordering the
release of a captive elephant).
330 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 2008 [C.P.] art. 71 (Ecuador).
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United States, such as the Wekiva River and Econlockhatchee River Bill
of Rights (WEBOR) in Orange County, Florida, which protects the
Wekiva and Econlockhatchee river basins in central Florida.331 The
WEBOR ordinance grants standing to Orange County, all
municipalities and public agencies within the county, and all county
citizens to bring an enforcement action on behalf of the local waters.332
Similarly, the city of Santa Monica, California has enacted a
“Sustainability Bill of Rights” recognizing the “fundamental and
inalienable rights” of nature within the city limits.333 In turn, the
ordinance grants city residents legal standing to enforce the rights of
nature.334
A final category designates specific legal guardians to act on behalf
of the protected natural features. For example, to enforce protections
for the Whanganui River in New Zealand, the rights of nature initiative
delegates legal guardianship to the office of Pou Tupua, a body
composed of two representatives from different components of the
larger polity, one appointed by the Crown and one by the local Māori
communities.335 Similarly, the High Court of Uttarakhand, India
required the Chief Secretary of the State of Uttarakhand and the
Advocate General of the State of Uttarakhand to serve in loco parentis
for the protection of the Ganges and Yamuna Rivers.336
3.

What Legal Mechanism Protects Rights in Nature?

Similar to the different legal mechanisms by which the public trust
doctrine operates, rights of nature initiatives differ on the legal
mechanisms through which the designated rights of nature are
protected and vindicated. A few proposals incorporate rights of nature
protections into the relevant constitution, most are legislative, and in a
few instances, legal personhood has been articulated by the judicial
system.
To date, Ecuador is the only country to explicitly incorporate the
rights of nature into its constitution. The rights of nature provision was

ORANGE COUNTY, FLA., CHARTER art. VII, § 704.1 (2020).
Id.
333 SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 12.02.030(a) (2013).
334 Id. § 12.02.030(b).
335 Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017, subpt. 20 (N.Z.).
336 Mohd. Salim v. State of Uttarakhand, (2017) Writ Petition (PIL) No. 126 of 2014 (UTT
H.C.)
(India),
https://www.nonhumanrights.org/content/uploads/WPPIL-126-14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6Z3U-4UHA].
331
332
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part of a comprehensive constitutional amendment process ushered in
by the newly elected president Rafael Correa and was approved by
referendum in 2008.337 Similar efforts have also been considered in
Nepal338 and, most recently, Sweden.339 In 2019, Swedish MP Rebecka
Le Moine proposed a constitutional amendment to recognize nature’s
right to “exist, flourish, regenerate, and evolve.”340 Le Moine remarked,
“The underlying value in our society is that we are the dominators of
this world, and Nature is just a resource for us to use . . . . I hope we can
re-think our relationship with Nature. And for me, it starts with
admitting that Nature has rights.”341 Though not yet successful, the
Swedish proposal is the first of its kind in the European Union. In 2020,
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) included the rights of
nature in its working draft of the Post-2020 Global Diversity
Framework, which will be up for adoption at the fifteenth meeting of
the Conference of the Parties to the CBD.342
Legislative examples range from the national level to municipal
ordinances. Bolivia, for example, adopted the first-ever statutory rights
of nature law in 2010.343 The Law of the Rights of Mother Earth was
enacted by the national legislature and creates rights throughout the
land.344 In 2019, Senator Risa Hontiveros introduced the “Rights of
Nature Act of 2019” in the congress of the Philippines.345 The law sought
to recognize the rights of “natural ecosystems” and would have allowed
337 Craig M. Kauffman & Pamela L. Martin, Can Rights of Nature Make Development More
Sustainable? Why Some Ecuadorian Lawsuits Succeed and Others Fail, 92 WORLD DEV. 130, 132
(2017).
338 Mari Margil, Our Laws Make Slaves of Nature. It’s Not Just Humans Who Need Rights,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 6, 2018, 6:08 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/23/
laws-slaves-nature-humans-rights-environment-amazon [https://perma.cc/69US-FENX].
339 Press Release, Cmty. Env’t Legal Def. Fund, Rights of Nature Constitutional Amendment
Introduced in Sweden’s Parliament (Oct. 8, 2019), https://celdf.org/2019/10/media-releaserights-of-nature-constitutional-amendment-introduced-in-swedens-parliament
[https://
perma.cc/S79P-HNUZ].
340 Jon Queally, In European First, Proposed Constitutional Amendment in Sweden Would
Enshrine Rights of Nature, COMMON DREAMS (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.commondreams.org/
news/2019/10/08/european-first-proposed-constitutional-amendment-sweden-wouldenshrine-rights-nature [https://perma.cc/K6NZ-SD6W].
341 Id.
342 Convention on Biological Diversity, Update of the Zero Draft of the Post-2020 Global
Biodiversity
Framework
(Aug.
17,
2020),
https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/3064/749a/
0f65ac7f9def86707f4eaefa/post2020-prep-02-01-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/MNT4-K9PP].
343 Ley de Derechos de la Madre Tierra [Law of the Rights of Mother Earth], 2010 (Law No.
71) ch. III, art. 7 (Bol.).
344 Id.
345 Rights
of Nature Act of 2019, S.B. 1097 (Oct. 2, 2019) (Phil.),
http://files.harmonywithnatureun.org/uploads/upload937.pdf [https://perma.cc/HT7A-5435].
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any Philippine resident to bring an action enforcing the rights of
nature.346 At the other end of the jurisdictional spectrum are local
legislative ordinances, such as the 2006 Sewage Sludge Ordinance of
Tamaqua Borough, Pennsylvania, which recognized that “natural
communities, and ecosystems shall be considered to be ‘persons’ for
purposes of the enforcement of the civil rights of those residents,
natural communities, and ecosystems.”347
Finally, judicially articulated rights for nature have emerged in
Colombia, India, and Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, for example, in
resolving litigation over the health of the Turag River, the High Court
of Bangladesh declared all rivers in the country to be “living entities”
entitled to rights as “legal persons.”348 In Colombia, the recognition of
the rights of the Atrato River resulted from an acción de tutela, a cause
of action used to enforce the immediate protection of fundamental
constitutional rights, brought by “disadvantaged ethnic communities
before the constitutional court to protect the fundamental rights to life,
health, water, food security . . . and to address the health, socioenvironmental, ecological and humanitarian crisis in the Atrato River
Basin . . . .”349 The recognition of the rights of the Amazon River also
resulted from an acción de tutela brought by youth plaintiffs asserting
their right to a healthy environment.350
4.

What Rights Are Protected?

Finally, there is great diversity in the type of rights granted by
different rights of nature initiatives. Again, the laws generally fall into
three categories: legal personhood, nature-specific rights, and strong
environmental management obligations to protect designated natural
objects.
The first type frames the legal rights of nature as legal personhood,
enabling the vindication of rights against otherwise legally cognizable
harms. For example, New Zealand’s Whanganui River is granted “the

Id.
Tamaqua Borough, Pa., Tamaqua Borough Sewage Sludge Ordinance, Ordinance No. 612
(Sept. 19, 2006).
348 Margil, supra note 325.
349 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], noviembre 10, 2016, Sentencia T622/16 (Colom.) (Dignity Rts. Project trans., 2019), https://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/
resources/riveratratodecisionenglishdrpdellaw.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y2U-AWTJ].
350 Alessandro Pelizzon, An Intergenerational Ecological Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court of
Colombia and the Rights of the Amazon Rainforest, 2 L. TECH. & HUMS. 33, 33 (2020).
346
347
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rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person.”351 Similarly, the
Punjab and Haryana High Court recognizes all animals in Haryana as
“legal entities having a distinct persona with corresponding rights,
duties and liabilities of a living person.”352
The second variety moves beyond mere legal personhood and
grants nature-specific rights to “exist, flourish, and naturally evolve.”353
Examples include the Lake Erie Bill of Rights, WEBOR, and the Grant
Township, Pennsylvania Community Bill of Rights Ordinance
recognizing the rights of “[n]atural communities and ecosystems within
Grant Township, including but not limited to, rivers, streams, and
aquifers . . . to exist, flourish, and naturally evolve.”354 Similarly, the
Ecuadorian Constitution recognizes a nature-specific right to
regeneration and restoration.355
The third and final category grants something less than legal rights
and, instead, imposes strong environmental management obligations
on the state to protect designated natural objects. For example, when
the Australian state of Victoria recognized the Yarra River as “one living
and integrated natural entity”356 in 2017, the River was not granted
personhood or the specific rights to flow or evolve, but the law requires
the development of a strategic plan to inform the future management
of the region.357 To date, this is the least common type of rights of nature
law, but it may represent an emerging middle ground for jurisdictions
that are interested in the way the doctrine puts a fist on the scale in favor
of environmental protection but are unwilling to commit to full legal
personhood or independent rights in natural features.
Perhaps it is fitting that a doctrine asserting nature’s rights to
biodiversity and evolution should itself prove so diverse and so fluid in
its own evolution. One thing that is clear is that there are successes and
failures in nearly each of the categories, and that none has yet emerged
the clear victor.

Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017, subpt. 14 (N.Z.).
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana, 2019 SCC OnLine P&H 704 (India),
https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pdf_upload-361239.pdf [https://perma.cc/X56L-K7UX].
353 TOLEDO, OHIO, MUN. CODE § 254(a) (2019).
354 Grant Township, Pa., Community Bill of Rights Ordinance § 2(d) (June 1, 2014),
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1370022/grant-township-community-bill-of-rightsordinance.pdf [https://perma.cc/76MQ-3VNP].
355 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 2008 [C.P.] ch. VII (Ecuador).
356 Yarra River Protection Act 2017 (Vict.) subpt. 5(b) (Austl.).
357 Id. subpt. 16.
351
352
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The Rights of Nature Internationally

Having explored the enormous variety of approaches taken within
different rights of nature initiatives, we now review the best-known
examples of unfolding initiatives worldwide. This Section begins with
international examples, tracing them through each of the inhabited
continents of the world, followed separately by examples from within
the United States. As noted above, these examples differ dramatically in
their design, goals, and results—further revealing that the rights of
nature movement is much more of a mosaic than a monolith, with
substantial variation along the multiple axes identified in Section II.B.
1.

South America

a. Ecuador
Perhaps the most famous rights of nature example is the world’s
most ambitious initiative: Ecuador’s blanket constitutional protection
for all of nature. In 2008, drawing deeply on the core values of its
Indigenous cultures, the Ecuadorian Constitution was amended by
public referendum to protect a pantheon of environmental rights
associated with nature in general.358 The new provisions set forth that
Pacha Mama, or Mother Earth, “has the right to integral respect for its
existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles,
structure, functions and evolutionary processes,” and further
recognizes the right of nature to exist, persist, maintain, and regenerate
its vital cycles.359 The constitution further specifies that “[a]ll persons,
communities, peoples and nations” are legally empowered to enforce
these rights.360
Ecuador is the first and only country thus far to explicitly recognize
the rights of nature at the constitutional level, and the rights thereby
created have proven actionable. To date, the rights of nature have been
enforced primarily through litigation.361 Between 2008 and 2016, one
study identified thirteen cases in which the rights of nature were
invoked in litigation.362 Of those thirteen cases, ten were successful—a

358
359
360
361
362

CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 2008 [C.P.] ch. VII (Ecuador).
Id. art. 71.
Id.
Kauffman & Martin, supra note 337, at 133.
Id. at 133–34.
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yield of 76.9%.363 For example, three years after ratification of the new
constitutional provisions, two Americans living near the Vilcabamba
River successfully sued on behalf of the river to stop a proposed roadwidening project364 on grounds that the construction altered the river’s
natural flow.365 In October 2020, the Constitutional Court of Ecuador
heard arguments on proposed mining projects in Los Cedros Protected
Forest.366 The case, still unfolding as this Article goes to press, is the first
rights of nature case to reach Ecuador’s highest court, and it could have
significant implications for extraction projects in Ecuador’s other 186
Protected Forests.367
b. Bolivia
Following Ecuador’s 2008 constitutional referendum, and drawing
on similar Indigenous values, Bolivia adopted similar rights of nature
provisions legislatively in the 2010 Law of the Rights of Mother Earth.368
The law states that Madre Tierra, Mother Earth, is entitled to life,
biodiversity, water, clean air, balance, restoration, and to be free from
pollution.369 Bolivia’s move was the first statutory recognition of the
rights of nature worldwide, though it was grounded in weaker
environmental rights recognized by the 2009 Bolivian Constitution.370
However, the 2010 law did not include sufficient guidance or mechanics
for enforcement. For example, when Indigenous resistance to
roadbuilding through the Isiboro Ségure Indigenous Territory and
National Park led to violence, lawmakers were forced to recognize that
the new law lacked any means by which authorities were required to

Id. at 134.
Mihnea Tanasescu, When a River Is a Person: From Ecuador to New Zealand, Nature Gets
Its Day in Court, CONVERSATION (June 19, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://theconversation.com/whena-river-is-a-person-from-ecuador-to-new-zealand-nature-gets-its-day-in-court-79278
[https://perma.cc/FJN2-4HQH].
365 María Valeria Berros, Defending Rivers: Vilcabamba in the South of Ecuador, 6 RCC
PERSPS. 37, 38 (2017).
366 Rebekah Hayden, Rights of Nature in Ecuador, ECOLOGIST (Nov. 6, 2020),
https://theecologist.org/2020/nov/06/rights-nature-ecuador [https://perma.cc/39AK-LE7B].
367 Id.
368 See Paola Villavicencio Calzadilla & Louis J. Kotzé, Living in Harmony with Nature? A
Critical Appraisal of the Rights of Mother Earth in Bolivia, 7 TRANSNAT’L ENV’T L. 397 (2018)
(extensively detailing the legislative history of Bolivia’s rights of nature laws).
369 Ley de Derechos de la Madre Tierra [Law of the Rights of Mother Earth], 2010 (Law No.
71) ch. III, art. 7 (Bol.).
370 See Calzadilla & Kotzé, supra note 368, at 404–05 (noting that while the Bolivian
Constitution recognizes the importance of protecting nature, it does not constitutionally
entrench the rights of nature as firmly as the Ecuadorian counterpart).
363
364
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account for or protect the Rights of Mother Earth when threatened.371
Accordingly, the legislative effort was expanded in 2012 in the
Framework Law of the Mother Earth and Integral Development for
Living Well, specifically designed to operationalize the specific rights in
Mother Earth that had been set out in the 2010 law.372 In 2010, Bolivia
hosted the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the
Rights of Mother Earth, resulting in the Universal Declaration on the
Rights of Mother Earth, which was issued by the Conference and
submitted to the United Nations for its consideration.373
c. Colombia
In Colombia, the rights of nature were first articulated by the
judiciary after a series of legal challenges resulted in the judicial
recognition of rights for certain national parks, rivers, and lakes.374 The
Colombia Constitutional Court, which is specifically tasked with
resolving constitutional issues, first recognized the rights of the Atrato
River in 2016 as “an entity subject to rights of protection, conservation,
maintenance and restoration.”375 In 2018, responding to a suit by youth
plaintiffs against the government for the right to a healthy environment,
the supreme court of Colombia built on the Atrato River decision to
recognize the Amazon River as “an entity subject of rights.”376 In
addition to creating an Intergenerational Pact for the Life of the
Colombian Amazon, the Supreme Court required Amazonian
municipalities to create and implement territorial land use plans
371 Pablo Sólon, The Rights of Mother Earth, in THE CLIMATE CRISIS: SOUTH AFRICAN AND
GLOBAL DEMOCRATIC ECO-SOCIALIST ALTERNATIVES 107, 121–24 (Vishwas Satgar ed., 2018).
372 See Ley Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien [Framework Law
of the Mother Earth and Integral Development for Living Well], 2012 (Law No. 301) (Bol.); Anna
Hernandez, Defending Mother Earth in Bolivia, CULTURAL SURVIVAL (June 19, 2016),
https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/defending-mother-earth-bolivia
[https://perma.cc/X8SY-Z3UT].
373 Sólon, supra note 371, at 122–23.
374 Rights
of Nature Law and Policy, HARMONY WITH NATURE, U.N.,
http://harmonywithnatureun.org/rightsOfNature [https://perma.cc/Y4V4-ZDQ5] (listing recent
legal decisions regarding the rights of nature in Colombia).
375 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], noviembre 10, 2016, Sentencia T622/16 (Colom.) (Dignity Rts. Project trans., 2019), https://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/
resources/riveratratodecisionenglishdrpdellaw.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SRP-8ZM7].
376 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Civ. abril 5, 2018, M.P. Luis
Armando Tolosa Villabona, STC4360-2018, Radicación n. 11001-22-03-000-2018-00319-01
(Colom.),
https://www.dejusticia.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Fallo-Corte-Suprema-deJusticia-Litigio-Cambio-Clim%C3%A1tico.pdf?x54537
[https://perma.cc/4APV-DUJ5];
Colombian Supreme Court Rules to Protect Future Generations and Amazon Rainforest in Climate
Change
Case,
ESCR-NET,
https://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/2019/stc-4360-2018
[https://perma.cc/7E8T-H9DJ].
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respecting the rights of the Amazon and required action plans to
combat deforestation and mitigate the impacts of climate change.377 It
is worth noting the striking similarity between this suit seeking a
healthy environment, brought by youth plaintiffs against the
government, and the atmospheric trust litigation seeking a livable
climate, brought by youth plaintiffs against the government, in cases
like Juliana v. United States—and the strikingly different results.378
2.

Oceania

a. New Zealand
As in Ecuador and Bolivia, the rights of nature movement in New
Zealand has been driven by the core values and cultural identities of
local Indigenous cultures. Departing from the broad grants of rights
enacted in Ecuador and Bolivia, however, New Zealand has set forth a
more limited set of rights of nature initiatives over the past decade,
recognizing the legal personhood of three specific natural features. In
2014, the New Zealand Parliament first granted legal personhood to Te
Urewera National Park.379 The park is “the homeland and the heartland
of the Tūhoe people”380 and was a historic source of conflict between
the Crown and the tribe.381 The statute recognizes that Te Urewera “has
all the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person”382 and
transfers ownership of the land from the Crown to Te Urewera itself.383
The statute also establishes a legal guardian for the protected park, the
Te Urewera Board.384 The Board is composed of nine members—six
appointed by the trustees of Tūhoe Te Uru Taumatua and three

377 See Nicholas Bryner, Colombian Supreme Court Recognizes Rights of the Amazon River
Ecosystem, IUCN (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.iucn.org/news/world-commissionenvironmental-law/201804/colombian-supreme-court-recognizes-rights-amazon-riverecosystem [https://perma.cc/KH75-UJHY] (quoting the Supreme Court opinion, which is
written in Spanish and translated in this article).
378 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir.
2020); see also Ryan, Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 60–64 (discussing the
atmospheric trust movement).
379 Te Urewera Act 2014, subpt. 11 (N.Z.).
380 TE UREWERA BD., TE KAWA O TE UREWERA [TE UREWERA MANAGEMENT PLAN] 43
(2017).
381 See generally Vincent O’Malley, Tūhoe-Crown Settlement—Historical Background, MĀORI
L. REV. (Oct. 2014) (discussing the turbulent history behind the Tūhoe-Crown Settlement).
382 Te Urewera Act 2014, subpt. 11(1) (2014) (N.Z.).
383 Id. subpt. 12(3).
384 Id. subpts. 16–20.
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appointed by the Minister of Conservation—and is empowered to
exercise and protect the rights set forth in the law.385 While the Te
Urewara Act represents a radical shift for the Western property
constructs that form the basis of New Zealand’s common law tradition,
for the Tūhoe people it is simply a return to the philosophy of
environmental rights that have always been part of their culture.386 As
the Te Urewera Board’s management plan observes, “The Act does not
establish the Te Urewera identity rather it liberates it from human
speculation in order that nature and the natural world return to its
primal role, revered and served by those of her children she has given
life to.”387
In 2017, three years after the recognition of Te Urewera, the New
Zealand Parliament granted legal personhood to the Whanganui River
(Te Awa Tupua) watershed, resolving a legal fight by the local Māori
people that dates back to 1873.388 The legislation grants legal
personhood to the river as “an indivisible and living whole, comprising
the Whanganui River from the mountains to the sea, incorporating all
its physical and metaphysical elements,”389 and creates the office of Te
Pou Tupua, a body of two representatives, one appointed by the Crown
and one appointed by the Māori communities, to act as legal guardians
on behalf of the river.390 Finally, New Zealand has also granted
personhood to a specific mountain, Mt. Taranaki, 391 a dormant volcano
on the west coast of the North Island.392 This legislation appoints a joint
entity composed of both Māori tribes and representatives of the British
Commonwealth Crown as “the human face of” of Mt. Taranki, to “act
in the name of” the mountain as legal guardians.393
b. Australia
Neighboring Australia began recognizing limited rights to specific
natural areas shortly after New Zealand pioneered the concept at Te
Urewera National Park in 2014. In 2017, the Australian state of Victoria

Id. subpts. 19, 21(2).
TE UREWERA BD., supra note 380, at 24.
387 Id.
388 Erin L. O’Donnell & Julia Talbot-Jones, Creating Legal Rights for Rivers: Lessons from
Australia, New Zealand, and India, 23 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 1, 4 (2018).
389 Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017, subpt. 12 (N.Z.).
390 Id. at subpt. 20.
391 Record of Understanding, supra note 316.
392 Global
Volcanism
Program,
Taranaki
(241030),
SMITHSONIAN
INST.,
https://volcano.si.edu/volcano.cfm?vn=241030 [https://perma.cc/26JZ-8MXH].
393 Record of Understanding, supra note 316, at subpts. 5.14–5.15.
385
386
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recognized the Yarra River as “one living and integrated natural
entity.”394 Victoria mandated the development and implementation of
a Yarra Strategic Plan, as well as the creation of the Birrarung Council,
a statutory advisory board designated to speak and advocate for the
Yarra River.395 Like the rights of nature efforts in New Zealand, the
Victorian law incorporates traditional Australian Aboriginal values.396
Unlike New Zealand, however, the Act was passed at the state level,
rather than the national level. More importantly, it does not grant full
legal personhood to the river, but protects environmental rights
associated with the river basin by requiring the development of a
strategic plan to inform the future management of the region.397 Some
proponents of the rights of nature have advocated that Australia
broaden rights of nature initiatives to create legal rights in the Great
Barrier Reef,398 the world’s largest coral reef system off the Australian
east coast,399 and the Great Artesian Basin, the largest and deepest
artesian groundwater basin in the world,400 from which most of inland
Australian draws its drinking water.401 However, these efforts have yet
to materialize into legislative action.402
3.

Asia

a. India
In 2017, in the northern Indian state of Uttarakhand, traversed by
the Himalayas, the High Court of Uttarakhand granted legal

Yarra River Protection Act 2017 (Vict.) subpt. 5(b) (Austl.).
Id. at pts. 4, 5.
396 Katie O’Bryan, Indigenous Rights and River Rights: Australia and New Zealand, GLOB.
WATER F. (June 7, 2018), https://globalwaterforum.org/2018/06/07/indigenous-rights-and-riverrights-australia-and-new-zealand [https://perma.cc/8C2Y-S8VE].
397 Id.
398 U.N. Secretary-General, Harmony with Nature, ¶ 46, U.N Doc. A/74/236 (July 29, 2019)
(noting that in 2018, one Australian Senator “called for the adoption of rights of Nature laws, in
particular for iconic ecosystems such as the Great Barrier Reef, the Murray-Darling Basin and
the Great Artesian Basin”).
399 Britannica, Great Barrier Reef, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (June 18, 2021),
https://www.britannica.com/place/Great-Barrier-Reef [https://perma.cc/N66L-BYQS].
400 Great Artesian Basin Strategic Management Plan, DEP’T OF AGRIC., WATER & THE ENV’T
(Austl.) (June 18, 2021), https://www.agriculture.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/strategicmanagement-plan.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2021).
401 Id.
402 Rights of Nature, AUSTL. EARTH L. CTR., https://www.earthlaws.org.au/aelc/rights-ofnature [https://perma.cc/98A6-TGGK].
394
395
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personhood to the Ganges and Yamuna Rivers.403 Ten days later, the
same court granted legal rights to the Gangorti and Yamunotri Glaciers
above these rivers.404 The court observed that the rights granted “shall
be equivalent to the rights of human beings and the injury/harm caused
to these bodies shall be treated as harm/injury caused to the human
beings.”405 The Supreme Court of India ultimately stayed the lower
court rulings on the Ganges and Yamuna Rivers,406 as well as the
Gangorti and Yamunotri Glaciers.407 Despite the supreme court’s
ruling, rights of nature initiatives have continued to develop in India,
especially in the North. In 2018, the Uttarakhand High Court acted once
again to declare that animals are “legal entities.”408 In 2019, the Punjab
and Haryana High Court also declared animals to be legal persons,409
and the following year, it declared Chandigarh’s Sukhna Lake to be a
living entity.410
b. Bangladesh
In 2019, following several years of environmental litigation over
serious water pollution and illegal riverbank development,411 the
Bangladeshi Supreme Court granted all of its rivers the same legal status

403 Mohd. Salim v. State of Uttarakhand (2017) Writ Petition (PIL) No. 126 of 2014 (UTT
H.C.)
(India),
https://www.nonhumanrights.org/content/uploads/WPPIL-126-14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EA23-EMBS].
404 Lalit Miglani v. State of Uttarakhand (2017) Writ Petition (PIL) No. 140 of 2015 (UTT
H.C.) (India), http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/living%20entity%20Gangotri%
20Himalaya%20Uttarakhand%20High%20Court%20Order.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2YRM4XUA]
405 Id. at *65.
406 India’s Ganges and Yamuna Rivers Are ‘Not Living Entities’, BBC (July 7, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-40537701 [https://perma.cc/RGY8-5CPT].
407 Stellina Jolly & K.S. Roshan Menon, Of Ebbs and Flows: Understanding the Legal
Consequences of Granting Personhood to Natural Entities in India, TRANSNAT’L ENV’T L. 1, 2 n.5
(2021) (explaining that the appeals of both the river and glacier decisions have been grouped
together and stayed).
408 See Vineet Upadhyay, Animals Have Equal Rights as Humans, Says Uttarakhand High
Court, TIMES INDIA (July 5, 2018, 1:19 PM) https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/dehradun/
members-of-animal-kingdom-to-be-treated-as-legal-entities-ukhand-hc/articleshow/
64860996.cms [https://perma.cc/CP44-B3C6].
409 Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana, 2019 SCC OnLine P&H 704 (India),
https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pdf_upload-361239.pdf [https://perma.cc/3H97-JLX9].
410 Court on Its Own Motion v. Chandigarh Administration, CWP No. 18253 of 2009 (P&H
H.C.) (2020) (Unreported), https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pdf_upload-370827.pdf [https://
perma.cc/W4NU-VJRN].
411 See Protecting Rights of Rivers: Turning Intention into Action, DAILY STAR (Nov. 20, 2020,
12:00 AM), https://www.thedailystar.net/law-our-rights/news/protecting-rights-rivers-turningintention-action-1998201 [https://perma.cc/E9ZN-LZA8].
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as human beings and called for the removal of all illegal establishments
on their banks.412 In 2016, a nongovernmental organization had filed
suit over pollution and illegal construction on the Turag River, the
upper tributary of the major Buriganga River in the Dhaka region in the
center of the country.413 By 2019, the case made its way to the High
Court of Bangladesh, which resolved the case with reference to both the
public trust doctrine and emerging rights of nature principles. It held
that the government had an obligation under the public trust doctrine
to protect the river, but it also declared that the river, together with all
other rivers within the country, are “living entit[ies]” entitled to rights
as “legal persons.”414
D.

The Rights of Nature in the United States

Even as the rights of nature movement surged abroad, it struggled
to gain traction in the United States after its rejection in Sierra Club v.
Morton.415 Domestic responses to the rights of nature movement have
ranged from incredulity and derision to sincere philosophical debate
over who should be able to represent nature and how to cope with
potential conflicts among legal guardians. Illustrating naked skepticism,
one blogger on Marcellus Drilling News, a website promoting Northeast
shale drilling, assessed the rights of nature movement as “[u]tter bull
crap of the highest order—but a dangerous precedent if allowed. We
can see your dog suing you, the trees that ring your property suing you,
wrongful death lawsuits for killing a snake . . . .”416
Professor Stone, author of the rights of nature-supportive article
that inspired Justice Douglas’s dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton,417
seemed to anticipate these reactions in his original work. There, he
warned,
Each time there is a movement to confer rights onto some new
“entity,” the proposal is bound to sound odd or frightening or
laughable. This is partly because until the rightless thing
See Chandran, supra note 325.
Legal Rights of Rivers—An International Trend?, CLIENTEARTH (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://www.clientearth.org/projects/access-to-justice-for-a-greener-europe/updates/legalrights-of-rivers-an-international-trend [https://perma.cc/TZ2X-ZVD8].
414 Margil, supra note 325.
415 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972).
416 It Speaks! An “Ecosystem” Has Filed to Join a Lawsuit in PA, MARCELLUS DRILLING NEWS
(Aug. 14, 2015), https://marcellusdrilling.com/2015/08/it-speaks-an-ecosystem-has-filed-tojoin-a-lawsuit-in-pa [https://perma.cc/W7JD-EPQS].
417 See supra Section II.A.2 (discussing Sierra Club v. Morton).
412
413
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receives its rights, we cannot see it as anything but a thing for
the use of “us”—those who are holding rights at the time.418

Since the 2000s, whether by international adoption or the passage
of a half-century since Professor Stone’s original work, the rights of
nature concept has become increasingly normalized in some legal and
intellectual circles. The concept appears to be enjoying a domestic
renaissance, especially at the municipal level. While these local efforts
have not always proved successful, rights of nature initiatives have
appeared in multiple city ordinances and charters, county charters, and
tribal constitutions throughout the country. Unsuccessful attempts
have also been made to recognize the rights of nature in state legislation,
state constitutional amendments, and in litigation on the Colorado
River.419 In 2019, in Florida, rights of nature principles were even
formally incorporated into the state Democratic Party platform.420
While the U.S. legal system continues to regard these efforts with
skepticism, increasingly ambitious appeals to rights of nature principles
in American law reflect the growing sentiment that natural systems
deserve better protection than conventional environmental law has
provided and protection for their own intrinsic value, rather than those
values and services they provide us.
This Section reviews the emerging rights of nature initiatives
around the United States, noting examples from Pennsylvania, Ohio,
and California before reviewing examples from Tribal Nations within
the United States and Canada. It culminates with a closer examination
of efforts in the State of Florida.
1.

Pennsylvania

a. Tamaqua Borough’s Sewage Ordinance
Ecuador’s constitutional recognition in 2008 may be the most
famous rights of nature initiative in the world, but the first community
in the world to formally recognize legal personhood for nature is a small

Stone, supra note 294, at 455.
See Advancing Legal Rights of Nature: Timeline, CMTY. ENV’T LEGAL DEF. FUND,
https://celdf.org/rights-of-nature/timeline
[https://perma.cc/JT82-T6BN]
(providing
a
comprehensive history of rights of nature efforts in the United States and abroad).
420 Scott Powers, Florida Democratic Party Adopts ‘Rights of Nature’ into Platform, FLA. POL.
(Oct. 16, 2019), https://floridapolitics.com/archives/308603-florida-democratic-party-adoptrights-of-nature-into-platform [https://perma.cc/X9JJ-PRD5].
418
419
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town of 7,000 people in central Pennsylvania: Tamaqua Borough.421 The
effort was inspired in the mid-2000s by opposition to a proposed sewage
sludge dumpsite in the town, which is northwest of Allentown,
Pennsylvania.422 In 2006, after lobbying by community advocates, the
Borough Council adopted the Tamaqua Borough Sewage Sludge
Ordinance, prohibiting the land application of sewage sludge and
recognizing that “natural communities, and ecosystems shall be
considered ‘persons’ for purposes of the enforcement of the civil rights
of those residents, natural communities, and ecosystems.”423
b. City of Pittsburg’s Anti-Fracking Ordinance
Tamaqua’s action motivated the larger Pennsylvania City of
Pittsburgh to adopt rights of nature principles in 2010 in a bid to stop
hydraulic fracking within its boundaries. Hoping to circumvent state
preemption of municipal oil and gas regulations, the city adopted an
ordinance that not only prohibited fracking, but also granted the
“inalienable and fundamental rights to exist and flourish” to “[n]atural
communities and ecosystems, including, but not limited to, wetlands,
streams, rivers, [and] aquifers . . . .”424 Doug Shields, former President
of the Pittsburgh City Council, observed, “We not only banned
fracking, but we asserted our right to self-government. We asserted
nature’s rights, and our obligation to protect the ecosystems that sustain
us.”425
Four years after the adoption of Pittsburgh’s anti-fracking
ordinance, as discussed above in Section I.C.2, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court invalidated the fracking preemption statute under the
Environmental Rights Amendment of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
which codifies an expansive version of the public trust doctrine.426
While not a party to the suit, the City of Pittsburgh had filed an amicus

421 Timeline, GLOB. ALL. FOR RTS. NATURE, https://therightsofnature.org/timeline
[https://perma.cc/A8N5-GTT7] (noting that Tamaqua Borough was the first place in the world
to officially recognize the rights of nature).
422 Madeleine Sheehan Perkins, How Pittsburgh Embraced a Radical Environmental
Movement Popping Up in Conservative Towns Across America, BUS. INSIDER (July 9, 2017, 2:00
PM)
https://www.businessinsider.com/rights-for-nature-preventing-fracking-pittsburghpennsylvania-2017-7 [https://perma.cc/G9CP-XFCT].
423 Tamaqua Borough, Pa., Tamaqua Borough Sewage Sludge Ordinance, Ordinance No. 612
(Sept. 19, 2006).
424 PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE § 618.03 (2010).
425 Doug Shields from We the People 2.0—The Second American Revolution, CMTY. ENV’T
LEGAL DEF. FUND (Oct. 19, 2016), https://celdf.org/2016/10/doug-shields-people-2-0-secondamerican-revolution [https://perma.cc/3KUP-HFSE].
426 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 976–78 (Pa. 2013).
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curiae brief and argued that the preemption prohibited local
governments from meeting their civic obligations to protect public
health and welfare through local zoning regulations.427 While the city
did not raise the public trust doctrine or the rights of nature directly in
its brief, the court situated the city’s understanding of civic duty as
within the constitutional recognition of these public trust obligations.
The Pennsylvania fray over fracking thus presents a rare example where
the rights of nature and public trust doctrine have been deployed
simultaneously to resolve the same underlying issue. The fact that the
court raised the public trust doctrine sua sponte suggests that the parties
did not think the doctrine offered a viable legal argument on which to
fight the preemption, perhaps explaining why Pittsburgh turned to the
untested rights of nature as an alternative. It will be interesting to see
whether the court’s action has changed the environmental legal calculus
there going forward.
c. Anti-Fracking Home Rule Charter of Grant Township
Rights of nature principles continue to play a notable role in the
ongoing regulatory battles over fracking the Marcellus Shale in
Pennsylvania. In 2020, the small community of Grant Township won
one of the most high-profile and hard-fought victories for rights of
nature principles in the state. In 2014, Pennsylvania General Energy
(PGE) received an initial permit to convert an existing gas well into a
fracking wastewater injection well in Grant Township, a tiny town of
fewer than one thousand people.428 The proposal to inject 42,000 gallons
of fracking wastewater a day was met with opposition from these
residents.429 In 2014, the Township adopted a Community Bill of Rights
Ordinance prohibiting the disposal of fracking waste within the
township, restricting corporate personhood, and recognizing the rights
of “[n]atural communities and ecosystems within Grant Township,
including but not limited to, rivers, streams, and aquifers . . . to exist,
flourish, and naturally evolve.”430 When the ordinance was challenged
by PGE, a group of local environmental advocates, the East Run
Hellbenders Society, attempted unsuccessfully to intervene as legal
guardians on behalf of the Little Mahoning Watershed.431
Amicus Curiae Brief of Council of the City of Pittsburgh at 3, id. (No. 284 M.D. 2012).
Pa. Gen. Energy Co. v. Grant Twp., No. 14-209ERIE, 2017 WL 1215444, at *3 (W.D. Pa.
Mar. 31, 2017).
429 Nobel, supra note 293.
430 Grant Township, Pa., Community Bill of Rights Ordinance §§ 2(d), 3(a), 5(a) (June 1,
2014).
431 Pa. Gen. Energy Co. v. Grant Twp., 658 F. App’x. 37, 42–43 (3d Cir. 2016).
427
428
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The community rights ordinance was eventually struck down in
federal court as “run[ning] afoul of constitutional protections afforded
corporations such as PGE and attempt[ing] to immunize Grant
Township from clashes with current federal and state law.”432 The
Township responded by enacting a Home Rule Charter that
incorporated the same prohibition on fracking waste, limits on
corporate personhood, and rights of nature provisions included in the
original ordinance.433 In 2017, the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP) issued a permit to allow PGE to inject
fracking waste into an existing natural gas well.434 After a prolonged
legal battle over the issuance of the permit, the DEP reversed course and
rescinded the well permit, citing the Home Rule Charter’s ban on
injection wells for fracking fluids.435 However, in December 2020, PGE
again filed suit against Grant Township,436 seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief on the grounds that the Home Rule Charter is void and
unenforceable.437 At the time this Article goes to press, it is not yet clear
whether Grant Township’s rights of nature charter will remain in force.
2.

Ohio

a. The Lake Erie Bill of Rights
In 2014, the same year that the Flint, Michigan, water crisis
began,438 the City of Toledo, Ohio, was forced to warn local residents
not to use their tap water for drinking, bathing, or cooking.439 A harmful
algae bloom in Lake Erie, the source of the city’s drinking water, had
rendered the water toxic. The algae produce microcystin, a toxin that
causes gastrointestinal, respiratory, neurological, and dermatological

Pa. Gen. Energy, 2017 WL 1215444, at *16.
Grant Twp., Pa., Home Rule Charter §§ 105, 107, 301, 401 (Nov. 21, 2015).
434 Laura Legere, Pa. DEP Revokes Permit for Grant Twp. Oil and Gas Waste Well, PITT. POSTGAZETTE (Mar. 27, 2020, 7:15 AM), https://www.post-gazette.com/business/powersource/2020/
03/27/Pennsylvania-DEP-revokes-permit-oil-gas-waste-well-Grant-home-rule-charter/stories/
202003260151 [https://perma.cc/3VKD-6ZY2].
435 Id.
436 Complaint, Pa. Gen. Energy Co. v. Grant Twp., 20-cv-00351 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2020).
437 Id. at 3.
438 Merrit Kennedy, Lead-Laced Water in Flint: A Step-by-Step Look at the Makings of a Crisis,
NPR (Apr. 20, 2016, 6:39 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/04/20/
465545378/lead-laced-water-in-flint-a-step-by-step-look-at-the-makings-of-a-crisis
[https://perma.cc/FJ57-APM6].
439 Toledoans for Safe Water’s Amicus Brief re Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings,
Drewes Farms P’ship v. City of Toledo, 441 F. Supp. 3d 551 (N.D. Ohio 2020) (No. 19-cv-00434).
432
433
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health effects.440 For three days, the 400,000 city residents had to rely on
bottled water instead.
After this three-day tap water ban, Toledo residents successfully
launched a multi-year effort to amend their city charter with the Lake
Erie Bill of Rights (LEBOR), one of the most ambitious rights of nature
initiatives in the United States. In its own words, LEBOR was created
by residents to “reclaim, reaffirm, and assert our inherent and
inalienable rights, and to extend legal rights to our natural environment
in order to ensure that the natural world . . . [is] no longer subordinated
to the accumulation of surplus wealth and unaccountable political
power.”441 LEBOR asserts three different sets of rights: (1) the rights of
the Lake Erie ecosystem, (2) the rights of the residents to a clean and
healthy environment, and (3) the right of local community selfgovernance.442 Under LEBOR, Lake Erie and its watershed “possess the
right to exist, flourish, and naturally evolve,” and any local resident (or
the city itself) has the right to sue to enforce these rights.443 LEBOR also
engages one of the more powerful rhetorical foils of the rights of nature
movement—the idea that corporations are granted legal personhood
while natural systems are not. While LEBOR explicitly grants legal
personhood to the Lake Erie ecosystem, it also expressly restricts legal
personhood for corporations that violate the law, stating that
“[c]orportions that violate this law, or that seek to violate this law, shall
not be deemed to be ‘persons’ to the extent that such treatment would
interfere with the rights or prohibitions enumerated by this law.”444
The day after Toledo voters approved the measure, the city was
promptly sued by agricultural interests.445 The plaintiff, Drewes Farms,
alleged primarily that LEBOR exceeded Toledo’s authority as a
municipal arm of the state, was unconstitutionally vague, and violated
due process.446 Drewes Farms argued that by applying fertilizer on their
land they might run afoul of LEBOR’s protections and expose their
operations to liability, despite legally operating under a certificate by

440 Elizabeth D. Hilborn et al., Algal Bloom-Associated Disease Outbreaks Among Users of
Freshwater Lakes—United States, 2009–2010, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 11
(2014).
441 TOLEDO, OHIO, MUN. CODE ch. XVII, § 253 (2019).
442 Id. § 254(a)–(c).
443 Id. § 254(a), (d).
444 Id. § 257(a).
445 Complaint at 2–3, Drewes Farms P’ship v. City of Toledo, 441 F. Supp. 3d 551 (N.D. Ohio
2020) (No. 19-cv-00434) (alleging violations of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection
Clause, the Fifth Amendment (for vagueness), and deprivation of rights without due process).
446 Drewes Farms, 441 F. Supp. 3d at 556 (Order Invalidating Lake Erie Bill of Rights).
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the Ohio Department of Agriculture.447 While the case was winding its
way through federal court, the Ohio State Legislature acted directly to
preempt the initiative and specifically prohibited any person from
bringing a legal action on behalf of an ecosystem.448 In 2020, the federal
district court agreed with the plaintiff’s arguments and invalidated
LEBOR, noting that it was “well-intentioned” but unconstitutionally
vague and beyond the power of local government.449 The City of Toledo
initially fought the decision, but in May 2020, it voluntarily dismissed
its appeal, citing budgetary constraints.450
3.

California

a. Santa Monica’s Bill of Rights for Sustainability
In 2013, the City Council of Santa Monica, California unanimously
approved the “Bill of Rights for Sustainability,” granting “[n]atural
communities and ecosystems . . . fundamental and inalienable rights to
exist and flourish” within the city limits.451 The ordinance also allows
city residents to bring legal actions on behalf of “groundwater aquifers,
atmospheric systems, marine waters, and native species” within the
city.452 Santa Monica is a rare example of a proactive rights of nature
ordinance that was not adopted in response to an immediate
environmental threat. To date, neither the city nor its citizens have
utilized the ordinance to bring an action on behalf of nature, but neither
has the ordinance been challenged.
4.

Florida

Like Pennsylvania, Florida provides an interesting example of a
state in which the rights of nature movement and public trust doctrine
could intersect in the context of environmental law. As detailed in
Section I.B.1, Florida has codified the public trust doctrine in both the
state constitution and statutory law, emphasizing the sovereign

Id.
H.R. 166, 133d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2305.011 (Ohio 2019).
449 Drewes Farms, 441 F. Supp. 3d at 557–58.
450 Tom Henry, City Quietly Drops Appeal of Lake Erie Bill of Rights Ruling, BLADE (May 11,
2020, 3:43 PM), https://www.toledoblade.com/local/environment/2020/05/11/toledo-quietlydrops-appeal-of-lebor-ruling-lake-erie/stories/20200511082 [https://perma.cc/VN5E-25N9].
451 SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 12.02.030(b) (2019).
452 Id.
447
448

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3841825

7_RYAN.CURRY.RULE.42.6.7.DONE.docx (Do Not Delete)

2528

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

10/9/21 12:22 AM

[Vol. 42:6

ownership of submerged lands.453 However, the Florida public trust has
thus far not played a significant role in environmental advocacy. Unlike
New Jersey, Florida has not applied the doctrine to protect its upland
beaches or drinking water resources.454 Unlike California, it has not
explicitly required the balancing of environmental values against other
values associated with state waterways in the state’s ambitious water
management system.455 The lack of a dynamic public trust doctrine in
Florida is not for lack of need. Florida’s environment is beset by
environmental woes as laws struggle to keep pace with explosive
development and population growth.456 Additionally, Florida’s
waterways are uniquely vulnerable, given the importance to the state of
groundwater resources that have not been explicitly protected by the
Florida public trust doctrine.457

453

Article X, Section 11 of the Florida Constitution reads:

The title to lands under navigable waters, within the boundaries of the state, which
have not been alienated, including beaches below mean high water lines, is held by the
state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for all the people. Sale of such lands may be
authorized by law, but only when in the public interest. Private use of portions of such
lands may be authorized by law, but only when not contrary to the public interest.
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11; see also Broward v. Mabry, 50 So. 826, 829–30 (Fla. 1909) (affirming the
sovereign ownership aspect of the public trust doctrine); Coastal Petrol. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid
Co., 492 So. 2d 339, 342–43 (Fla. 1986) (holding that the trust imposes a legal duty on the state
to preserve and control navigable rivers, lakes, and tidelands for public navigation, fishing,
swimming, and other lawful uses).
454 Mayor of Clifton v. Passaic Valley Water Comm’n, 557 A.2d 299 (N.J. 1989) (applying the
public trust doctrine to all water resources in the state, including surface, ground, and drinking
water).
455 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983); see also Owen, supra note 70,
at 1116–17 (detailing the many provisions of the California Water Code that protect public trust
doctrine values, including water quality, fisheries, and wildlife).
456 Approximately one thousand new residents move to Florida every day. DEMOGRAPHIC
ESTIMATING CONFERENCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, FLA. OFF. ECON. & DEMOGRAPHIC RSCH.
(2021),
http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/conferences/population/demographicsummary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SZ8B-RH8F]. In 1960, Florida was home to eight percent of the nation’s coastal
population; by 2008, that number had already doubled to more than sixteen percent. STEVEN G.
WILSON & THOMAS R. FISCHETTI, COASTLINE POPULATION TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1960
TO 2008, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 5–6 (2010), https://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p25-1139.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NH67-NTZR].
457 Groundwater remains unprotected by the public trust doctrine in many states, although,
this is an aspect of trust-related environmental protection that is evolving. For example, Hawaii’s
trust has long protected groundwater, see RESTORING THE TRUST: AN INDEX, supra note 49, at 8–
9 n.62, and California courts have recently recognized the application of the trust to groundwater
resources that are tributaries of trust-protected navigable waterways. Env’t L. Found. v. State
Water Res. Control Bd., 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 393, 399–403 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (concluding that the
public trust doctrine protected groundwater tributaries of navigable waters), cert denied, 2018
Cal. LEXIS 9313 (Cal. 2018).
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Faced with an inert public trust doctrine and environmental
statutes that have allowed the ongoing degradation of state waterways
large and small, environmental advocates have increasingly sought legal
recognition for rights of nature principles. In a first for the nation,
explicit reference to the rights of nature was recently included in the
platform of one of the state’s two main political parties, the Democrats.
In October 2019, the Florida Democratic Party became the first statelevel political party to incorporate the rights of nature into their
platform, declaring “to adequately protect our waters, we support
communities’ rights in reclaiming home rule authority and recognizing
and protecting the inherent rights of nature, as we have done for
corporations . . . .”458 One Democratic Party leader explained the
impetus of the proposal:
Nowhere is it more apparent than Florida that current laws and
policies have failed to protect our waters from recklessly-planned
and poorly-managed human impact . . . . Florida Democrats
demonstrated the bold initiative necessary to change the
conversation from “nature is property, to be used and abused for
profit,” to “nature is alive, and deserving of respect for its rights.”459

This Section describes how the rights of nature debate has emerged
and grown in Florida, from the flurry of local initiatives attempting to
apply it to vulnerable waterways to the legislature’s move to preempt
any recognition of legal rights in nature, with special focus on the
WEBOR.
a. Local Initiatives in Response to Ecological Disaster
The rights of nature movement emerged in Florida after several
prolonged and highly publicized ecological disasters. In 2016, beaches
on both the Gulf and Atlantic coasts were closed for most of July as a
massive blue-green algae bloom blanketed Lake Okeechobee, the largest
freshwater lake in the state.460 Lake Okeechobee, in turn, discharged the
bloom and its polluted waters into the St. Lucie and Caloosahatchee
Rivers, fouling both the Atlantic and Gulf coasts.461 The algae was so
Powers, supra note 420.
Press Release, Cmty. Env’t Legal Def. Fund, Florida Democrats Adopt Rights of Nature in
Party Platform (Oct. 15, 2019) [https://perma.cc/AFS7-CB73].
460 USGS Finds 28 Types of Cyanobacteria in Florida Algal Bloom, USGS (May 31, 2017),
https://www.usgs.gov/news/usgs-finds-28-types-cyanobacteria-florida-algal-bloom
[https://
perma.cc/C9KV-RHB9].
461 Mayra Cuevas, Toxic Algae Bloom Blankets Florida Beaches, Prompts State of Emergency,
CNN (July 1, 2016, 7:18 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/07/01/us/florida-algae-pollution/
index.html [https://perma.cc/SRF3-3P9Q].
458
459
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thick that state leaders began referring to it as “guacamole-like,” a
reference to its color and consistency, and emergency declarations were
made for four South Florida counties.462
In a separate crisis in 2018, Florida’s southwest coast along the Gulf
of Mexico struggled to cope with the longest, largest “red tide” algal
bloom in a decade. Distinct from blue-green algae, red tide occurs in
salt water and is caused by another type of algae, K.brevis.463 Red tides
are naturally occurring, but they are exacerbated by nutrient pollution
and can cause harm on contact or inhalation by swimmers and marine
life.464 Dead fish and sea turtles littered the beaches in Lee and Collier
counties, alarming residents and discouraging tourism.465 In the same
year, on the southeast Atlantic coast, beaches were once again impacted
by blue-green algae blooms. These “harmful algal blooms” (HABs)
sickened beachgoers, killed marine life, and shuttered small
businesses.466 Floridians have been deeply dismayed as HABs
increasingly appear to be the new normal, impairing 82% of all lakes in
the state, more than 50% of the assessed rivers, and 32% of Florida’s
bays.467 Concern over the issue cuts across conventional political
interest groups, deeply alarming environmentalists, harming
homeowners with residences along Florida’s ample waterways,
frustrating recreationalists prevented from enjoying the state’s
renowned beaches and waterways, and terrifying the business owners

462 Oliver Milman, Florida Declares State of Local Emergency over Influx of ‘God-Awful’ Toxic
Algae, GUARDIAN (June 30, 2016, 12:09 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/
30/florida-emergency-toxic-algae-treasure-coast [https://perma.cc/YFM8-G7GE]; Pam Wright,
10 Things to Know About Florida’s Harmful Algae Blooms, WEATHER CHANNEL (July 18, 2016),
https://weather.com/science/nature/news/florida-algae-crisis [https://perma.cc/CW6Y-GP5E].
463 Florida Red Tide FAQs, MOTE MARINE LAB’Y & AQUARIUM, https://mote.org/news/
florida-red-tide#Has%20coastal%20(nutrient)%20pollution%20caused%20the%20Florida%
20red%20tide [https://perma.cc/2KG8-CH5J].
464 Id.
465 Chad Gillis, National Weather Service Extends Beach Hazard Advisory Through Thursday,
NEWS-PRESS (July 31, 2018, 7:39 AM), https://www.news-press.com/story/news/2018/07/30/redtide-caloosahatchee-lake-okeechobee-sanibel-naples/864721002
[https://perma.cc/5HD7FZM5]; Shannon Sims, A Red Tide on Florida’s Gulf Coast Has Been a Huge Hit to Tourism, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/travel/florida-red-tide-tourismgulf-coast.html [https://perma.cc/CT9Z-R6C4].
466 Pam Wright, Florida Algae Blooms Send People to Hospital, Kill Marine Wildlife, WEATHER
CHANNEL (July 31, 2018), https://weather.com/science/environment/news/2018-07-31-floridaalgae-blooms-red-tide-health-wildlife [https://perma.cc/V63J-5P6H].
467 Waters Assessed as Impaired Due to Nutrient-Related Causes, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
nutrient-policy-data/waters-assessed-impaired-due-nutrient-related-causes [https://perma.cc/
V23R-MYQ3] (noting that, in Florida’s most recent Water Quality Assessment Report, only
twenty percent of rivers were assessed).
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that depend on water-related tourism, the central driver of Florida’s
economy.
In 2019 and 2020, a flurry of rights of nature initiatives sprang up
in Florida, mostly by residents and environmentalists attempting to
protect local waterways threatened by algal blooms, other forms of
pollution, and water withdrawals for commercial purposes, including
consumer bottled water. These included efforts to protect the Indian
River Lagoon in Brevard County, the Kissimmee River in Osceola
County, the Caloosahatchee River near Fort Myers, the Santa Fe River
near Gainesville, and Pensacola Bay in the upper northeast corner of the
state.468
Each of the measures was inspirited by specific ecological crises.
The Santa Fe River Bill of Rights was inspired by a proposal to increase
groundwater withdrawals for Nestlé water bottling from one of the
Santa Fe River’s springs.469 The Indian River Lagoon, a 156-mile-long
estuary, struggles with nutrient pollution and persistent harmful algal
blooms.470 The Lagoon is also connected to Lake Okeechobee though
the St. Lucie Canal, and in periods of wet weather, lake water is diverted
into the canal and estuary to prevent flooding.471 These discharges are
highly polluted, alter estuarine salinity, and routinely carry toxic bluegreen algae blooms to the coast.472 Very similar facts inspired the effort
to protect the Caloosahatchee River on Florida’s Gulf Coast, which is
also impacted by polluted freshwater releases from Lake Okeechobee,
as well as restricted flows during periods of drought.473

468 Press Release, Cmty. Env’t Legal Def. Fund, Florida: Flurry of Rights of River Ballot
Initiatives Proposed to Save Drinking Water, Ecosystems (Sept. 11, 2019) [https://perma.cc/
4H8B-EA3M].
469 Greg Allen, The Water Is Already Low at a Florida Freshwater Spring, but Nestlé Wants
More, NPR (Nov. 8, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/08/776776312/the-water-isalready-low-at-a-florida-freshwater-spring-but-nestl-wants-more
[https://perma.cc/48679WCM].
470 INDIAN RIVER LAGOON—FACTS AND FIGURES, HARBOR BRANCH, https://www.fau.edu/
hboi/meh/IRL.Fact.Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MXA-YYRF]; Brian Lapointe et al., Nutrient
Over-Enrichment and Light Limitation of Seagrass Communities in the Indian River Lagoon, An
Urbanized Subtropical Estuary, 699 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 1 (2020), https://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S0048969719340458.
471 Max Chesnes, What Are Lake Okeechobee Discharges? A Multimedia Primer and Historical
Data, TREASURE COAST NEWSPAPERS (Mar. 11, 2021, 4:25 PM), https://www.tcpalm.com/story/
news/local/indian-river-lagoon/2021/01/07/lake-okeechobee-discharges-into-st-lucie-indianriver-lagoon-graphic/6567907002 [https://perma.cc/CE5H-U3D9].
472 Id.
473 The Ripple Effect, CONSERVANCY SW. FLA. [https://perma.cc/Y566-4WRY] (providing
overview of ecological impacts from Lake Okeechobee discharges and altered hydrology).
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The Kissimmee River was once a shallow and meandering 103mile river with a significant floodplain as wide as three miles.474 In the
1960s, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers channelized the river for flood
control, dredging a thirty-foot-deep canal that destroyed much of the
area’s unique ecosystems.475 Since the 1990s, the U.S. Army Corps and
local Water Management District have begun restoring portions of the
river, but local environmental advocates allege that these efforts have
been insufficient and responded with a rights of nature initiative, the
Kissimmee River Bill of Rights.476 As local organizer Barbara Cady
explained to the public, “Our river was destroyed in the name of flood
control, killing the wildlife it supported. A Kissimmee River Bill of
Rights will ensure that this living breathing ecosystem will never be
assaulted again.”477
Of all these efforts, however, the most successful to date was
recently formalized by Orange County to protect the Wekiva and
Econlockhatchee Rivers, addressed below.
b. Orange County, WEBOR, and Senate Bill 712
The Wekiva and Econlockhatchee Rivers run through Orange
County in central Florida, north of Orlando. For decades, citizens have
raised alarms about declining water levels and increasing nutrient
pollution from septic tanks, agricultural waste, and lawn fertilizer.478 In
2020, Orange County made national news when it enacted a county
charter amendment to grant legal protections directly to the Wekiva
and Econlockhatchee Rivers.479 The resulting Wekiva River and
Econlockhatchee River Bill of Rights, or WEBOR, recognizes the right
of the Wekiva and Econlockhatchee rivers to “exist, [f]low, to be
protected against [p]ollution and to maintain a healthy ecosystem”
while creating standing for citizens of Orange County to bring actions
on behalf of the rivers.480 After eleven public hearings, the 2020 Charter
474 Kissimmee River, S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST., https://www.sfwmd.gov/our-work/
kissimmee-river [https://perma.cc/2VW9-QXNL].
475 Id.
476 Tamia Streeter, Legislation Proposed to Grant Kissimmee River Rights, NEWS STAR (Sept.
15, 2019), https://www.thenewsstar.com/story/news/2019/09/15/legislation-proposed-grantkissimmee-river-rights/2333791001 [https://perma.cc/FPG4-HV29].
477 Cmty. Env’t Legal Def. Fund, supra note 468.
478 Rebecca Renner, In Florida, A River Gets Rights, SIERRA (Feb. 9, 2021),
https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/2021-2-march-april/protect/florida-river-gets-rights
[https://perma.cc/Y62X-6VKM] (discussing the sharply declining water level and increasing
pollution load).
479 Id.; ORANGE COUNTY, FLA., CHARTER art. VII, § 704.1(A)–(B).
480 Id.
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Review Commission approved WEBOR to appear on the ballot in
November 2020.481
Roughly eight months before the election, and before the proposed
amendment had even qualified for the ballot, the Florida Legislature
moved decisively to preempt it and all other rights of nature efforts in
Florida, enacting statutory language clarifying that
[a] local government regulation, ordinance, code, rule,
comprehensive plan, charter, or any other provision of law may not
recognize or grant any legal rights to a plant, an animal, a body of
water, or any other part of the natural environment that is not a
person or political subdivision . . . or grant such person or political
subdivision any specific rights relating to the natural environment
not otherwise authorized in general law or specifically granted in the
State Constitution.482

It was an impressive legislative feat, requiring swift coordination. In
recent years, the Florida Legislature has preempted many local
environmental protection efforts, including statewide preemption of
local plastic-bag bans,483 local polystyrene foam foodware bans,484 local
plastic straw bans,485 and local reef protection ordinances banning the
sale and use of certain chemical sunscreens found to damage coral
reefs.486 However, the statewide legislative effort to preempt rights of
nature ordinances stands out for the speed with which the legislature
acted.
At the time the legislature acted, approximately half-a-dozen rights
of nature initiatives had been proposed at the municipal level, but none
had actually qualified for the ballot, and only WEBOR was close to
succeeding. Yet within the two months of state legislative session,
identical language prohibiting local governments from taking any
action to “recognize or grant any legal rights to a plant, an animal, a
481 2020 ORANGE CNTY. CHARTER REV. COMM’N, RIGHTS OF THE WEKIVA RIVER AND
ECONLOCKHATCHEE RIVER COMMITTEE (2020), https://www.occompt.com/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2020/01/2020-01-22-Rights-of-the-Wekiva-River-and-Econlockhatcee-RiverFinal-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/PT3E-NVUW].
482 FLA. STAT. § 403.412(9)(a) (2020) (proposed as Senate Bill 712).
483 § 403.7033 (2020).
484 § 500.90 (2016).
485 H.R. 771, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2019). The bill was subsequently vetoed by Governor
Ron DeSantis. Letter from Ron DeSantis, Governor, to Laurel M. Lee, Fla. Sec’y of State (May 10,
2019), https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/05.103.pdf [https://perma.cc/23SJT353] (veto transmittal letter).
486 § 499.002(7) (2020); Samantha J. Gross, Key West Banned Sunscreen to Protect Reefs.
Florida Legislature Voted to Overrule That, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 10, 2020),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/florida-keys/article241057161.html.
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body of water, or any other part of the natural environment” was
incorporated into four separate bills, a clear indicator that the
legislation was a top priority and destined for passage.487 Representative
Blaise Ingoglia, the original House sponsor of the preemption, had
urged the preemptive measure on grounds that the proposed rights of
nature charter amendments in Florida would cause “chaos and will
damage our tremendous economy” and framed them as creating the
ability to sue on behalf of a fern or anthill.488 In the waning days of the
session, the preemption language was amended onto SB 712, a massive
water quality bill dubbed the “Clean Waterways Act.”489 The bill was
signed into law on June 30, 2020, just weeks after WEBOR qualified for
the ballot.
Despite the preemption, Orange County kept WEBOR on the
ballot. In November, electors approved the charter amendment by
nearly ninety percent.490 The margin of victory is noteworthy in a
county that cleaves, like the rest of the state, fairly evenly along partisan
lines, indicating bipartisan support for this novel legal idea.491
Notwithstanding the overwhelming local endorsement, the future of
WEBOR is unclear. Supporters argue that the preemption is
unconstitutional and unenforceable. The ordinance seems vulnerable,
but thus far, legal challenges to WEBOR itself have yet to emerge.
However, litigants have not hesitated to use the new ordinance in
pursuit of its intended goal. In April 2021, local plaintiffs filed the firstever WEBOR enforcement action on behalf of Lake Hart, Lake Mary
487 S. 712, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 48 (Fla. 2020), http://laws.flrules.org/2020/150
[https://perma.cc/YZ29-3E2R] (amending Section 403.412 to include Subsection 9).
488 HB
1199, House-Judiciary Committee (Fla. Feb. 12, 2020), https://
www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/HouseSchedule/houseschedule.aspx?
calendarListType=
Interim&date=02-12-2020 [https://perma.cc/8Z7Z-NP6G] (click “Watch Archived Stream”
under the “Judiciary Committee” subheader) (video of state house committee hearing that
includes statement of Rep. Blaise Ingoglia, R-Spring Hill).
489 FLA. S. APPROPRIATIONS COMM., COMMITTEE MEETING EXPANDED AGENDA 2–3 (2020),
https://www.flsenate.gov/Committees/Show/AP/ExpandedAgenda/4919
[https://perma.cc/
YB77-LCN8] (proposed committee substitute for CS/SB 712).
490 ORANGE CNTY., FLA. ELECTIONS, 2020 OFFICIAL RESULTS 7 (2020), https://
www.ocfelections.com/sites/default/files/media/forms/Election%20Records%20and%
20Turnout/election%20records/10866-2020%20GENERAL%20ELECTION/10866-officialelection-results-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/HNL2-B7KG] (showing that 89.2% voted yes
and 10.8% voted no).
491 Joseph Bonasia, Voters Approve Charter Amendment and Make Florida the Epicenter of
Rights of Nature, FLA. TODAY (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.floridatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/
11/06/florida-epicenter-rights-nature-opinion/6189196002 [https://perma.cc/YY6Y-NVFJ] (“In
a county in which the breakdown of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents is 36.6%, 34.2%
and 24.3%, respectively, the amendment results may reflect the sentiments of residents
throughout the state.”).
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Jane, Wilde Cypress Branch, Boggy Branch, Crosby Island Marsh, and
a local rights of nature activist. The plaintiffs are attempting to use
WEBOR to stop a 1,900-acre housing development in Orange
County.492 They argue that the proposed development violates the rights
of the waters under WEBOR—Article 7 of the Orange County Charter,
Section 704.1.493 Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the project violates the
rights of the water bodies to exist, flow, and be free from pollution by
proposing the dredge and fill of approximately 115 acres of Orange
County waters and wetlands for road construction, development, and
stormwater pond construction.494 The plaintiffs also allege that the
destruction of wetlands and impacts to water quality violate the rights
of the waters to “maintain a healthy ecosystem.”495 Whether the
litigation will be successful remains to be seen, but the lawsuit has
already gained broad national and international attention.496
Emboldened by their success in Orange County, advocates are
currently proposing rights of nature ordinances in twenty-eight
counties and municipalities throughout Florida.497 Advocates have also
begun gathering signatures to qualify a statewide rights of nature citizen
ballot initiative for the 2022 general election.498 The proposed ballot
measure, “Florida Right to Clean Water,” recognizes a right to clean
water for Floridians and an additional right to the waters themselves to
be clean. Like WEBOR, the ballot measure proposes rights for waters to
“exist, flow, be free from pollution, and maintain a healthy
ecosystem.”499 The proposed amendment also grants any Florida

492 Complaint, Wilde Cypress Branch v. Beachline South Residential, L.L.C. (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct.
Apr. 26, 2021).
493 Id. ¶ 33.
494 Id. ¶¶ 21–24.
495 Id. ¶ 24.
496 See generally Isabella Kaminski, Streams and Lakes Have Rights, A U.S. County Decided.
Now They’re Suing Florida, GUARDIAN (May 1, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2021/may/01/florida-rights-of-nature-lawsuit-waterways-housing-development
[https://perma.cc/NYP9-AZNW]; Anagha Srikanth, Streams and Lakes Have Rights—And
They’re Suing Florida, HILL (May 3, 2021), https://thehill.com/changing-america/sustainability/
environment/551513-streams-and-lakes-have-rights-and-theyre-suing
[https://perma.cc/
Q7UA-KNUA].
497 Efforts are currently underway in Leon County, Alachua County, Seminole County, Lee
County, Palm Beach County, Santa Rosa County, Miami-Dade County, Pinellas County, St. Lucie
County, Martin County, Volusia County, Maitland, Davenport, Haines City, Winter Springs,
Pensacola, Apalachicola, Peace River, Satellite Beach, New Smyrna Beach, Altamonte Springs,
Venice, Sarasota, Cocoa, Naples, Punta Gorda, and Northport. Telephone Interview with Chuck
O’Neal, Chairman, Fla. Rts. of Nature Network (Jan. 5, 2021).
498 FL5.org, Ballot Title: Florida Right to Clean Water.
499 Id.
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resident, governmental entity, and nongovernmental entity the right to
sue for enforcement of the rights.500
5.

North American Tribal Nations

Perhaps inspired by domestic and international examples, North
American tribes and First Nations have recently acted formally to codify
a number of diverse and far-reaching rights of nature laws. While these
newly recognized rights may represent a significant shift in the legal
landscape, for many tribes, they simply codify what they have always
held to be true—that nature is sacred and that people and the
environment are inextricable.501
a. Ho-Chunk Nation and Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin
In 2015, the Ho-Chunk Nation of Wisconsin proposed an
amendment to its Tribal constitution to affirm that “[e]cosystems,
natural communities, and species within the Ho-Chunk Nation
territory possess inherent, fundamental, and inalienable rights to
naturally exist, flourish, regenerate, and evolve.”502 In 2018, 86.9% of the
General Council of the Ho-Chunk Nation voted to proceed with the
rights of nature amendment.503 The proposed amendment still needs
final approval from the full membership.504 In 2020, the Menominee
Indian Tribe of Wisconsin asserted the rights of the Menominee River
in an effort to stop proposed mining.505

Id.
See generally James D K Morris & Jacinta Ruru, Giving Voice to Rivers: Legal Personality
as a Vehicle for Recognizing Indigenous Peoples’ Relationships to Water?, 14 AUSTL. INDIGENOUS
L. REV. 49, 58 (2010) (discussing the strong connections between Indigenous people and
freshwater rivers).
502 Resolution to Amend the Ho-Chunk Nation Constitution and Provide for Rights of
Nature,
Gen.
Council
Res.
09-19-15
(Ho-Chunk
Nation
2015),
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/honorearth/pages/2098/attachments/original/
1446129806/HoChunk_RightsOfNature_Resolution_Sep2015.pdf?1446129806
[https://perma.cc/A2VZ-N8QD]; Press Release, Cmty. Env’t Legal Def. Fund, Ho-Chunk Nation
General Council Approves Rights of Nature Constitutional Amendment (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://celdf.org/2018/09/press-release-ho-chunk-nation-general-council-approves-rights-ofnature-constitutional-amendment [https://perma.cc/PM2P-4C89].
503 Cmty. Env’t Legal Def. Fund, supra note 502.
504 Id.
505 Amelia Cole, Wisconsin Tribe Recognizes Menominee River Rights, GREAT LAKES ECHO
(Mar.13, 2020), https://greatlakesecho.org/2020/03/13/wisconsin-tribe-recognizes-menomineeriver-rights [https://perma.cc/MS8B-9954].
500
501
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b. Ponca Nation of Oklahoma
In 2017, the Ponca Nation of Oklahoma passed a statute
recognizing the rights of nature to protect tribal lands from fracking.506
Casey Camp-Horinek, a Ponca Nation councilwoman, observed, “The
Ponca Nation has chosen to follow the rights of nature, the immutable
rights of nature by . . . recognizing that we as human beings are not
separate from but part of this sacred system of life.”507
c. White Earth Band of Ojibwe in Minnesota
In 2018, the White Earth Band of Ojibwe, part of the Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe, adopted legal rights for manoomin (wild rice) and the
freshwater resources where it is found.508 This was the first law to
recognize the rights of a plant species.509 The resolution asserts that
manoomin has “inherent rights to exist, flourish, regenerate, and
evolve, as well as inherent rights to restoration, recovery, and
preservation.”510 In August of 2021, the White Earth Band filed suit to
stop the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources from issuing a
water use permit for a new oil pipeline that it alleged would violate the
protected rights of manoomin, in a suit currently pending in the White
Earth Band of Obibwe’s Tribal Court.511 Uniquely, the protections also
include a right to a healthy climate system and a right to be free from

506 Alex Brown, Cities, Tribes Try a New Environmental Approach: Give Nature Rights, PEW
STATELINE (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/
2019/10/30/cities-tribes-try-a-new-environmental-approach-give-nature-rights
[https://
perma.cc/GPC8-KN7N].
507 Casey Camp-Horinek, Councilwoman, Ponca Tribe of Okla., Keynote Address at the 2019
Bioneers Conference: Aligning Human Law with Natural Law (Oct. 20, 2019),
https://bioneers.org/casey-camp-horinek-aligning-human-law-natural-law-zstf1911
[https://perma.cc/XQ2X-Y4CA].
508 1855 Treaty Auth., Resolution Establishing Rights of Manoomin, Res. 2018-05 (Dec. 5,
2018), https://whiteearth.com/assets/files/public_documents/Letter%20to%20Tim%20Walz%
20re%20Rights%20of%20Manoomin.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK27-N7FY] (see same URL for
subsequent citations); White Earth Rsrv. Bus. Comm., Res. 001-19-009 (Dec. 31, 2018); White
Earth Rsrv. Bus. Comm. Res. 001-19-010 (Dec. 31, 2018).
509 Advancing Legal Rights of Nature: Timeline, CMTY. ENV’T LEGAL DEF. FUND,
https://celdf.org/rights-of-nature/timeline [https://perma.cc/9E45-THJ6] (noting that the Rights
of the Manoomin is the “first law to secure legal rights of a particular plant species”).
510 White Earth Band of Ojibwe Res. 0001-19-0009 and 0001-19-101 (2018),
https://whiteearth.com/assets/files/public_documents/Letter%20to%20Tim%20Walz%20re%20
Rights%20of%20Manoomin.pdf (last visited July 30, 2021).
511 See Dan Gunderson, Advocates Hope White Earth Wild Rice Case Will Boost ‘Rights of
Nature,’ MINN. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 1, 2021, 5:43 AM), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2021/09/
01/advocates-hope-white-earth-wild-rice-case-will-boost-rights-of-nature
[https://perma.cc/
WLH6-TRCE].
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genetic engineering from “seeds that have been developed using
methods other than traditional plant breeding.”512
d. Yurok Tribe of California
In 2019, the Tribal Council of the Yurok Tribe of Northern
California adopted a resolution establishing the rights of the Klamath
River to “exist, flourish, and naturally evolve; to have a clean and
healthy environment free from pollutants . . . .”513 After adoption of the
resolution, one member of the Yurok Tribal Council stated, “We are
sending a strong message that we now have an additional legal
mechanism to shield the Klamath against those who might harm our
most sacred resource. It is and always will be our responsibility to
defend this river by any means necessary.”514
e.

Innu Council of Ekuanitship and Minganie County, Quebec
As this Article goes to print, the Innu Council of Ekuanitship and
the Minganie Regional County Municipality have granted legal rights
to the Magpie River in northern Quebec.515 Through tandem
resolutions, the Indigenous council and municipality confer nine rights
to the river, including the right to flow, the right to maintain its natural
biodiversity, and the right to sue.516 This is the first instance in which
rights have been recognized in natural objects in Canada.517

512 1855 Treaty Auth., Resolution Establishing Rights of Manoomin, Res. 2018-05 § 1(a) (Dec.
5, 2018), https://whiteearth.com/assets/files/public_documents/Letter%20to%20Tim%20Walz%
20re%20Rights%20of%20Manoomin.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK27-N7FY].
513 Testimony Regarding Natural Solutions to Cutting Pollution and Building Resilience:
Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on the Climate Crisis, 116th Cong. 8 (2019) [hereinafter
Testimony Regarding Natural Solutions], https://docs.house.gov/meetings/CN/CN00/20191022/
110110/HMTG-116-CN00-Wstate-MyersF-20191022.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B5RH-X2NM]
(statement of Frankie Myers, V. Chairman, Yurok Tribe).
514 Tribe Passes Powerful Resolution, YUROK TODAY (Yurok Tribe, Klamath, Cal.), May 2019,
at 3 [https://perma.cc/CD3W-LSNF].
515 See Jack Graham, Canadian River Wins Legal Rights in Global Push to Protect Nature,
REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2021, 6:49 PM), https://news.trust.org/item/20210224174810-i75ms
[https://perma.cc/H5WY-6RXQ]; see also Morgan Lowrie, Quebec River Granted Legal Rights as
Part of Global ‘Personhood’ Movement, CBC (Feb. 28, 2021, 9:10 AM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/montreal/magpie-river-quebec-canada-personhood-1.5931067
[https://perma.cc/
4AUB-HCHT].
516 See Graham, supra note 515; see also Lowrie, supra note 515.
517 See Graham, supra note 515; see also Lowrie, supra note 515.
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***
In concluding this review of rights of nature initiatives in the
United States, it is worth recalling the early presentation of the idea by
Christopher Stone in his 1972 article, Should Trees Have Standing?—
Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects.518 For Stone, the recognition
of legal rights for natural objects was always about more than simply
protecting natural resources. The movement is about “subordinating
some human claims to those of the environment per se.”519 This requires
a sea change, a departure from the current anthropocentric worldview
where humans exist separately from the natural world to one that
recognizes the interconnectedness of nature and humanity and the
intrinsic values of both. It comes as no surprise that the rights of nature
movement isn’t there yet, but the recent spate of rights of nature
amendments and resolutions signal an emerging change in
consciousness. Each successive rights of nature effort nudges the
concept a bit further into the consciousness of the U.S. legal system. As
Thomas Linzey, Senior Legal Counsel for the Center for Democratic
and Environmental Rights, has remarked, “In fifteen short years, rights
of nature is no longer the fringe that it once was. . . . now it’s a
movement.”520
III.

COMPARING THE PUBLIC TRUST AND RIGHTS OF NATURE

Having introduced these two distinctive approaches to
environmental protection, the Article now turns to analysis of
important points of convergence and divergence between the public
trust doctrine and the rights of nature movement. Both approaches can
lay claim to long historical roots, though in wholly independent legal
and philosophical traditions—the ancient Roman and early English and
American common law traditions that gave rise to the public trust
doctrine521 and the various Indigenous cultures and philosophical
traditions around the world in which the rights of nature perspective
has long been central.522 In some environmental contexts, it appears that
See generally Stone, supra note 294.
Id. at 490.
520 Alachua County, Rights of Nature Workshop—Board of County Commissioners Discussion,
YOUTUBE
(Feb.
12,
2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=jcXm53XcHmc
[https://perma.cc/VF66-RHJ3] (testimony of Thomas Linzey, at 27:15).
521 See supra Section I.A.
522 See supra Section II.A.
518
519
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applying both doctrines would produce similar substantive results—
although in other cases, due to important underlying differences, they
would not.523 The most important drivers of these differences are the
contrasting environmental ethics that animate them: in the case of the
public trust doctrine, the anthropocentric ethic that places human
needs at the center of the normative calculus, and in the case of the
rights of nature movement, the biocentric ethic that deprivileges human
concerns.
Nevertheless, there are also noteworthy similarities. As regards the
resources each approach protects, for example, it is noteworthy that
while both approaches are widely applicable in theory, each seems to
take a special interest in waterways. This suggests that waterways are
the most central and vulnerable components of the natural systems that
environmental advocates seek to protect—and the most underprotected by conventional environmental laws. Indeed, both have
attracted attention from environmental advocates who turn to them as
a last resort when other legal strategies have failed or seem inapplicable.
The modern trend toward increased appeals to both approaches in
different legal systems suggests generalized public frustration with the
limits of conventional environmental regulation to protect vulnerable
natural systems and the desire to find a more foundational grounds for
protection than the conventional cost-benefit analysis that undergirds
much activity by the modern regulatory state.524
Perhaps relatedly, it is striking that both approaches seem to match
failures in the judicial context with corresponding successes in the
political context—meaning that even when environmental advocates
lose on their cause of action in court, the litigation serves to galvanize
success in related political advocacy. This suggests that both approaches
can play similarly useful roles as component pieces of a wider strategy
for environmental protection, one that considers the points of
intersection and leverage between all three branches of government.
This Part considers the differences and similarities between the
two approaches, beginning with their strikingly contrasting underlying
environmental ethics. It then considers these points of overlap and what
these combined features suggest more broadly about the limits, and
failures, of conventional environmental law.

See infra Sections III.C.3–III.C.4.
Circular A-4, OMB (Sept. 17, 2003), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/
circulars_a004_a-4 [https://perma.cc/R3QP-VU6M] (discussing the role of the Office of
Management and Budget in ensuring that the costs of regulations are justified by their benefits).
523
524
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Contrasting Environmental Ethics: Anthropocentrism vs.
Ecocentrism

Reflecting the different legal roots from which the two approaches
begin, the most striking difference between the public trust doctrine and
rights of nature movement is in the normative environmental ethic that
animates each approach. The public trust doctrine reflects the
anthropocentrism that underlies most of the common law traditions
from which it stems, especially manifest in modern American
regulatory law, which derives normative direction primarily in
reference to human needs.525 By contrast, the rights of nature movement
is squarely rooted in a biocentric ethic that considers human interests
only as one component of the overall natural system, in which people
are merely one constituent part.526 This Section discusses the critical
differences between these underlying environmental ethics and their
implications for environmental policy.
1.

Anthropocentrism and the Public Trust

Anthropocentrism literally means that human concerns are placed
at the center of the normative assessment as to whether an action is right
or wrong.527 It follows from the ethic of utilitarianism as Jeremy
Bentham first imagined it, defining what is right as whatever will
provide the greatest good for the greatest number of people.528 As
Professor William Baxter has memorably outlined for the context of
environmental law, the anthropocentric approach to environmental
ethics asks “what is good for people, not penguins”—considering the
intrinsic value of human beings and the mere instrumental value of all
else, and with reference only to the needs of human beings.529
The public trust doctrine begins with an anthropocentric premise,
that certain public resource commons are so important (impliedly, to
people) that they cannot belong to any one person in particular, and
therefore must belong to all people together, held and managed by the
See infra Section III.A.1.
See infra Section III.A.2.
527 Sarah E. Boslaugh, Anthropocentrism, BRITANNICA (Oct. 28, 2013), https://
www.britannica.com/topic/anthropocentrism [https://perma.cc/5XX2-WZFG].
528 Brian Duignan & Henry R. West, Utilitarianism, BRITANNICA (Nov. 20, 2020),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/utilitarianism-philosophy [https://perma.cc/5S63-JESK].
529 WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION 4–9
(1974).
525
526
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state as trustee for the public benefit.530 As discussed in Part I, the
doctrine probably originated as a means of preventing private
monopolies over critical natural resources that people depend on for
navigation, commerce, sustenance, sanitation, recreation, and
implicitly, such ecosystem services as water purification, flood control,
fish and wildlife habitat, and others.531 While traditional trust values
relating to commerce and navigation remain protected under most
versions of the doctrine, many jurisdictions have increasingly
interpreted it to convey more rigorous environmental protections for
the ecosystem services associated with trust resources, especially
waterways.532 Jurisdictions that have moved in this direction have done
so even when environmental protection values conflict with presentday commercial interests. This is often on grounds that the public
interest must account for the needs of future generations, which
sometimes requires that trust resources be protected against the shortsighted needs of the present generation.
In a recent high-profile example, as discussed in Section I.C.3.,
Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer invoked the public trust
doctrine in November of 2020 to repeal a nearly seventy-year-old
easement permitting two oil pipelines along the Straits of Mackinac
connecting Lake Huron and Lake Michigan, following prolonged and
unremedied concerns about potential damage from equipment
failure.533 The Office of the Governor announced that “[t]he state is
revoking the 1953 easement for violation of the public trust doctrine.
This body of law recognizes the State of Michigan as the ‘trustee’ of the
public’s rights in the Great Lakes and lays upon the state legal
obligations to protect those rights from any impairment.”534 In a
statement, the governor explained that “[t]he continued use of the dual
pipelines cannot be reconciled with the public’s rights in the Great
Lakes and the State’s duty to protect them” and that the pipeline
operators had imposed “on the people of Michigan an unacceptable risk
of a catastrophic oil spill in the Great Lakes that could devastate our
economy and way of life.”535
Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 137.
See supra Part I.
532 See supra Section I.B.2.
533 Flesher, supra note 163.
534 State of Mich. Off. of the Governor, supra note 164.
535 Id. (“The state found that the 1953 easement violated the public trust doctrine from its
inception because the easement does not make the necessary public trust findings. Moreover, the
state also found that the continued use of the dual pipelines cannot be reconciled with the public’s
530
531
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In defending this dramatic and controversial move, Governor
Whitmer explicitly recognized the multiple sources of value in the Great
Lakes and her obligation to protect the interests of future generations
in management decisions involving them, noting that “in Michigan, the
Great Lakes define our borders, but they also define who we are as
people.” Her press release continued:
The Great Lakes are home to 21% of the world’s fresh surface water.
They supply drinking water for 48 million people, including 5
million here in Michigan, and support 1.3 million jobs that generate
$82 billion in wages annually across the US. In Michigan, the Great
Lakes support over 350,000 jobs. An oil spill in the Great Lakes
would put families and small businesses across the region at risk.536

In this striking example, the public trust doctrine was invoked to
protect the Great Lakes ecosystem into the future, and against powerful
present economic interests in fuel transport. Nevertheless, Whitmer’s
focus remains squarely on the interests of her constituents—the people
of Michigan, and perhaps their neighbors—in drinking water, jobs, and
even personal identity. Reference to the role of the Great Lakes in
defining Michiganders as a people epitomizes modern appeals to the
public trust doctrine to protect environmental values that are often left
out of regulatory cost-benefit analysis—but even so, defending the
environmental components of human identity remains an
anthropocentric goal. The protection of natural systems for the benefit
of future generations of people belies the public trust doctrine’s
anthropocentric perspective, centered around the satisfaction of human
needs. Even if the substantive outcome is a management decision that
protects the overall natural system, it is still an anthropocentric move if
the ethical point of reference is the human interests in that system.
The baked-in anthropocentrism of the public trust doctrine is to
be expected in the context of the many legal systems throughout the
world committed to the good-governance principle of meeting the
needs of the governed, which, itself, is far preferable to the alternatives
that are even less defensible by democratic standards, like systems that

rights in the Great Lakes and the State’s duty to protect them. Transporting millions of gallons
of petroleum products each day through two 67-year old [sic] pipelines that lie exposed along the
entire span of a busy shipping channel presents an extraordinary and unacceptable risk. The dual
pipelines are vulnerable to anchor strikes, similar dangerous impacts, and the inherent risks of
pipeline operations.”). The statement goes on to list examples in which the pipelines were
accidentally struck by commercial vessel anchors and repeated efforts by the state to win
cooperation by the pipeline operators in meeting its obligations under the easement to avoid
potential harm. Id.
536 Id.
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prioritize the needs of a tyrannical autocrat or a feudally privileged royal
class. Anthropocentrism is the mainstream in American law, which, by
design, is generally grounded in the conventional police power of the
state to protect the public health, safety, and welfare.537 The very basis
for the legitimate exercise of sovereign authority on individuals—from
providing public education to prosecuting crimes—rests on the
promise that such authority will be used non-arbitrarily to protect the
people of the land.538 Especially in recent decades, American law has
been purposefully oriented around anthropocentrism in the form of
Bentham utilitarianism, as recognized forthrightly in modern tort,
contract, and property law. The inclusion of utility elements in the
Restatement of Torts reasonableness standard,539 the doctrine of
efficient breach of contract,540 and such property law doctrines as
common law nuisance541 all attest to this. The dominance of
utilitarianism in American law has been especially overt since the
advent of the Law and Economics movement in the 1980s, which
advanced consideration of utilitarianism and wealth maximization as
an ethical framework for legal decision-making.542
Indeed, in his consequential 1993 Executive Order 12866, still in
effect today, President Clinton explicitly recommitted federal
regulation to its longstanding goals of protecting the health, safety,
environment, economy, and well-being of the American people, and he
mandated formal cost-benefit analysis for all regulatory activity, to
ensure that these goals are accomplished without imposing

537 See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, in THE LAW AND
POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 355, 372 (Kalyani Robbins
ed., 2015) (discussing the police power).
538 Cf. Kate Brown, What Is Power Under the Rule of Law?, A.B.A. (Mar. 3, 2021),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/law-day/law-day-2021/what-is-powerunder-the-rule-of-law- [https://perma.cc/EY66-6KUM] (“Under the rule of law, power is the
sovereign will of the people expressed as non-arbitrary laws that—theoretically, if not perfectly
in practice—apply to everyone equally.”).
539 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 (AM. L. INST. 1979) (balancing the social utility
of the harmed and harmful uses of land in determining liability for incompatible uses).
540 See, e.g., Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985)
(explaining Judge Richard Posner’s view that individuals who breach inefficient contracts are not
acting wrongfully when their choice advances overall social utility).
541 See, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) (requiring payment of
permanent damages rather than enjoining operation of a factory that rendered neighboring
homes unlivable but stabilized the regional economy).
542 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
103 (1979) (introducing the new discourse).
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unreasonable costs on society.543 The cost-benefit analysis used to
justify federal regulation weighs the benefits promised by the proposed
regulatory action against the costs of providing them, as measured by
the corresponding positive and negative impacts on the American
people, generally as quantifiable in dollar terms.544
In the United States, as in most other nations, environmental
regulations follow the same pattern. The growing importance of costbenefit analysis to justify federal action under Executive Order 12866
has especially vexed advocates for the noncommercial values of natural
systems because it is hard to quantifiably assess the ecological values of
natural systems that are protected from extraction, development, and
recreation.545 Environmental economists and other advocates have
developed an elaborate vocabulary to cope with such non-priced
environmental values as clean air, remote wilderness, or nonmarketable
ecosystem services.546 They have called for assessment of the existence
values of natural resources, which recognize the value people place on
maintaining the very existence of a natural resource (even a distant one
they may never visit in person); the option values of resources, which
recognize the value people place on having the option to one day enjoy
a resource, even if they never actually do; and bequest values, which
recognize the value people place on knowing that their children or
future generations will be able to enjoy a natural resource.547 They have
also called attention to the very real costs of replacing critical ecosystem
services provided by natural resources, such as flood control, carbon
sinks, water purification, and pollination.548 Yet these values are not
always given sufficient attention in casual cost-benefit analyses.549 Even

543 Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (mandating cost-benefit
analysis of regulatory activity to ensure that the federal regulatory system “protects and improves
[the American people’s] health, safety, environment, and well-being and improves the
performance of the economy without imposing unacceptable or unreasonable costs on society”).
544 Id.
545 See, e.g., David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545 (1997). But see Sidney A. Shapiro &
Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV.
ENV’T L. REV. 433 (2008) (discussing the advantages of cost-benefit analysis in environmental
contexts).
546 See, e.g., Catherine M. H. Keske, How to Value Environmental and Non-Market Goods: A
Guide for Legal Professionals, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 423 (2011).
547 Id. at 427–28.
548 James Salzman, Barton H. Thompson, Jr. & Gretchen C. Daily, Protecting Ecosystem
Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 309, 310–12 (2001).
549 See MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE & RICHARD L. REVESZ, REVIVING RATIONALITY: SAVING
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR THE SAKE OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2020).
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the term “ecosystem service” implies anthropocentrism, as people are
the primary intended beneficiaries of the service.
But even before the rise of regulatory cost-benefit analysis, most
American environmental and natural resources law has long been
oriented toward utilitarian goals and mediated by anthropocentric
ethics. The vast majority of U.S. public lands, held by the United States
Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management,550 are managed
under a Multiple-Use and Sustained-Yield directive that privileges a
handful of anthropocentrically valuable uses, from the extraction of
valuable resources like minerals, timber, and wildlife to the provision of
enjoyable recreational opportunities like camping and hiking.551
Congress has defined the “Multiple Use” directive in anthropocentric
terms, clarifying that it requires “the management of the public lands
and their various resource values so that they are utilized in the
combination that will best meet the present and future needs of the
American people . . . .”552 Fisheries management under the MagnusonStevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act553 similarly
prioritizes utilitarian concerns about maximizing the sustainable yield
of a fishery554 and protecting the interests of fishing-based economies
and the communities that surround them,555 with only recent and
ambiguous protection for fishery habitat and ecosystem values.556

550 CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40225, FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT AGENCIES: BACKGROUND ON
LAND AND RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (2009) (reporting that the majority of public lands are
managed by the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management for “multiple use and sustained
yield”).
551 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a)
(requiring the adoption of multiple-use principles for certain public lands managed by the
Department of the Interior); Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA), 16 U.S.C.
§ 529 (requiring the adoption of multiple-use principles for certain public lands held by the
Department of Agriculture).
552 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c); see also 16 U.S.C. § 531 (providing a similar definition in application
to United States Forest Service lands).
553 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1891.
554 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (requiring that fishery management plans prevent overfishing); 16
U.S.C. § 1802(34) (defining overfishing as that which “jeopardizes the capacity of a fishery to
produce the maximum sustainable yield on a continuing basis”).
555 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(8) (requiring fishery managers to account for the interests of fishing
communities, provide for their sustained participation in the fishery, and “to the extent
practicable, minimize adverse economic impacts on such communities”).
556 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(9) (requiring managers to minimize bycatch mortality in fisheries).
The overwhelming majority of the ten national standards that Regional Management Councils
must uphold in issuing management plans are focused on economic factors rather than
environmental factors. See 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a). For further discussion, see also Erin Ryan,
Fisheries Without Courts: How Fishery Management Reveals Our Dynamic Separation of Powers,
32 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 431 (2017).
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Modern water allocation laws in both the eastern557 and the western558
United States include explicit consideration of the public interest, and
the public interest is calculated in utilitarian terms close to those
identified in the Second Restatement of Torts, Section 828.559 In Idaho,
the water code requires that water managers give consideration to the
public interest in “fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life, recreation,
aesthetic beauty, transportation and navigation values, and water
quality”560—a list that tracks many of the values associated with the
modern public trust doctrine—but as the “aesthetic beauty” factor
suggests, they remain assessed from the human vantage point.
In the same way, the public trust doctrine is unambiguously
anthropocentric because it is rooted in the protection of the public
interest in trust resources, in which the public interest is
unapologetically registered in human terms. As some environmentalists
have long critiqued, the doctrine essentially treats natural resource
commons as public property for public use and enjoyment.561 Even the
environmentally protective California public trust doctrine, made
internationally famous by its role in a 1983 decision protecting the
Mono Lake ecosystem against water withdrawals to Los Angeles,
privileges human values.562 In the Mono Lake case, the California
Supreme Court clarifies that in meeting the state’s obligations under the
doctrine, the water agency must balance the public trust values of
ecology, scenery, and recreation in the Mono Basin against
557 As regards the eastern riparian states, see, for example, WATER RES. PLAN. & MGMT. DIV.,
AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE § 1R-1-01 (Joseph W.
Dellapenna ed., 1997) (setting forth the obligation of the state in protecting the public interest in
water resources); see also id. § 1R-01-02 (requiring the state to allocate water rights efficiently,
productively, and sustainably “in the satisfaction of economic, environmental, and other social
goals, whether public or private, with the availability and utility of water being extended with a
view of preventing water from becoming a limiting factor in the general improvement of social
welfare”).
558 As regards the western prior appropriation states, see, for example, ALASKA STAT.
§ 46.15.080(b) (1966) (setting forth an example of the modern public interest requirement that
must be satisfied in many prior appropriation states before new water rights are granted); IDAHO
CODE § 42-1501 (1978) (listing public interest elements for consideration when assigning water
rights); IDAHO CODE § 42-203A(5)(e) (requiring a showing that a proposed new water use is in
the local public interest).
559 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 (AM. L. INST. 1979).
560 IDAHO CODE § 42-1501 (1978) (listing public interest elements for consideration when
assigning water rights).
561 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 12 (critiquing the public trust doctrine for adopting the
vocabulary of property law instead of a more protective stewardship ethos); Ryan, The Historic
Saga, supra note 1, at 620 (discussing the “green dissent”).
562 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983); see also Ryan, The Historic
Saga, supra note 1, at 620–21.
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countervailing public interests in transferring its water hundreds of
miles to the south for uses associated with economic and residential
development in Los Angeles.563 While the state may not slight its
obligation to consider public trust values and protect them from shortsighted destruction as much as “feasible,” the court explained,
ecological values in flowing waters must sometimes give way to other
pressing human interests:
The prosperity and habitability of much of this state requires the
diversion of great quantities of water from its streams for purposes
unconnected to any navigation, commerce, fishing, recreation, or
ecological use relating to the source stream. The state must have the
power to grant nonvested usufructuary rights to appropriate water
even if diversions harm public trust uses. Approval of such diversion
without considering public trust values, however, may result in
needless destruction of those values. Accordingly, we believe that
before state courts and agencies approve water diversions they
should consider the effect of such diversions upon interests
protected by the public trust, and attempt, so far as feasible, to avoid
or minimize any harm to those interests.564

Under the public trust doctrine, natural resource commons must
be protected—including the wildlife and ecosystems within them—but
the touchstone for arbitrating among competing values remains their
importance to human beings.
2.

Biocentrism, Ecocentrism, and the Rights of Nature

By contrast, the rights of nature movement is rooted
unapologetically in an environmental ethic of biocentrism, and even
ecocentrism. Biocentric ethics deprivilege human interests in the
normative assessment of environmental management choices,
considering instead the interests of all living things.565 Through the
biocentric ethical lens, the ecosystem should be protected not just for
the useful services they provide us, but as the necessary sustaining
conditions for all living things within it.
For example, when the White Earth Band of the Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe assigned rights to a species of wild rice in 2018, the
move reflected a biocentric ethic that considered the rights of the living
Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 728.
Id. at 712.
565 See, e.g., NICHOLAS AGAR, LIFE’S INTRINSIC VALUE: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND NATURE 63
(2001).
563
564
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plants as worth consideration beyond their utility to people.566
Expanding the biocentric critique of anthropocentrism even further,
ecocentrism deprivileges the interests of living things to offer equal
regard for the well-being of both the biotic and abiotic components of
nature, including the weather, watershed, and nonliving components of
an ecosystem.567 From the ecocentric perspective, ecosystems should be
protected not for the services they provide living things, but for their
own intrinsic value. When the California Yurok Tribe ascribed legal
personhood to the Klamath River in 2019, it represented a more
ecocentric move, recognizing not just the rights of the living things that
depend on the river, but of the entire river system itself.568
As suggested in Part II, biocentric and ecocentric approaches have
long been rooted in ancient Indigenous cultures around the world, but
these ethics have also made important appearances in Western legal
conversations beginning at least a century ago. For example, John Muir,
the champion of unmediated nature often credited as the intellectual
architect of the National Park System, urged greater biocentric
sensibility among the general public when he urged that even the most
seemingly hostile members of the natural kingdom must be seen as
valuable in and of themselves, without reference to their usefulness to
people:
Nevertheless, again and again, in season and out of season, the
question comes up, “What are rattlesnakes good for?” As if nothing
that does not obviously make for the benefit of man had any right to
exist; as if our ways were God’s ways. Long ago, an Indian to whom
a French traveler put this old question replied that their tails were
good for toothache, and their heads for fever. Anyhow, they are all,
head and tail, good for themselves, and we need not begrudge them
their share of life.569

Expanding on Muir’s insights, naturalist Aldo Leopold powerfully
challenged the prevailing anthropocentrism of public lands
management in the 1949 classic of environmental literature A Sand

See supra note 508 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., J. Stan Rowe, Ecocentrism: The Chord That Harmonizes Humans and Earth, 11
TRUMPETER 106 (1994) (“Ecocentrism goes beyond biocentrism with its fixation on organisms,
for in the ecocentric view people are inseparable from the inorganic/organic nature that
encapsulates them.”).
568 See Testimony Regarding Natural Solutions, supra note 513.
569 John Muir, Chapter II: The Yellowstone National Park, SIERRA CLUB, https://
vault.sierraclub.org/john_muir_exhibit/writings/our_national_parks/chapter_2.aspx [https://
perma.cc/TE6F-LL3J] (digitized version of original work JOHN MUIR, OUR NATIONAL PARKS
(1901)).
566
567
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County Almanac, in which he set forth the “land ethic.” 570 Through this
gentle manifesto toward greater ecocentrism in American land
management, Leopold sought to expand the ethical obligations we
recognize toward other people to also include other members of the
“biotic community,” a concept we might translate today as the overall
ecosystem, but which he summarized then as “the land.”571 With
reference points in ancient Greek mythology, Leopold analogized to the
expansion of ethical obligations that once applied only among free
people to also include enslaved people—seeing them no longer as
chattel property, but as people to whom others owe an ethical
obligation.572 Then, he called for a similar expansion of the community
to whom we owe an ethical obligation to embrace not only the people
with whom we share the world, but the entire biotic community. He
exhorted us to “quit thinking about decent land-use as solely an
economic problem. Examine each question in terms of what is ethically
and esthetically right, as well as what is economically expedient.”573 In
the end, Leopold offered a land ethic for environmental management as
something tethered to human interests only to the extent that we are
part of the overall biotic community: “A thing is right when it tends to
preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It
is wrong when it tends otherwise.”574
As a member of the U.S. Forest Service, Leopold struggled with the
short-sighted anthropocentrism of many forest management plans that
he helped implement. Leopold’s personal land ethic appeared
pragmatic and forgiving at times, striving to win recognition for
biocentric or ecocentric concerns at all amidst the overwhelmingly
anthropocentric approach of the day. In his land ethic, people seem to
maintain a somewhat privileged role, though as stewards of the
environmental values that we alone can protect or destroy.575 To better
perform this role in his own life, he eventually founded the Wilderness
Society, dedicated to the land ethic’s goal of preserving the biotic

ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE (1949).
Id. at 201–26.
572 Id. at 201–04.
573 Id. at 224.
574 Id. at 224–25.
575 Earlier writings showed greater tolerance for the displacement of nature so long as not all
of it was lost to human development. ALDO LEOPOLD, A PLEA FOR WILDERNESS HUNTING
GROUNDS (1925), reprinted in ALDO LEOPOLD’S SOUTHWEST 155, 159 (David E. Brown & Neil B.
Carmony eds., 2003) (noting that it might be legitimate to develop five out of six vacant lots for
housing, “but when we build houses on the last one, we forget what houses are for. The sixth
house would not be development at all, but rather it would be mere short-sighted stupidity”).
570
571
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community in the wild places thus far spared from human
development.576
Later environmental ethicists have set forth purer biocentric and
ecocentric manifestos, grounded in principles that bend less easily for
the pragmatic concerns that Leopold faced while working aside fellow
forest managers in the Department of Agriculture. One such example is
the Deep Ecology movement, an environmental ethic that further
deprivileges humanity in a vision of biocentric equality among all
members of Leopold’s biotic community.577 Inspired by Rachel Carson’s
Silent Spring, the groundbreaking call to arms for the modern
environmental movement,578 Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss first
set forth the principles of Deep Ecology in 1973.579 Deep Ecologists do
not privilege human interests in normative assessment; they consider
human beings as merely one component of the overall biosphere, in
which all things “have an equal right to live and blossom and to reach
their own individual forms of unfolding and self-realization . . . .”580 As
a movement, Deep Ecologists rue the commodification of nature under
industrial capitalism and fear that damage to natural systems since the
industrial revolution portends social and ecological collapse.581 Taken
to its full conclusion, Deep Ecology advocates for foundation-level
ideological, economic, and technological change.582
The Deep Ecologists hold that the survival of any part of the
biosphere is dependent upon the well-being of the entirety, critiquing
the anthropocentric narrative of human supremacy and rejecting the
human role as a “steward” of nature, because that sets humans apart
from nature. In their exposition on Deep Ecology, environmentalists
George Sessions and Bill Devall set forth the core principles of the ethic,
emphasizing its break with the anthropocentric norms of the day:
1. The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman
Life on Earth have value in themselves . . . . These values are

576 See Our History, WILDERNESS SOC’Y, https://www.wilderness.org/about-us/our-team/ourhistory [https://perma.cc/VPF5-32V9]; see also Aldo Leopold, WILDERNESS SOC’Y,
https://www.wilderness.org/aldo-leopold [https://perma.cc/SDV7-ZMEB].
577 Arne Naess, The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary, 16
INQUIRY 95 (1973).
578 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
579 Naess, supra note 577.
580 BILL DEVALL & GEORGE SESSIONS, DEEP ECOLOGY: LIVING AS IF NATURE MATTERED 67
(1985).
581 See generally id.
582 Id. at ix–x.
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independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for
human purposes.
2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the
realization of these values and are also values in themselves.
3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity
except to satisfy vital needs.
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible
with a substantial decrease of the human population. The
flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease.
5. Present human interference with the nonhuman world is
excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.
6. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect
basic economic, technological, and ideological structures.
The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from
the present.583

The Deep Ecologist’s ethic thus begins with a similar principle to
the land ethic, but where the land ethic frames human beings as
stewards of the land, Deep Ecology frames them as beings with no more
right to the resources of the land than any other member, be it a
rattlesnake or a scorpion. For the Deep Ecologists, “[t]he right of all the
forms [of life] to live is a universal right which cannot be quantified. No
single species of living being has more of this particular right to live and
unfold than any other species,”584 making it a statement not just of
ethics, but of rights—and in this respect, echoing much of the
vocabulary of the rights of nature movement.
More recently, philosopher Thomas Berry articulated a set of core
principles for ecocentrism that would inspire a school of Earth
Jurisprudence, providing further fortification for the emerging rights of
nature movement.585 After clarifying that the natural world “gets its
rights from the same source that humans get their rights, from the
Universe that brought them into being,” Berry declared that “[e]very
component of the Earth community, both living and non-living has
three rights: the right to be, the right to a habitat or place to be, and the
right to fulfill its role in the ever-renewing process of the Earth

Id. at 65–70.
ARNE NAESS, ECOLOGY, COMMUNITY AND LIFESTYLE: OUTLINE OF AN ECOSOPHY 166
(David Rothenberg trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989).
585 See Takacs, supra note 287, at 556–57 (describing the origins of Thomas Berry’s statement
of principles and its impact on later advocates for the rights of nature movement).
583
584
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Community.”586 By his conception, environmental rights “are based on
the intrinsic relations that the various components on Earth have to
each other,” in which “[e]ach component of the Earth community is
immediately or mediately dependent of every other member of the
community for the nourishment and assistance it needs for its own
survival.”587 The ideals he set forth in these principles inspired
contemporary theorists and activists who would soon apply them in
rights of nature advocacy.588
While most environmental laws in the United States are
anthropocentric in orientation, a few take a more biocentric approach,
albeit more land ethic than Deep Ecology. The Endangered Species
Act589 is perhaps the best example because it has historically placed the
continued existence of species over countervailing economic
concerns—even those with no apparent use or sentimental appeal to
human beings—at least in some parts of the statute. When Congress
first enacted the law, species were to be protected for their intrinsic
value, no matter the cost. For example, Section 7 of the Act prohibits
federal agencies from taking any action likely to jeopardize the
continued survival of a species, and in almost all cases, without regard
to economic factors.590
On the other hand, other portions of the law are less biocentric.
For example, after the Act was invoked to prevent completion of the
eighty- million-dollar Tellico Dam project on the Tennessee River,591
the Act was amended to create a special committee of the heads of the
federal natural resource agencies (the so-called “God Squad”),
authorized to overrule a jeopardy determination in extreme cases where
applying the law would unduly adversely affect the public interest.592 In
this move, Congress explicitly created an anthropocentric failsafe to
preempt extremely expensive biocentric decisions. In addition, Section

586 THOMAS BERRY, THE ORIGIN, DIFFERENTIATION, AND ROLE OF RIGHTS, Principles 4–5
(2001),
http://www.ties-edu.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Thomas-Berry-rights.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G437-GT87].
587 Id. at Principle 9.
588 See Takacs, supra note 287, at 556–57 (discussing Berry’s impact); CORMAC CULLINAN,
WILD LAW: A MANIFESTO FOR EARTH JUSTICE (2d ed. 2011) (building on Berry’s ideals).
589 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544.
590 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
591 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 166, 171–72 (1978) (holding that construction on
the eighty-million-dollar Tellico Dam project on the Tennessee River must be halted to protect
the snail darter, an endangered species of perch living in the river).
592 Eric M. Yuknis, Would a “God Squad” Exemption Under the Endangered Species Act Solve
the California Water Crisis?, 38 B.C. ENV’T AFF. L. REV. 567, 575–78 (2011) (explaining the
creation and functioning of Endangered Species Committee, or “God Squad”).
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4 has been amended to allow economic factors to be taken into account
when deciding whether to list the critical habitat that resource agencies
determine should be preserved to protect an endangered species.593
Modeled after the Endangered Species Act, the Marine Mammals
Protection Act of 1972 has a similar biocentric orientation, although
there, too, biocentric concerns may be overridden by compelling
anthropocentric priorities.594 As enacted in 1972, the law sets forth an
ambitious “zero mortality” conservation goal to prevent the depletion
of marine mammal populations as bycatch or in competition with
commercial fishing operations.595 However, later amendments in 1994
enabled routine incidental takes of marine mammals by fishing
operations if doing so will not disadvantage the species,596 creating a
loophole that has effectively swallowed the rule.597
Another natural resource law premised on the ecocentric and
biocentric aspirations of, respectively, A Sand County Almanac and
Silent Spring is the Wilderness Act of 1964,598 designed to protect wild
ecosystems as yet “untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor
who does not remain.”599 In its statement of purpose, Congress
explicitly prioritized the preservation of the lands in their comparatively
wild state, clarifying that the law was enacted “to assure that an
increasing population, accompanied by expanding settlement and
growing mechanization, does not occupy and modify all areas within
the United States and its possessions, leaving no lands designated for
preservation and protection in their natural condition . . . .”600
Even so, Congress clarified that the objective was to preserve these
wild lands for the enjoyment of present and future generations, noting
that
these [lands] shall be administered for the use and enjoyment of
the American people in such manner as will leave them
unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so
as to provide for the protection of these areas, the preservation
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1423h.
595 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (“[I]t shall be the immediate goal that the incidental kill or
incidental serious injury of marine mammals permitted in the course of commercial fishing
operations be reduced to insignificant levels approaching a zero mortality and serious injury
rate.”).
596 16 U.S.C. § 1373(a).
597 Susan C. Alker, The Marine Mammal Protection Act: Refocusing the Approach to
Conservation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 527, 551 (1996).
598 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136.
599 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
600 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a).
593
594
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of their wilderness character, and for the gathering and
dissemination of information regarding their use and
enjoyment as wilderness . . . .601

While the Act may protect intact natural systems over time, it is
therefore still grounded in anthropocentrism. Similarly, amendments
to the Fisheries Management Act now exhort ecosystem-based
management, somewhat tempering the overwhelming anthropocentric
focus of the other factors that fishery management councils must heed
when deciding what kinds of fishing to allow.602 That said, it is always
in the service of promoting the maximum sustained yield, the
maximum amount of fish that can be taken out of the system without
reducing its capacity to produce fish over time, for human needs. So, it
too, in the end, remains an overwhelmingly anthropocentric
management approach.
B.

Doctrinal Similarities in the Larger Political Context

Comparing the public trust doctrine and rights of nature
approaches to environmental protection yields striking contrasts, but
also surprising commonalities. While the differences in underlying
theory are powerful, the two approaches also reveal unexpected points
of overlap in what they focus on, when advocates appeal to them, and
the kind of work each doctrines does within the larger political context.
1.

Duality or False Dichotomy?

When analyzing the distinct public trust and rights of nature
approaches to environmental protection, the contrast is most vivid in
the duality of these underlying ethical frameworks and the practical
implications of those differences.
For some environmental advocates, the core theoretical challenge
associated with the public trust doctrine is the dangerous indeterminacy
of its anthropocentrism, leading to practical concerns over how strongly
it will protect environmental values when they are pitted against
competing human interests, such as the exploitation of natural
Id.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1882(f) (requiring a regional ecosystem research study on the “integration
of ecosystem considerations” in management plans); 16 U.S.C. § 1867 (requiring a “cooperative
research and management program” and prioritizing data collection to address bycatch, habitat
conservation, stock assessments, etc.).
601
602
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resources for economic development.603 For others, the more daunting
challenges flow from unfinished theoretical development in the rights
of nature movement, especially regarding who speaks for nature when
nature cannot speak for itself. This leads to the core practical challenge
of uncertainty regarding who should be legally privileged to act on
behalf of the non-human components of a protected ecosystem—
especially when human spokespeople disagree on what nature’s rights
require, be it more solar arrays or more desert tortoise habitat, more
wind farms or migratory birds, or which of two competing endangered
species should take priority.604 It is perhaps noteworthy that the core
theoretical challenge for each approach boils down to different forms of
indeterminacy.
Yet contrasting the anthropocentric and ecocentric orientations of
these two ethical approaches also begs interesting questions about the
significance of the distinction on the ground, when they are applied in
real legal controversies. For one thing, we must query whether the
advocates organizing under each of these banners truly see the world in
strictly anthropocentric or biocentric terms. William Baxter clearly
does, and the Deep Ecologists might, but what about the non-theorist
citizens who are bringing actual lawsuits and ballot initiatives? Even
Aldo Leopold seems to waiver on the question at times–and so, it would
seem, do many of us.
When pressed, many ordinary people will give voice to both ethics
simultaneously, even though they are, strictly speaking, mutually
exclusive ethical directives.605 It is highly plausible that many of the
atmospheric trust champions passionately advocating for the expansion
of the public trust doctrine to protect the atmospheric commons against
greenhouse gas pollution606 would subscribe to a rights of nature
perspective if it were legally available to them, just as many of the
Tamaqua, Pennsylvania, advocates for the Sewage Sludge Ordinance
that assigned civil rights to nature607 probably also subscribe to the
public trust principles enshrined in the Pennsylvania Constitution’s

See Lazarus, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Mauricio Guim & Michael A. Livermore, Where Nature’s Rights Go Wrong, VA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (critiquing rights of nature approaches as theoretically problematic
and difficult to implement).
605 After decades of teaching environmental ethics to hundreds of law students, I can
personally attest to this phenomenon.
606 See, e.g., Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d, 947 F.3d 1159
(9th Cir. 2020); see also Ryan, Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 60–64
(discussing the atmospheric trust movement).
607 See supra Section II.D.1.a.
603
604
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Environmental Rights Amendment.608 Behavioral economics has
demonstrated that human beings are not nearly as rational as we like to
think we are, and that we often hold inconsistent beliefs at the same
time.609 Our tolerance of cognitive dissonance, in which people hold
inconsistent ideas simultaneously, has been well documented in the
social science literature.610 My own experience teaching hundreds of law
students environmental ethics over nearly two decades has
demonstrated this for me personally time and time again (and if I am
honest, I can hardly claim not to demonstrate the same behavior
myself).611
Moreover, it oversimplifies the rights of nature movements in
many parts of the world to see them as purely ecocentric or biocentric
enterprises, in contrast to anthropocentrism, when some follow from
cultural traditions that lovingly anthropomorphize important
components of the ecosystem that the movement seeks to protect. Some
people, and some cultures, hold a Gaia conception of nature as a
person.612 For example, when the Māori people of New Zealand assign
legal personhood to a river system, it is because they consider the river
part of their family.613 They see the river system as not just a legal
person, but a person—their grandmother, so to speak.614 If the river is
part of the people, and the people are part of the river, then the
bifurcation
between
people
and
nature
that
the
anthropocentric/ecocentric dichotomy presumes begins to break down.

608 PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (“The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.
Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.”).
609 Cf. RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (2015)
(reviewing how behavioral economics revealed the many fallacies and irrationalities of human
thinking).
610 See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
611 See supra note 605.
612 See, e.g., JAMES LOVELOCK, GAIA: A NEW LOOK AT LIFE ON EARTH 9–10 (1979) (“[T]he
entire range of living matter on Earth, from whales to viruses, and from oaks to algae, could be
regarded as constituting a single living entity, capable of manipulating the Earth’s atmosphere to
suit its overall needs and endowed with faculties and powers far beyond those of its constituent
parts. . . . [Gaia can be defined] as a complex entity involving the Earth’s biosphere, atmosphere,
oceans, and soil; the totality constituting a feedback or cybernetic system which seeks an optimal
physical and chemical environment for life on this planet.”).
613 Catherine J. Iorns Magallanes, Nature as an Ancestor: Two Examples of Legal Personality
for Nature in New Zealand, 10 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON LEGAL RSCH. PAPERS 1, 1–3 (2020)
(observing that plants, animals, and natural features are treated as “kin” by the Māori).
614 Id.
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Perhaps the most important lesson in reviewing the plethora of
rights of nature movements erupting across the nation and the globe is
that they are not one thing—there is so much variety among these
efforts, let alone the unfinished definition that characterizes many of
them—that it is more accurate to see them not as “the rights of nature
movement,” but, though less poetically, as “a series of loosely related
movements for reconceptualizing legal protections for different
components of nature.” Indeed, the same thing can be said of the
rapidly evolving public trust principles across the globe—which brings
us to among the most important observations in this comparative
analysis, which is that both of these unfolding legal movements are
mosaics, and not monoliths.
2.

Mosaics, Not Monoliths

Doubtlessly obvious by now, one key parallel between the public
trust doctrine and the rights of nature movement is the enormous
doctrinal variety each has spawned in different jurisdictional contexts.
As demonstrated in Parts I and II, neither approach means just one
thing—there is enormous variation in the public trust doctrine as it has
independently developed in the states, and even more variation in what
the rights of nature mean to different movements in different parts of
the world. Neither can be understood as a monolith—instead, both are
mosaics of related but diverging legal doctrines.
For example, in Colorado, the public trust doctrine barely protects
navigational and commercial values in waterways,615 while in Hawaii,
the doctrine protects all water in the state for purposes that range from
navigational access to environmental protection,616 and in
Pennsylvania, it protects all natural resources in the state, even beyond
waterways.617 Meanwhile, although Ecuador has assigned constitutional
protection for nature,618 New Zealand and India have focused on
protecting specific waterways,619 Santa Monica protects sustainability
interests,620 and the Minnesota White Earth Band of Ojibwe protects
individual plant species of wild rice.621

615
616
617
618
619
620
621

See supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text (discussing Colorado law).
See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text (discussing the Hawaiian doctrine).
See supra notes 61, 99 and accompanying text (discussing Pennsylvania’s trust).
See supra notes 264–66 and accompanying text (discussing Ecuador’s constitution).
See supra notes 388–89 (New Zealand), 403–07 (India) and accompanying text.
See supra notes 451–52 and accompanying text (discussing Santa Monica’s ordinance).
See supra notes 508–12 and accompanying text (discussing the protection of manoomin).
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This rich variety is a result of the ongoing doctrinal development
described above, which points to another important shared feature of
the two approaches: their propensity to evolve pragmatically,
sometimes rapidly, in response to changing legal circumstances.
Moreover, because neither approach means just one thing, both are less
absolutist than they may at first appear, leaving open the possibility of
multiple meanings and the contradictory impulses that motivate some
advocates who appeal to them.622 Doctrinal variety not only diffuses the
absolutism that can accord more dogmatic approaches, but it also adds
to the core theoretical challenges of indeterminacy, discussed above,
that both approaches feature for different reasons.623
3.

A Special Focus on Waterways

Another key similarity is that while both public trust and rights of
nature principles have been applied to protect various natural resources
and ecosystems, the predominant focus in both legal contexts has been
waterways.
The public trust doctrine is overwhelmingly focused on the
protection of water and waterways.624 This repeated emphasis has been
evident since the ancient Roman recognition of the sea and its shores as
public commons, to the Magna Carta’s specific protection of public
navigation, to the early English and American doctrines of sovereign
ownership of submerged lands and resources, to the more recently
articulated protections for groundwater, recreational access to
waterways, and the ecological values associated with them.625 Similarly,
while different communities have established rights of nature
protection for resources ranging from full ecosystems to wild rice, the
majority thus far have been applied to river systems.626 Testifying to this,
Professor David Takacs entitles his recent review of international rights
of nature initiatives simply We Are the River.627
The shared emphasis of the public trust and rights of nature on
protecting waterways likely reflects the intrinsic centrality of water and
waterways to the ecosystems and natural resources that advocates see as
needing protection. Just as likely, it suggests something important
622
623
624
625
626
627

See supra Section III.A.3 (discussing the possibility of a false dichotomy).
See supra Section III.A.3 (discussing indeterminacy).
See supra Section I.B.2; see also Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 149–50.
See supra Part I. See generally Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1.
See supra Section II.C.
See generally Takacs, supra note 287.
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about the shortcomings of conventional environmental law to protect
them. In this regard, both approaches reflect efforts by communities of
interest to better protect the most critical and legally vulnerable aspects
of natural systems—the water.
4.

Arguments of Last Resort and Intuitive Appeal

To that point, both public trust and rights of nature principles are
routinely invoked as arguments of last resort, by constituents who are
openly unsatisfied with the level of protection conventional
environmental law has provided for the critical natural resources they
see under siege. As one Floridian told the press after passage of the
WEBOR rivers Bill of Rights ordinance, the “mandate . . . demonstrates
that an overwhelming majority of Orange County citizens have lost
faith in a state government and a regulatory system that have failed to
protect the basic rights of people as well as the natural world.”628
In this respect, both approaches function, as much as anything else,
as signaling tools for legal desperation. Indeed, the Mono Lake
advocates in California did not appeal to the public trust doctrine until
all other legal avenues had been explored,629 just as the Kissimmee River
Bill of Rights initiative in Florida was launched only after all other legal
options had failed.630 In the end, the Mono Lake advocates had more
luck than those seeking to protect the Kissimmee River, but all were
desperate before trying these novel strategies.
Yet in both public trust and rights of nature contexts,
environmental advocates appeal to these strategies not only because
they are desperate, but because they are drawn to the seemingly
straightforward principles at their core. These novel legal strategies
offer hope for saving beloved natural resources that advocates feel have
been underprotected by conventional environmental law and
peremptory cost-benefit analyses that fail to account for the full array
of values at stake. But even beyond that, they turn to public trust and
rights of nature strategies because the ideas at the center of these
approaches, from their perspective, make sense to them.
Public trust and rights of nature principles seem able to speak to
lay people on an intuitive plane that conventional environmental law
cannot always reach. At their core, both principles reduce to the
premise that vulnerable natural systems should be protected against
628
629
630

Bonasia, supra note 491.
See supra notes 146–57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 474–77 and accompanying text.
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annihilation in service of short-sighted economic interests. The
intuitive draw of the public trust doctrine was evident in the nationwide
coalition of 36,000 young people inspired to join the atmospheric trust
project (even as the litigation struggled to make headway in court),631
just as the intuitive appeal of the rights of nature movement was
demonstrated by the ninety percent of voters in a politically divided
Florida county that supported the Orange County WEBOR rivers Bill
of Rights initiative (even as the state legislature voted to preempt it).632
5.

Leveraging the Political Arena

A related feature that both concepts hold in common is that while
they have not always resulted in legal successes, they very often facilitate
political successes. That is to say, even where public trust and rights of
nature advocacy has failed to produce the results sought in court, the
movements have succeeded in building public awareness and concern
to accomplish their goals in the political arena. For example, the
atmospheric trust movement has not been terribly successful in court
so far, but it has resulted in notable political successes, for example, the
gubernatorial creation of a climate action plan in the State of
Massachusetts, and galvanized public advocacy for climate governance,
especially among the young.633
Similarly, even though the rights of nature-oriented Community
Bill of Rights ordinance enacted by Pennsylvania’s Grant Township was
struck down in federal court, the community nevertheless
accomplished its substantive goal.634 The rights of nature ordinance
galvanized public opinion against the injection well that PGE was
seeking to use for fracking wastewater. Even after the original ordinance
was invalidated in court, the community doubled down on a Home Rule
Charter that incorporated many of the original provisions, and it
continues to protest the injection well.635 In the end, the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection bowed to public pressure and
rescinded the well permit, citing the Home Rule Charter’s ban on
injection wells, and doubtlessly heeding the public outcry that was

631 See Ryan, Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 63–64 (discussing the
36,000 youth who signed an open amicus brief in support of Juliana v. United States).
632 See supra note 491 and accompanying text.
633 See Ryan, Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 62–63.
634 See supra Section II.D.1.c.
635 Ryan, Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 62–63.
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facilitated by the clear principles it had set forth in its rights of nature
proclamations.
Indeed, there is an important, dynamic relationship between
judicially enforceable constraints on political branch decision-making,
such as those set forth in public trust and rights of nature lawmaking,
and the larger political process. As one of us has written previously:
The Juliana case recalls one of the most powerful features of the
public trust doctrine, one that implicates the separation of
powers controversy, but with a twist. It is the way that the
doctrine enables citizens to use the levers made available by the
horizontal separation of powers to increase their efficacy in
democratic participation, by invoking judicial review of
legislative or executive action that violates legal rules. This is a
feature of our democratic design, hallowed in the United States
since Marbury v. Madison. The Juliana plaintiffs may not
succeed in their lawsuit, but the very act of bringing it, and
generating so much public support for their claim, puts pressure
on the political branches in ways that amplify their voices as
individual voters and constituents.636

When public trust and rights of nature advocates fail in the judicial
sphere but succeed politically, it may be construed not as a design flaw
in the system, but instead as a design feature. Scholars are beginning to
study the overlooked importance of litigation loss as a galvanizing force
in political movements that are later successful, such as the campaigns
for LGBTQ and religious rights.637 Failed campaigns for environmental
rights, under the banners of both the public trust and the rights of
nature, may well prove another example.
6.

The Emotional Element

Finally, it is important to acknowledge that both the public trust
and rights of nature approaches do more than just appeal to advocates
on an intuitive level, based on principle—they also do so on an
emotional level. These relatively open-ended doctrines, by virtue of
being ill-defined and open to legal evolution, have allowed people to
pour into them all their hopes and dreams for the kind of environmental
protection unavailable to them under conventional environmental

Id. at 63.
Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2011) (analyzing the
productive function of litigation loss toward successful social movements).
636
637
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regulation. As these doctrines become flexible reservoirs for advocates’
uniquely unsatisfied hopes and dreams, so are they pushed to evolve
further in different directions, completing the spiral of their rapid
differentiation and development.
Even beyond that, both approaches appeal to something emotional
in people that goes beyond whether the idea is actionable in court. Each
gives voice to concerns that are otherwise underserved in the legal
system and resource management regimes. Advocates have reacted to
the various Rivers Bill of Rights movements in Florida and the Juliana
atmospheric trust litigation in the same way—not just intuitively, but
emotionally, and almost spiritually. As noted, the core premises of these
approaches speak to ordinary people on levels that conventional legal
doctrines do not. They engage people unsatisfied with existing legal
resources and looking for new tools and vocabulary. Advocates speak
about their efforts with the zeal of a mission that goes beyond ordinary
legal advocacy. For example, in his statement of principles that would
inspire the Earth Jurisprudence movement, Thomas Berry referred not
only to “the physical need of humans[,] but also the wonder needed by
human intelligence, the beauty needed by human imagination, and the
intimacy needed by human emotions for personal fulfillment.”638
Whatever one’s critique may be of either the public trust doctrine
or the rights of nature movement—or both—one would be wise to heed
the critique this level of engagement suggests for the rest of
environmental law. While conventional environmental laws like the
Clean Air and Water Acts have made important strides in containing
pollution, they are not designed to protect public natural resource
commons of the sort the public trust and rights of nature initiatives are
now targeting. Conventional environmental law is not working in many
such cases, especially with regard to waterways, and the rise of these
novel legal strategies reveal that the people most impacted by these
failures are getting restive.
C.

Comparative Analysis: Florida as a Living Laboratory

Having reviewed the core differences and similarities between the
public trust doctrine and rights of nature movement, it is worth
exploring at least one jurisdiction where both approaches are actively in
play, in order to compare how these two different frames of reference
provide different answers to similar questions of environmental

638

See BERRY, supra note 586.
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management. Florida is not the only living laboratory for analyzing the
two approaches simultaneously; as noted in Section II.D.1, both
approaches have surfaced in Pennsylvania’s disputes over fracking, and
Hawaii’s strong public trust doctrine has long marinated in the
Polynesian cultural traditions that gave rise to the rights of nature
movement in related cultures, such as the New Zealand Māori.639
However, rights of nature principles are developing more rapidly in
Florida than anywhere else in the nation, so this Section explores the
interplay between the Florida public trust and unfolding rights of nature
movement.
1.

Florida as a Living Laboratory to Assess Both Approaches

The Florida rights of nature initiatives and the political pushback
they have engendered provide a unique opportunity to analyze the
drivers of the broader American movement, and to contrast it with a
conventional example of a public trust doctrine that has not developed
to protect environmental values.
Florida boasts more coastline than any state in the union, and a
higher percentage of submerged inland area than all but six others,640
making the public trust doctrine an especially important aspect of
Florida law. However, and as noted in Part I above, Florida’s public trust
doctrine protects only the traditional trust values of navigation,
commerce, fishing, and swimming; it has never been interpreted to
protect the ecological values associated with waterways.641
Moreover, the Florida public trust provides no protection for
groundwater resources.642 This is true for most American states, but
Florida sits atop two of the largest freshwater aquifers in the world, and
they are intricately interwoven with countless square miles of surface
waters throughout the state. Furthermore, the process of common law
development that enabled the California public trust to extend to
See supra Section II.C.2.a.
Caitlin Dempsey, Interesting Geography Facts About Florida, GeographyRealm (Oct. 3,
2020),
https://www.geographyrealm.com/interesting-geography-facts-about-florida
[https://perma.cc/F4UQ-ZFNJ] (noting that Florida has the longest coastline in the contiguous
United States at 1,350 miles, not including its many barrier islands); Caitlin Dempsey, Which
States Have the Highest Percentage of Water Area?, GEOGRAPHYREALM (Nov. 10, 2015),
https://www.geographyrealm.com/which-states-have-the-highest-percentage-of-water-area
[https://perma.cc/3Q2C-85JM] (chart showing relative state surface area covered by water).
641 See White v. Hughes, 190 So. 446, 448–51 (Fla. 1939); Adams v. Elliot, 174 So. 731, 734
(Fla. 1937).
642 State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing, 47 So. 353, 355 (Fla. 1908).
639
640
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groundwater tributaries of navigable waters seems unlikely in Florida,
where the doctrine appears to have calcified in its 1960s common law
form after being codified in statute and the state constitution.643 As
vulnerable waterways have become increasingly stressed by the
demands of development and extraction, local advocates seeking to
protect them have turned to the rights of nature to cope with harms
unprotected by the public trust doctrine.
Like other jurisdictions described in Part II, nearly all rights of
nature initiatives in Florida have focused on waterways, targeting issues
of both water quality and water quantity. These efforts may be
understood as a sincere response to the underlying biocentric principles
of the rights of nature movement, but they may also be understood as
pragmatic “gap fillers” in legal strategy, picking up where the public
trust doctrine’s protection of environmental values has fallen short (and
as noted above, for many advocates, they may represent both). Unlike
the public trust doctrine, rights of nature principles are not limited by
questions of whether the waterway is navigable or underground.
In addition, and unlike public trust arguments in Florida, rights of
nature arguments are not forced to shoehorn ecological protections into
a doctrine that has historically protected only anthropocentric values.
Thomas Linzey, Senior Legal Counsel for the Center for Democratic
and Environmental Rights, has observed the uniqueness of Florida’s
position in the rights of nature movement, noting that “[i]n the U.S.,
Florida is really now is the new front line for whether the system is
capable of transitioning to this new rights based protection for
ecosystems. . . . [T]ime will tell whether obedience to the old system is
stronger than the need to transcend that system and save places . . . .”644
2.

The Failed Santa Fe River Bill of Rights

Although it was unsuccessful, one rights of nature campaign that
showcases these challenges was the Santa Fe River Bill of Rights
initiative (SAFEBOR). The Santa Fe River runs through north-central
Florida along the Cody Scarp, an abrupt break in elevation where the

See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text (discussing the Florida Constitution)
Alachua County, supra note 520; Alachua County, Rights of Nature Workshop—Board
Commissioners Discussion, YOUTUBE, at 26:52 (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=jcXm53XcHmc&feature=youtu.be&fbclid=IwAR0hIt- [https://perma.cc/QZV6-CFY3].
643
644
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panhandle meets the peninsula.645 The river disappears in and out of the
karst-limestone formation at this geological juncture, uniting aboveground flows and underground caves that have been home to wildlife
and human settlements for thousands of years.646 However, water
quality in the river has declined markedly in recent years, due both to
nutrient loading and groundwater pumping that has substantially
lowered the water table.647
In 2019, SAFEBOR was crafted in response to these ongoing water
quality concerns, proposed phosphate mining, and a proposal by the
Nestlé Corporation to increase withdrawals for its bottled water
operations from underground wells at Ginnie Springs, a main tributary
source of the Santa Fe River northeast of Gainesville. 648 River flow was
already reduced by groundwater pumping, down twenty-eight percent
from historical levels.649 At the time, Seven Springs/Nestlé650 already
held a permit for withdrawals of up to 1.1 million gallons a day, though
only a quarter of that amount was being withdrawn.651 When the permit
came up for renewal, Seven Springs sought permission to withdraw the
full amount, which one local opponent of the permit calculated as four
hundred gallons per minute.652

645 Santa Fe River and Sink, FLA. STATE PARKS, https://www.floridastateparks.org/learn/santafe-river-and-sink [https://perma.cc/G2QB-YQPY] (describing the location and geology of the
river).
646 Id.
647 Robert Knight, The Santa Fe River Is Being Polluted, Depleted, GAINESVILLE SUN (Nov. 7,
2019, 2:02 AM), https://www.gainesville.com/opinion/20191107/robert-knight-santa-fe-river-isbeing-polluted-depleted [https://perma.cc/EK49-4HHJ].
648 Thomas Linzey, It’s Time for New Laws to Protect Florida’s Waters, GAINESVILLE SUN (Jan.
30, 2020, 2:01 PM), https://www.gainesville.com/opinion/20200130/thomas-linzey-its-time-fornew-laws-to-protect-floridas-waters [https://perma.cc/8F9D-88U6].
649 Allen, supra note 469.
650 Seven Springs Water Company holds the water use permit and sells the water to Nestlé for
bottling. See Richard Luscombe, Nestlé Plan to Take 1.1m Gallons of Water a Day from Natural
Springs Sparks Outcry, GUARDIAN (Aug. 26, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
business/2019/aug/26/nestle-suwannee-river-ginnie-springs-plan-permit
[https://perma.cc/
785Y-X5RB].
651 Id.; Ray Carson, Battle Over the Springs, Withdrawal Permit Bring Controversy, ALACHUA
CNTY. TODAY (Jan. 25, 2020), https://www.alachuatoday.com/news-featured/latest/4146-battleover-the-springs-withdrawal-permit-brings-controversy [https://perma.cc/L38B-7Q42] (“The
permit allowed them [Seven Springs Bottling Plant] to withdraw up to 1.152 million gallons a
day[,] . . . but as a smaller local plant, their average withdrawal has been a quarter of that amount,
peaking at under 270,000 gallons per day for the past four years.”).
652 Reagan Fink, Gainesville Residents Protest Seven Springs Water Permit at Ginnie Springs
and Santa Fe River, WUFT NEWS (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.wuft.org/news/2019/11/04/
gainesville-residents-protest-seven-springs-water-permit-at-ginnie-springs-and-santa-fe-river
[https://perma.cc/9V58-N8X7].

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3841825

RYAN.CURRY.RULE.42.6.7 (Do Not Delete)

2021]

10/9/21 12:22 AM

ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS

2567

Advocates for SAFEBOR did not argue that Seven Springs/Nestlé
are violating the terms of the permit; instead, they alleged that the
problem was the permit itself, as two board members of Our Santa Fe
River, a local nonprofit supporting SAFEBOR, put it, the river and
springs were “slowly but surely being bled to death under the watch of
previous and current water managers.”653 From their perspective, the
state has allowed the commodification of a public resource to the
detriment of an entire river system and all constituent components of
the ecosystem, including significant declines in spring flow, nutrient
pollution, and algae blooms.654 SAFEBOR organizers needed 18,094
signatures to qualify for the ballot but only managed to gather
approximately 4,000.655 Accordingly, the initiative failed.
Patently, SAFEBOR illustrates the serious weaknesses of rights of
nature initiatives to protect waterways. As discussed further below,
rights of nature proponents have yet to grapple with the difficult
questions of who will speak for rights-holders and the extent of the
rights they seek to protect. Constitutional concerns arise when state and
municipal actors seek to regulate navigable waterways, which are
avenues of interstate commerce, impressed with the federal
navigational servitude and other federal interests under the Supremacy
Clause and Commerce Clause. And the biocentric underpinnings of the
rights claimed fit poorly within the overwhelmingly anthropocentric
legal system, provoking resistance among conventional jurists. In a
memo that is illustrative of many of these concerns, the Alachua County
Charter Review Commission General Counsel wrote the Commission
members on the subject of SAFEBOR:
I came to the abiding conclusion that the proposals, while
seemingly well meaning, ran so far afield and so utterly ignored
the existing structure and restrictions of Florida and federal
environmental law, local government law, and constitutional
law in so many ways, that I could not anticipate any reasonable

653 Merrillee Malwitz-Jipson & Jim Tatum, Santa Fe River, Springs Being Bled to Death,
GAINESVILLE SUN (Aug. 21, 2019, 2:57 PM), https://www.gainesville.com/opinion/20190908/
editorial-dont-stop-with-safebor-to-protect-santa-fe [https://perma.cc/8228-9T84].
654 Editorial, Don’t Stop with SAFEBOR to Protect Santa Fe, GAINESVILLE SUN (Sept. 8, 2019,
2:01 AM), https://www.gainesville.com/opinion/20190908/editorial-dont-stop-with-safebor-toprotect-santa-fe [https://perma.cc/8228-9T84].
655 John Moran, The Case for Rights of Nature: Next Steps for the SAFEBOR Campaign, OUR
SANTA FE RIVER (Apr. 5, 2020), https://oursantaferiver.org/nature-3 [https://perma.cc/9H6PD82V].
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outcome other than their invalidation upon challenge, along
with not accomplishing anything significant for the effort.656

These weaknesses help explain the substantial pushback against rights
of nature initiatives like SAFEBOR from other legal actors within the
state, ranging from the legislature that acted to preempt them,657 to
conventional environmental advocates who regard them with
skepticism.658
But SAFEBOR also illustrates the most significant shortcomings of
Florida’s public trust doctrine, potentially illuminating why advocates
turned to the controversial rights of nature approach instead. First, as
noted, the Florida public trust doctrine has not been understood to
protect groundwater resources. While opponents of the Nestlé
withdrawals could fight the consumptive use permits on statutory
obligations to consider the public interest in negative ecological
impacts, the public trust doctrine itself was not directly implicated
because the source at issue—the underground wells at Ginnie Springs—
are not a navigable waterway. This is not a limitation of the public trust
doctrine in all permutations; the doctrine has evolved in other states,
such as Hawaii and California, to deal expressly with this problem.659 In
a relatively recent development, California extended trust protections
to the groundwater tributaries of the Scott River, a navigable
waterway,660 by following the precedent of the Mono Lake case, in which
the court protected non-navigable surface water tributaries because
withdrawals would impact the trust-protected navigable waterway
downstream.661
Secondly, and also unlike the doctrine in states like Hawaii and
California, Florida’s public trust doctrine has not explicitly included the
protection of ecological values. If the withdrawals implicated traditional
656 Memorandum from Wade C. Vose, Gen. Couns., to the Alachua Cnty. Charter Rev.
Comm’n 1 (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.alachuacounty.us/CharterReview/Documents/Memo%
20-%20AC%20CRC%20-%20Alternatives%20to%20Rights%20of%20Nature%20Proposals%20%2004-08-2020.PDF [https://perma.cc/2DPA-QBDF].
657 See supra Section II.D.4.b.
658 Nick Kilvert, There’s a Growing Push to Give Nature Legal Rights, but What Would That
Mean?, ABC NEWS (Mar. 16, 2019, 12:17 AM), https://www.abc.net.au/news/science/2019-0316/rights-of-nature-science/10899778 [https://perma.cc/9S3D-S5ZD] (recounting criticism that
existing environmental laws should be enforced rather than turning to novel rights of nature
protections).
659 See supra Section I.B.2.
660 Env’t L. Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 393, 399–403 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2018) (concluding that the public trust doctrine protected groundwater tributaries of
navigable waters), cert. denied, 2018 Cal. LEXIS 9313 (Cal. 2018).
661 See generally Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
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concerns of navigability on the Santa Fe, then public trust protections
might prove helpful. But if the negative impacts are limited to ecological
concerns for the health of the waterway and its surrounding ecosystem,
then there is little recourse under the current Florida doctrine. If the
public trust doctrine in Florida were extended to perform the same role,
then perhaps these advocates would have strategically turned to the
lower hanging fruit of an established doctrine to protect the threatened
waterway, rather than testing a comparatively novel legal theory in
rights of nature.
However, by a separate twist of fate, it seems unlikely to impact the
Florida public trust. As noted in Part I, Florida’s public trust was a
forward-leaning common law doctrine at the turn of the last century,
and the doctrine was considered so important to the state that in 1968,
it was incorporated directly into the state constitution, which the
Florida Supreme Court later characterized as “largely a . . . codification
of the public trust doctrine contained in our case law.”662 At first blush,
it might seem that elevating the doctrine into the constitution would
strengthen it, but as Professor Alexandra Klass has warned in her
scholarship on this issue, that is not always the case.663 As Klass
describes happened in Minnesota, it is possible that the constitutional
codification of Florida’s public trust doctrine effectively froze it at its
1960s-era stage of development, preventing it from continuing to evolve
in response to emerging public concerns through conventional
common law process—as the doctrine famously went on to do in states
like California and New Jersey.664
Nevertheless, as Professor Robin Kundis Craig has observed, some
case law suggests that Florida’s public trust doctrine might continue to
be expanded to include other uses.665 If the Florida public trust doctrine
ever did evolve to adopt more environmentally protective features, and
rights of nature initiatives in Florida were to recover from the current
legislative preemption, then—if only as a thought experiment—it is
Coastal Petrol. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 492 So. 2d 339, 344 (Fla. 1986).
See generally Klass, supra note 78 (exploring how codification of the common law public
trust doctrine may restrict its evolution and viability as a tool for environmental protection).
664 See supra Section I.B.2. It is perhaps coincidental that there are no serious attempts to
leverage rights of nature initiatives in New Jersey, and the only initiative in California has
attracted little attention, perhaps because it is unnecessary due to the state’s more
environmentally protective public trust doctrine.
665 Craig, Eastern Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 22, at 36; see, e.g., State v. Black River
Phosphate Co., 13 So. 640, 648 (Fla. 1893) (recognizing public trust protection of “navigation and
fishing, and other implied purposes”); Ferry Pass Inspectors’ & Shippers’ Ass’n v. White’s River
Inspectors’ & Shippers’ Ass’n, 48 So. 643, 645 (Fla. 1909) (recognizing public rights to “fishing
and bathing and the like”).
662
663
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interesting to consider how the two approaches would compare in
addressing the issues that SAFEBOR attempted to resolve.
3.

What Do the Public Trust Doctrine and Rights of Nature Do
Differently?

Under an environmentally protective version of the public trust
doctrine, like California’s, groundwater withdrawals that threaten
public trust values in a navigable waterway would be protected (and in
Hawaii, all groundwater would be). Moreover, an environmentally
protective public trust could be applied to protect purely ecological
concerns, as well as traditional values associated with navigability. If
groundwater withdrawals threatened the navigability or recreational
values on the connected surface water, or if ecological values associated
with the trust resource were threatened, the public trust would be
implicated and there would be a potential legal remedy to stem the
harm—at least to the extent it is feasible to do so while also protecting
competing public interests, such as access to drinking water.666 By
contrast, rights of nature laws, at least as they have been envisioned in
Florida, are written to be unapologetically protective of ecosystems,
even where they compete with other public interests. For the sake of
comparison, a typical domestic rights of nature ordinance would
recognize the right of a water body to “flow,” “flourish,” or “maintain a
natural ecosystem.”
In this comparison, one can easily imagine circumstances in which
the public trust doctrine will be less protective than the rights of nature
approach, even considering a protective California version of the public
trust. The public trust doctrine might be sufficient to protect some
public interests in the resource, but insufficient to protect ecological
values where they conflict with other compelling public interests. For
example, the public trust doctrine might protect river flows that are
sufficient to protect kayakers and anglers, but it might balk at the
anthropocentric flows needed to maintain the integrity of an ecosystem
supporting endangered mussels. The rights of nature approach may be
tangentially worried about kayakers but more wholesomely concerned
about the mussels.
Even under an expanded public trust doctrine that applies to
groundwater and protects ecological values, rights of nature principles
would be implicated far earlier, at a more nature-protective threshold.

666

See generally Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
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Before litigants could invoke the public trust doctrine, they would need
to affirmatively demonstrate potential impacts to cognizable trust
values—for example, a loss of recreational access, impacts to a
vulnerable species, or negative impacts on navigation. For the rights of
nature, however, any alternation of flow or impact to the natural
ecosystem, no matter the magnitude, could theoretically be sufficient to
warrant a claim. Taken to its extreme, any alternation of natural flow
could be held to violate the rights of nature—creating a potential
conflict reminiscent of the anthropocentric pressure that historically
caused the original English common law rule of natural flow riparian
rights to give way to the more modern American reasonable use
doctrine.667 It would be interesting to see, centuries later, if such a
transformation could truly be unmade. Certainly, it would be a very
uphill battle (or a very upstream journey).
4.

Which Is Better?

Those seeking to protect natural resource systems, especially the
waterways that are so often the subject of both approaches, may ask the
bottom-line question—which one is better? Here, too, the answer
remains unclear. The first problem we face in grappling with this
question, of course, is that we have to be more specific. Which rights of
nature initiative? Which public trust doctrine? As demonstrated amply
in Parts I and II above, there is enormous jurisdictional variation in
both arenas, as both approaches continue to differentiate and diversify
along multiple axes simultaneously. One cannot speak of the public
trust doctrine or the rights of nature movement as if either one is a
monolith, when as noted above, they are emphatically mosaics.
But even beyond that, both mosaics suffer from inherent
drawbacks that make it hard for observers to choose a clear winner. In
part, and as demonstrated in Part III, it depends on the goals of the
observer. Even from the purely pragmatic standpoint of providing more
or less environmental protection, the answer remains unclear. Because
anthropocentrism is human focused, the public trust doctrine can be a
precarious vehicle for environmental protection, if public sympathies
shift away from long-term environmental values in service of shorterterm economic needs. People clearing forests for agriculture in the
Amazon are making an anthropocentric choice that will better their
interests in the near-term, even though it will surely harm them over

667

See Ryan, A Short History, supra note 1, at 185–86.
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time, especially for future generations. But if the arbiters of decisionmaking are human beings in the moment, the public trust doctrine is
vulnerable to short-term decisions to pave paradise and put up a
parking lot,668 whenever parking becomes short. As shown in Part II,
environmental advocates have turned to the rights of nature movement
repeatedly, and especially in Florida, when the public trust doctrine has
proved insufficient to confer environmental protection, often because
it has been interpreted narrowly or to prioritize other human interests.
Biocentrism, however, is equally problematic, because we do not
fully understand who should be able to speak for nature in legal
contexts. The early Sierra Club v. Morton case first framed this dilemma
in terms of legal standing in court, denying natural objects independent
standing to sue to prevent harm. Accordingly, an early move by rights
of nature proponents was to secure legal personhood for natural objects,
unquestionably providing them standing in court, independently of the
people acting to protect them. But if we confer standing or legal
personhood on natural objects who cannot speak for themselves, how
do we reconcile the problem of voice? Who speaks for nature? As
Professor Stone asked at the beginning of the American movement, who
speaks for the trees?669
It is an especially puzzling problem because different people might
come to very different conclusions about how to prioritize the interests
of other members of the biotic community. Many believe that to protect
nature, we must act quickly to foster wind energy generation to stabilize
the climatic foundations of the overall biotic community, 670 while
others believe wind turbines cause unacceptable harm to vulnerable
populations of birds and other wildlife whose habitat they disrupt.671 In
this scenario, who speaks for nature? The proponents of renewable
energy or the proponents of birds? In an adversarial system such as that
in the United States, the representational problem is compounded by
procedural problems, as the first movers in litigation may determine

See Mitchell, supra note 13.
Cf. DR. SEUSS, THE LORAX (1971) (suggesting that the Lorax speaks for the trees).
670 See, e.g., International Renewable Energy Agency, Renewable Energy: A Key Climate
Solution, https://www.irena.org/climatechange/Renewable-Energy-Key-climate-solution (last
visited June 25, 2021) (“Renewables could supply four-fifths of the world’s electricity by 2050,
massively cutting carbon emissions and helping to mitigate climate change.”).
671 See, e.g., Conventional Wind Energy—A Design Deadly for Birds, AM. EAGLE FOUND.,
(2021), https://www.eagles.org/take-action/wind-turbine-fatalities [https://perma.cc/L75KLQVC] (“Wind turbines present an ever-present danger to not only eagles and other birds of
prey, but also to any migratory bird that passes through areas where wind turbine farms have
been constructed.”).
668
669
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how legal efforts to protect nature will unfold, even if they are not the
best representatives.
This particular puzzle in the developing rights of nature movement
is reminiscent of that between animal rights activists and conventional
environmental advocates for wildlife. Conventional wildlife advocates
protect populations, willing to sacrifice individual animals who may be
harmed by a larger regulatory program in service of species
preservation, as the Endangered Species Act anticipates through the
safety valve of incidental take permits. By contrast, animal rights
advocates protect individuals, treating each animal as an individual
worthy of protection, and not just a representative of a larger species of
biodiversity, just as human rights advocates fight for the sacred rights
of individual human beings, rejecting utilitarianism that would sacrifice
innocents in service of goals like swift justice or forced organ donation.
When people speak for nature in a rights of nature regime, should they
represent nature at the level of individual animals or plants or wetlands?
Or are they representing the natural system as a whole, even if there are
adverse consequences for individuals within those ecosystems?
And of course, in natural systems, there are always adverse
consequences for individuals, as they compete for scarce resources
within the food chain and other constraints of the habitat. To that end,
what will rights of nature proponents say about those elements of the
food chain that feed humans, and other non-endangered species? If wild
rice should have rights, what about cows, pigs, and the deer and beavers
who want to eat the wild rice? What about direct conflicts between the
human and non-human members of the biotic community—if a bear
attacks a hiker on a trail, whose interests should prevail?
Indeed, a common critique from conventional environmental
lawyers is that the rights of nature movement is so patently inchoate—
that it all seems very vague and unactionable, and if it is actionable, to
what ultimate end? It has been anecdotally reported that now that rivers
in India have rights, some people in India are suing a river for flooding
their lands. If rivers are legal persons, do they have responsibilities as
well as rights? How far does the legal personhood construct really go?
Thus far, the rights of nature movement has not answered these
questions, although they surely will have to be answered at some point.
But even then, the answer will likely be different in different
jurisdictions, representing different points in the constellation of
differing axes of development.
Pragmatically speaking, the answers to the question of which
approach is better may simply be a matter of path dependence. The
better choice is the one that fits more seamlessly into the legal tradition
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at hand, or the political circumstances of the day. The public trust
doctrine continues to command force because it has been the law of the
land for hundreds (if not thousands) of years in common law countries,
especially the United States. The rights of nature commands force in
Indigenous communities where that has been the prevailing norm for
hundreds, and possibly thousands, of years. And in communities where
conventional environmental tools have failed, rights of nature
approaches may provide an opportunity to organize around the
protection of a resource that has been failed by more conventional
means. Even if the rights of nature approach fails in court, it has been
effectively utilized to galvanize political support for the sought result,
by persuading decision-makers in office to heed public concerns.
A more interesting question to explore in future work is whether
there is value to be had in mixing and matching these approaches within
one legal system. Can the two doctrines ever be used to support one
another from these contrasting ethical approaches, or are they destined
only to undermine one another? Perhaps more interesting still is the
question of whether they may support one another asymmetrically. The
public trust doctrine might provide oblique support to a rights of nature
initiative, if only by constraining sovereign decisions to alienate a trust
resource, but will rights of nature initiatives openly conflict with public
trust principles by reorienting the discussion toward an ecocentric
ethical perspective that is ultimately incompatible with the public trust?
For what it may be worth, a frequently observed feature of multilevel environmental governance within a federal system of governance
is the advantage of redundancy of multiple sources of authority. History
has shown that it is very useful to have two or more available avenues
for environmental protection when the path is blocked for political
reasons at one level on the jurisdictional scale. The scholarship on
environmental federalism is especially cognizant of this benefit,
previously described as the “regulatory backstop” feature of American
federalism.672 It may be that simultaneous efforts toward environmental
protection rooted in both of these environmental ethics can provide a
paradoxical source of checks and balance in natural resource
protection. Even if the redundancy cannot be legally or philosophically
justified, because the two underlying ethical frameworks are
fundamentally irreconcilable, there may still be political advantages to
redundancy.

672

Ryan, supra note 537, at 364.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has presented a comprehensive analysis of two
contrasting approaches to environmental protection—the public trust
doctrine and the rights of nature movement—each with ancient roots
but made new once again, as environmental advocates increasingly turn
to them to protect environmental rights and values left behind by
conventional environmental, property, and constitutional law. Parts I
and II have reviewed how both approaches are under active states of
legal development, each evolving across multiple axes in different
jurisdictions that relate to the scope of legal protections, the legal
mechanism of protection, and the underlying purpose of protections.
They also review the rise in public trust and rights of nature principles
worldwide, as nations across the globe struggle to address the problem
of missing environmental rights in conventional constitutional systems.
In many cases, advocates have turned to either or both approaches to
resolve the same problems, in many cases seeking the same substantive
results. But Part III shows that the two approaches operate from
fundamentally different ethical frameworks.
This comparative analysis between the public trust doctrine and
rights of nature movements raises important questions for future
research, which this Article only just begins to touch on. The most
critical issue we raise is how these different approaches will provide
different answers to the same legal questions. The Florida example gives
us one context in which to analyze this, but in other states where both
principles are in play, what results would we see if we applied these
opposing legal frameworks to the same environmental problem? How
much will boil down to the level of economic activity that each approach
will allow, and how will the answer differ across jurisdictions? How
much will the answers change depending on the different axes along
which the two approaches deviate?
In looking to the future, there are also compelling questions about
how the public trust and rights of nature regimes will interact. Hawaii
provides an example where the state’s strong public trust doctrine is at
least partly informed by Native Hawaiian legal principles, which share
some of the rights of nature values that are common to wider Polynesian
cultures, including the New Zealand Māori people who have led on
rights of nature initiatives. This will be a good place to look for how
these doctrines coexist and work together, and for the interplay between
subsistence and environmental justice values in both traditions. Florida
provides an example of a state with an environmentally weak public
trust doctrine in which the rights of nature movement has arisen to fill
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gaps left open by the inability of the public trust doctrine to protect
environmental values of surface waters, and groundwater altogether.
Yet Pennsylvania provides an example of a state with an
environmentally strong public trust doctrine, where rights of nature
initiatives have also emerged to fill gaps.
In the end, the public trust doctrine is oriented toward
anthropocentric injuries, but it has been in legal operation for hundreds
of years, if not more, and it has been steadily evolving to address
ecological concerns in many jurisdictions. In theory, rights of nature
initiatives may provide even more robust ecological protections, but at
least domestically, they largely remain inchoate, untested (and, at least
at the moment, illegal in states like Florida). At this early stage of
development for the rights of nature, it is hard to assess which is the
better approach. The answer probably hinges on deep philosophical
questions about one’s underlying goals or pragmatic factors like path
dependence within the larger context of an existing legal system.
Ultimately, rather than choosing between the two, environmental
advocates may appreciate that the doctrines offer different but
complimentary layers of protection. The public trust may remain a
primary tool for protecting traditional values associated with
navigability and public enjoyment, but where the public trust doctrine
fails to address groundwater withdrawals or ecological concerns, rights
of nature principles can be invoked to protect an aquifer, or a habitat,
or biodiversity. It is possible that, in the end, the doctrines may offer
complimentary protections that are simply aimed at different goals,
with the public trust doctrine protecting water resources for human
needs and the rights of nature protecting water resources for their
inherent ecological value.
At this moment in time, with both doctrines actively evolving, it is
hard to predict the answers to all these questions, though it will be
fascinating to witness them play out. While that happens, we can all
hope that those shepherding the path of this unfolding law will find
effective and principled means for protecting elements of the natural
world thus far still vulnerable under existing environmental law.
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